キケロ『アカデミカ第二巻』(ルクルス)(対訳版、和訳は第一稿)


本ページのラテン語テキストはReid の校訂(ギリシア語の単語がローマ字に置き換えられている)になるものを

Loeb叢書のRackhamの校訂に一部合わせて研究社羅和辞典で引きやすくしたものである。

和訳は最終稿ではなく試行錯誤のあとを残している。英訳はRackhamのものである。

英訳中の(a),(b),(c)はRackham版の注の番号である。校訂本(ネットにあり)を参照されたい。

キケロ(前106~43)作『アカデミカ第二巻』(ルクルス)(前45年作)

I

1. Magnum ingenium(才能) Luci Luculli magnumque optimarum artium(学問)studium, tum omnis liberalis(教養の) et digna homine nobili ab eo percepta(身につけた) doctrina(学識), quibus temporibus florere in foro maxime potuit caruit omnino rebus urbanis(ローマの). Ut enim admodum(とても) adolescens cum fratre pari pietate et industria praedito(持っている) paternas inimicitias magna cum gloria est persecutus, in Asiam quaestor profectus, ibi permultos annos admirabili quadam laude provinciae praefuit; deinde absens(ローマにいない) factus(任命された) aedilis, continuo(つづいて) praetor (licebat enim celerius legis praemio(恩恵)), post in Africam, inde ad consulatum, quem ita gessit ut diligentiam admirarentur omnes, ingenium cognoscerent. Post ad Mithridaticum bellum missus a senatu non modo opinionem(予想) vicit omnium quae de virtute ejus erat sed etiam gloriam superiorum(前任者たち).

I1 ルキウス・ルクルス(前118~56)は豊かな才能の持ち主であり、学問への熱意も高く、高貴な生まれに相応しい学識を備えた人だったが、まさに政治の世界で花開くことができる時に、ローマの政界とは縁がなかった。というのも、まだ若いころ親孝行と献身を共有する弟と一緒に見事に父親のかたきを討った後、財務官になって小アジアへ旅立ち、長年の間立派にこの属州を統治したからである。次にローマに帰らずして造営官に選ばれ、さらに(特別な法の優遇措置によって若くして)法務官に選ばれた。次にアフリカに行き、その後、執政官になった。彼はこの職務の遂行ぶりによって、誰もがその真面目さ賞賛し、その能力を認めたのである。ついで、元老院によりミトリダテス戦争に派遣され、その勇敢さについて大方の予想を打ち破っただけでなく、前任者の栄誉も優ったのである。 

1 The great talents of Lucius Lucullus and his great devotion to the best sciences, with all his acquisitions in that liberal learning which becomes a person of high station, were entirely cut off from public life at Rome in the period when he might have won the greatest distinction at the bar. For when as quite a youth, in co-operation with a brother possessed of equal filial affection and devotion, he had carried on with great distinction the personal feuds of his father,(b) he went out as quaestor to Asia, and there for a great many years presided over the province with quite remarkable credit ; then in his absence he was elected aedile, and next praetor (since by a statutory grant (c) this was permitted before the usual time) ; later he was appointed to Africa, and then to the consulship, which he so administered as to win universal admiration for his devotion to duty and universal recognition of his ability. Later the senate commissioned him to the war with Mithridates,(d) in which he not only surpassed everybody's previous estimation of his valour but even the glory of his predecessors ;
    
2. Idque eo fuit mirabilius, quod ab eo laus(手柄) imperatoria non admodum exspectabatur qui adolescentiam in forensi opera, quaesturae(財務官の任期) diuturnum tempus Murena bellum in Ponto gerente in Asia pace consumpserat. Sed incredibilis quaedam ingeni magnitudo non desideravit(必要とする) indocilem(人から教われない) usus(経験の) disciplinam(教育). Itaque cum totum iter et navigationem consumpsisset partim in percontando(質問する) a peritis(経験者), partim in rebus gestis(歴史書) legendis, in Asiam factus imperator venit, cum esset Roma profectus rei militaris rudis(未経験な). Habuit enim divinam quandam memoriam rerum, verborum majorem Hortensius, sed quo plus in negotiis gerendis res quam verba prosunt(役に立つ), hoc(abl.それだけ) erat memoria illa praestantior; quam fuisse in Themistocle, quem facile Graeciae principem(第一人者) ponimus(みなす), singularem(並外れた) ferunt(言われている): qui quidem etiam pollicenti(申し出る) cuidam se artem ei memoriae, quae tum primum proferebatur(公開された) traditurum respondisse dicitur oblivisci se malle discere,―credo quod haerebant in memoria quaecumque audierat et viderat. Tali ingenio praeditus Lucullus adjunxerat etiam illam quam Themistocles spreverat disciplinam, itaque, ut litteris consignamus quae monumentis mandare volumus, sic ille in animo res insculptas habebat.

2 彼は指揮官としての手柄をそれほど期待されていなかっただけに、これは驚くべきことだった。というのも、彼は青春時代を法律の勉強をして過ごしていたし、ムレナが黒海で戦っている間も、ずっと小アジアで財務官として平和に暮らしていたからである。けれども、彼の驚くほど豊かな才能は経験によって得た知識を必要とはしなかった。陸路と海路の旅の間、経験者に質問したり歴史書を読んだりして、ローマを出発した時には軍事に関してずぶの素人であったルクルスは、小アシアに着く頃には立派な将軍になっていたのである。なぜなら、ルクルスは事実についての記憶力で人並み外れていたからである。言語の記憶力ではホルテンシウスに劣っていたが、実務においては言葉よりは事実の方が有力であるために、事実についての記憶力の方が立ち優っているのだ。ギリシアの第一人者と誰もが認めるテミストクレスはこの記憶力がすぐれていた。テミストクレスは、当時広まり始めていた記憶術を教えてやろうと申し出た人に、むしろ忘れる方法を教えて欲しいと言ったと伝えられている。彼は自分が見たことや聞いたことが何でも記憶の中に染み付いてしまったからだろう思われる。ルクルスはこのような能力に恵まれていたが、そこにテミストクレスが軽蔑していた学問も身につけたのである。つまり、我々が記録に残したいことを文字に書きつけるようにして、ルクルスは事実を心に刻み込んだのである。

2 and this was the more remarkable because military distinction was not particularly anticipated from one who had spent his youth in practice at the bar, and the long period of his quaestorship peacefully in Asia, while Murena was carrying on the war in Pontus.(a) But intellectual gifts that even surpassed belief had no need of the unschooled training that is given by experience.(b) Accordingly after spending the whole of his journeyby land and sea partly in cross-questioning those who were experts and partly in reading military history, he arrived in Asia a made general, although he had started from Rome a tiro in military matters. For he had a memory for facts that was positively inspired, although Hortensius had a better memory for words, but Lucullus's memory was the more valuable, inasmuch as in the conduct of business facts are of more assistance than words ; and this form of memory is recorded as having been present in a remarkable degree in Themistocles, whom we rank as easily the greatest man of Greece, and of whom the story is told that when somebody (c) offered to impart to him the memoria technica that was then first coming into vogue, he replied that he would sooner learn to forget - no doubt this was because whatever he heard or saw remained fixed in his memory. Gifted with such natural endowments, Lucullus had also added the training which Themistocles had despised, and thus he kept facts engraved on his mind just as we enshrine in writing things that we desire to record.

 3. Tantus ergo imperator in omni genere belli fuit, proeliis, oppugnationibus, navalibus pugnis, totiusque belli instrumento et apparatu, ut ille rex post Alexandrum maximus hunc a se majorem ducem cognitum quam quemquam eorum quos legisset fateretur(認める) In eodem tanta prudentia fuit in constituendis temperandisque civitatibus, tanta aequitas, ut hodie stet Asia Luculli institutis servandis et quasi vestigiis persequendis. Sed etsi magna cum utilitate rei publicae, tamen diutius quam vellem tanta vis virtutis atque ingeni peregrinata afuit ab oculis et fori et curiae. Quin etiam, cum victor a Mithridatico bello revertisset, inimicorum calumnia triennio tardius quam debuerat triumphavit. Nos enim consules introduximus paene in urbem currum clarissimi viri: cujus mihi consilium et auctoritas quid tum in maximis rebus profuisset dicerem, nisi de me ipso dicendum esset: quod hoc tempore non est necesse. Itaque privabo illum potius debito testimonio quam id cum mea laude communicem.

3 かくして、ルクルスは、あらゆる種類の戦争、即ち、戦闘、包囲戦、海戦について、またあらゆる戦争に必要な装備や準備に関して、優れた指揮官であり、アレクサンダーなき後の最大の王(=ミトリダテス)が、彼こそ今まで話に聞いて知っている中で最も優れた指揮官であると認めたほどである。それと同時に、彼にはまた国制を定めて運営する知恵と公正さも備わっており、小アシアでは今日でもルクルスの制度が守られ続け、彼の足跡が慕われているのである。けれども、彼は大いに国家に役立つ人間だったにも関わらず、彼の帰国は私の思った以上に遅れて、彼の才能は法廷でも元老院でも活躍の場が得られなかった。しかも、ミトリダテス戦争に勝利して帰国したときにも、政敵の中傷にあって凱旋式が三年も遅れたのである。この卓越した勇士の戦車をようやくローマに迎え入れたのは私が執政官だった時なのである。彼の助言と影響力がその当時の重大な局面(=カティリナ事件)にあった私にとってどれほど助けになったかをここで語れば、私自身のことを話すことになってしまう。けれども、今は自分の事を話す時ではない。これ以上話すと私の自慢話になるので、彼の武勇伝はこの辺にしておこう。

3 Consequently he was so great a commander in every class of warfare, battles, sieges, seafights, and in the entire field of military equipment and commissariat, that the greatest king (d) since the time of Alexander admitted that he had discovered Lucullus to be a greater general than any of those that he had read of. He also possessed so much wisdom and justice in the work of establishing and reforming governments that Asia today continues to observe the institutions and follow in the footsteps of Lucullus. But although greatly to the advantage of the state, nevertheless those vast powers of character and of intellect were absent abroad, out of the sight of both the lawcourts and the senate, for a longer time than I could have wished. Moreover when he returned (a) victorious from the Mithridatic War, the chicanery of his enemies postponed his triumph three years later than it ought to have taken place ; for it was I as consul who virtually led into the city the chariot of this glorious hero, of the value to me of whose advice and influence at that period in the most important affairs (b) I might speak if it did not involve speaking about myself, which at this time is not necessary ; and so I will rob him of the tribute due to him rather than combine it with my own praise.
II

4. Sed quae populari gloria decorari in Lucullo debuerunt, ea fere sunt et Graecis litteris celebrata et Latinis. Nos autem illa externa cum multis, haec interiora cum paucis ex ipso saepe cognovimus. Maiore enim studio Lucullus cum omni litterarum generi tum philosophiae deditus fuit quam qui illum ignorabant arbitrabantur, nec vero ineunte aetate solum, sed et pro quaestore aliquot annos et in ipso bello, in quo ita magna rei militaris esse occupatio solet, ut non multum imperatori sub ipsis pellibus otii relinquatur. Cum autem e philosophis ingenio scientiaque putaretur Antiochus, Philonis auditor, excellere, eum secum et quaestor habuit et post aliquot annos imperator, quique esset ea memoria quam ante dixi, ea saepe audiendo facile cognovit quae vel semel audita meminisse potuisset. Delectabatur autem mirifice lectione librorum de quibus audiebat.

II 4 とはいえ、国家的な名声を博したルクルスの功績は、ギリシア語やラテン語の文献で既に称えられている。そのような公的なことは多くの人々が知っていることであるが、次に示すようなもっと私的な側面は本人から聞かない限りあまり知られていない。ルクルスは彼を知らない人が考えるよりもずっと熱心にあらゆる文学、特に哲学に親しんでいた。それは若い頃だけではなく、財務官を辞めた後も、さらに戦争の最中、軍務に忙殺されて露営の将軍としてあまり暇がないときにも、そうだった。ところで、当時は哲学者の中ではフィロン(=新アカデメイア派、懐疑派、前154~83 ラリッサのフィロン、ラリサのピロンとも)の弟子のアンティオコス(=古アカデメイア派を再興、独断派 前125~68 アスカロンのアンティオコス)が才能も学識も優れていると思われていたので、ルクルス(~前56)は財務官のときも数年後に将軍になったときもアンティオコスをそばに置いて、彼の教説を何度も聞いてたやすく覚えてしまったのである。もちろん彼はさっき述べたような記憶力をもっていたので、一度聞いただけで覚えていたはずだが。また、ルクルスはアンティオコスから聞いた事を書いた本を読むことも大いに楽しんだ。

4 However, the things in Lucullus's career that deserved the honour of a national celebration have fairly well won their tribute of fame in both Greek and Latin records. But my knowledge of these facts about his public life I share with many persons ; the following more private details I have often learnt from himself in company with few others - for Lucullus was more ardently devoted both to letters of all sorts and to philosophy than persons who did not know him supposed, and indeed not only at an early age but also for some years during his proquaestorship, and even on active service, when military duties are usually so engrossing as to leave a commander not much leisure when actually under canvas. But as Philo's pupil Antiochus was deemed the chief among philosophers for intellect and learning, he kept him in his company both when quaestor and when a few years later he became general, and having the powerful memory that I have spoken of already he easily learnt from frequent repetition doctrines that he would have been quite capable of learning from a single hearing. Moreover, he took a marvellous delight in reading the books about which Antiochus used to discourse to him.

5. Ac vereor interdum ne talium personarum cum amplificare velim minuam etiam gloriam. Sunt enim multi qui omnino Graecas non ament litteras, plures qui philosophiam, reliqui etiam si haec non improbent, tamen earum rerum disputationem principibus civitatis non ita decoram putant. Ego autem, cum Graecas litteras M. Catonem in senectute didicisse acceperim, P. autem Africani historiae loquantur in legatione illa nobili quam ante censuram obiit(出かける) Panaetium unum omnino comitem fuisse, nec litterarum Graecarum nec philosophiae iam ullum auctorem requiro.

5 けれども、僕はこんな立派な人間の名誉を高めつもりで、かえって名誉を損なうことになるのではないかと恐れている。というのは、ギリシア文学を全く好まない人は多いし、哲学を嫌う人はもっと多いからである。別の人たちは哲学を嫌いはしないが、このような話題は国家の指導者にとって相応しくないと考えている。僕がマルクス・カトーがギリシア語を学んだのは老年になってからだと聞いたり、プブリウス・アフリカヌスが監察官になる前に有名な使節に出かけたときにパナイティオスだけを同行員にしたという話を歴史から学んだりしたとき、ギリシア文学や哲学の支援者を僕は最早必要としなくなったのである。

5 And I am sometimes afraid lest in regard to men of this character my desire to magnify their fame may actually diminish it. For there are many people who have no love for Greek literature at all, and more who have none for philosophy ; while the residue even if they do not disapprove of these studies nevertheless think that the discussion of such topics is not specially becoming for great statesmen. But for my own part, as I have been told that Marcus Cato learnt Greek literature in his old age, while history states that Publius Africanus, on the famous embassy (a) on which he went before his censorship, had Panaetius as absolutely the sole member of his staff, I need not look any further for someone to support the claims either of Greek literature or of philosophy.

 6. Restat ut iis respondeam qui sermonibus ejus modi nolint personas tam gravis illigari(関わる). Quasi vero clarorum virorum aut tacitos congressus esse oporteat aut ludicros sermones aut rerum colloquia leviorum! Etenim si quodam in libro vere est a nobis philosophia laudata, profecto ejus tractatio optimo atque amplissimo quoque dignissima est, nec quicquam aliud videndum est nobis, quos populus Romanus hoc in gradu(立場) collocavit, nisi ne quid privatis studiis de opera publica detrahamus. Quodsi cum fungi munere debebamus non modo operam nostram numquam a populari coetu removimus sed ne litteram quidem ullam fecimus nisi forensem, quis reprehendet nostrum otium, qui in eo(=otio) non modo nosmet ipsos hebescere et languere nolumus, sed etiam ut plurimis prosimus enitimur(努める)? Gloriam vero non modo non minui sed etiam augeri arbitramur eorum quorum ad popularis illustrisque laudes has etiam minus notas minusque pervolgatas adjungimus.
 
6 さらに、このような重要人物がこの種の話題に関わることをよしとしない人々にはこう答えよう。高名な人間も人の集まりで黙っているべきではないし、冗談だけを言っているべきでもないし、軽い話題に甘んじるべきでもないのだと。実際、僕がある本の中で哲学を讃えたのが間違いでなければ、哲学することは最高の人間、高名な人間にこそ相応しい事なのだ。ただ、ローマ国民によってこの地位に置かれた僕達が注意しなければならないのは、私的な勉強のせいで公けの仕事がなおざりにならないようにすることだけである。実際、僕は職務に専念しなければならなかったときに、国家の会合で手抜きすることは決してなかったばかりか、政治上のこと以外には一行たりとも書くことはなかった。だから、僕が余暇をのんきに休んで過ごそうと思わないばかりか、多くの人々の役に立とうと努めているのだから、僕達の余暇を誰に非難されることがあるだろうか。ここで僕が彼らの広く知られた輝かしい功績に、あまり知られていない功績を加えるならば、それはその人の名誉を減ずるどころか大きくすることになると思う。 

6 It remains for me to reply to the critics who are unwilling to have public characters of such dignity entangled in conversations of this nature. As if forsooth persons of distinction ought to hold their meetings in silence, or else engage in frivolous conversation or discussion on lighter topics ! In fact, if there is truth in the praise of philosophy that occupies a certain volume (b) of mine, it is obvious that its pursuit is supremely worthy of all persons of the highest character and eminence, and the only precaution that need be observed by us whom the Roman nation has placed in this rank is to prevent our private studies from encroaching at all upon our public interest. But if at the time when we had official duties to perform we not only never removed our interest from the national assembly but never even put pen to paper save on matters of public business, who will criticize our leisure, if therein we not only are reluctant to allow ourselves to grow dull and slack but also strive to be of service to the greatest number of men ? At the same time in our judgement we are not merely not diminishing but actually increasing the fame of those persons (a) to whose public and distinguished glories we also append these less known and less well advertised claims to distinction.


7. Sunt etiam qui negent in iis qui in nostris libris disputent fuisse earum rerum de quibus disputatur scientiam: qui mihi videntur non solum vivis sed etiam mortuis invidere.

III 

Restat unum genus reprehensorum quibus Academiae ratio non probatur. Quod gravius ferremus, si quisquam ullam disciplinam philosophiae probaret praeter eam quam ipse sequeretur. Nos autem, quoniam contra omnis dicere quae videntur solemus, non possumus quin alii a nobis dissentiant recusare: quamquam nostra quidem causa facilis est, qui verum invenire sine ulla contentione volumus idque summa cura studioque conquirimus. Etsi enim omnis cognitio multis est obstructa difficultatibus, eaque(しかもそのうえ) est et in ipsis rebus obscuritas et in judiciis nostris infirmitas ut non sine causa(無理はない) antiquissimi et doctissimi invenire se posse quod cuperent diffisi(自信がない) sint, tamen nec illi defecerunt neque nos studium exquirendi defetigati relinquemus; neque nostrae disputationes quicquam aliud agunt nisi ut in utramque partem dicendo eliciant et tamquam exprimant aliquid quod aut verum sit aut ad id(=verum) quam proxime accedat(近い).


7 僕の著作の中で議論をしている人々は実際には、そこで論じているようなことについて知ってはいなかったと言う人たちもいる。そんな人たちは、生きている人だけでなく死んだ人にも嫉妬しているのである。

III. 僕達を批判する人々にもう一種類いる。それはアカデメイア派(=懐疑派)の理論を認めない人たちである。もし誰かが自分の従っている学派の哲学しか認めないとすれば、これほど困ったことはない。けれども、我々のやり方は他人の意見に反論することであるから、他人が我々と意見を異にしても拒否できないのである。もっとも、僕達の主張は簡単である。それは人と争うことなく真理を発見したいのであり、真理だけを熱心に追い求めているのだ。というのは、認識はあらゆる障害によって妨げられているし、事柄そのものの曖眛さと我々の判断の脆弱さのために昔の哲人たちも自分の望む物を発見出来る自信がなかったほどであるが、かといって、彼らも諦めはしなかったし、僕達も疲れて探求の努力をやめることはない。僕達の議論の目的も、肯定否定の二通りに議論して、真実か真実に一番近いことに光を当てて明るみに引き出す事にほかならない。

7 There are also people who declare that the personages who debate in our books did not really possess a knowledge of the subjects debated ; but these critics to my eye appear to be jealous of the dead as well as of the living. III. There remains one class of adverse critics who do not approve the Academic system of philosophy. This would trouble us more if anybody approved any set of doctrines except the one of which he himself was a follower. But for our part, since it is our habit to put forward our views in conflict with all schools, we cannot refuse to allow others to differ from us ; although we at all events have an easy brief to argue, who desire to discover the truth without any contention,(b) and who pursue it with the fullest diligence and devotion. For even though many difficulties hinder every branch of knowledge, and both the subjects themselves and our faculties of judgement involve such a lack of certainty that the most ancient and learned thinkers had good reason for distrusting their ability to discover what they desired, nevertheless they did not give up, nor yet will we abandon in exhaustion our zeal for research ; and the sole object of our discussions is by arguing on both sides to draw out and give shape to (a) some result that may be either true or the nearest possible approximation to the truth.

    
8. Neque inter nos et eos qui se scire arbitrantur quicquam interest nisi quod illi non dubitant quin ea vera sint quae defendunt, nos probabilia(真実らしい) multa habemus, quae sequi facile, affirmare vix possumus; hoc autem liberiores et solutiores sumus quod integra nobis est judicandi potestas nec ut omnia quae praescripta et quasi imperata sint defendamus necessitate ulla cogimur. Nam ceteri primum ante tenentur astricti quam quid esset optimum judicare potuerunt, deinde infirmissimo tempore aetatis aut obsecuti amico cuidam aut una alicujus quem primum audierunt oratione capti de rebus incognitis judicant et, ad quamcumque sunt disciplinam quasi tempestate delati, ad eam tamquam ad saxum adhaerescunt.

8 自分に知識があると考えている人たちと僕達との違いは、彼らが自分たちの擁護している学説が真実であることを疑っていないのに対して、僕達は多くの学説を真実らしいと思うし、それらに従うのは容易だがそれらが真実だと言うことは出来ないと考えている。僕達は健全な判断力を保っているので、僕達の方が自由で柔軟性があり、学説を命令された事のように何もかも擁護するよう強制されることはない。それに対して、ほかの学派の人たちは、第一に、どの学説が最善であるか判断できるようになる前に縛られているし、次に、まだごく若い頃に友人の誰かに追随したり、初めて耳にした誰かのたった一度の演説に捉えられて、よく知らない学説について判断して、まるで嵐に吹き飛ばされたようにしてたまたま辿り着いた学説に、岩にしがみつくように固執しているのである。

8 Nor is there any difference between ourselves and those who think that they have positive knowledge except that they have no doubt that their tenets are true, whereas we hold many doctrines as probable, which we can easily act upon but can scarcely advance as certain ; yet we are more free and untrammelled in that we possess our power of judgement uncurtailed, and are bound by no compulsion to support all the dogmas laid down for us almost as edicts by certain masters. For all other people in the first place are held in close bondage placed upon them before they were able to judge what doctrine was the best, and secondly they form judgements about matters as to which they know nothing at the most incompetent period of life, either under the guidance of some friend or under the influence of a single harangue from the first lecturer that they attended, and cling as to a rock to whatever theory they are carried to by stress of weather.


9. Nam quod dicunt omnino se credere ei quem judicent fuisse sapientem, probarem si id ipsum rudes et indocti judicare potuissent(statuere enim qui sit sapiens vel maxime videtur esse sapientis); sed, ut potuerint, potuerunt omnibus rebus auditis, cognitis etiam reliquorum sententiis, judicaverunt autem re semel audita atque ad unius se auctoritatem contulerunt. Sed nescio quo modo plerique errare malunt eamque sententiam quam adamaverunt pugnacissime defendere quam sine pertinacia quid constantissime dicatur exquirere.

Quibus de rebus et alias(他の時)saepe multa quaesita et disputata sunt et quondam(特定の時) in Hortensii villa quae est ad Baulos, cum eo Catulus et Lucullus nosque ipsi postridie venissemus quam apud Catulum fuissemus. Quo quidem etiam maturius venimus quod erat constitutum, si ventus esset, Lucullo in Neapolitanum, mihi in Pompeianum navigare. Cum igitur pauca in xysto locuti essemus, tum eodem in spatio consedimus.

9 というのは、彼らは自分たちが賢者であると判断した人を全面的に信じていると言うのだが、もしそんな判断が無学で粗野な人にも出来るのなら、私は彼らの主張を認めてもよいと思う(なぜなら誰が賢者であるかを決定することは、まさに賢者にしか出来ないことであると思われるのだ)。しかしながら、仮りに彼らにそのような判断が出来るとしても、それはあらゆることを学び、ほかの学派の考え方を知った上で出来ることである。ところが、彼らはたった一度話を聞いただけで判断して、たった一人の権威に身を委ねたのである。ところが、どういうわけか大多数の人は、執着を捨てて理路整然と解かれる説を探求するのではなく、間違った説を選んでは、自分が惚れ込んだ説を喧嘩腰になって擁護するのである。

こうした問題についてはいつも熱心に研究したり話しあったりしているが、カトゥルスの所に滞在した翌日に、バウリにあるホルテンシウスの別荘に、カトゥルスとルクルスと僕達が集まったときもその話しになった。僕達はいつもより早い時間に集まった。ルクルスはナポリへ、僕はポンペイへ、風がよければ出帆する予定だったからである。回廊で少し立ち話をしたあとで、僕達はそこに腰を下ろした。

9 For as to their assertion that the teacher whom they judge to have been a wise man commands their absolute trust, I would agree to this if to make that judgement could actually have lain within the power of unlearned novices (for to decide who is a wise man seems to be a task that specially requires a wise man to undertake it) ; but granting that it lay within their power, it was only possible for them after hearing all the facts and ascertaining the views of all the other schools as well, whereas they gave their verdict after a single hearing of the case, and enrolled themselves under the authority of a single master. But somehow or other most men prefer to go wrong, and to defend tooth and nail the system for which they have come to feel an affection, rather than to lay aside obstinacy and seek for the doctrine that is most consistent.

Beside many other occasions on which we have engaged in long investigations and discussions of these subjects, there was one at Hortensius's countryhouse at Bauli, Catulus, Lucullus and we ourselves having come there on the day after we had been at Catulus's. We had in fact arrived there rather early because Lucullus had the intention of sailing to his place at Naples and I to mine at Pompei, if there was a wind. So after a little talk in the colonnade, we then sat down on a seat in the same walk.(a)

IV.

10. Hic Catulus,"Etsi heri," inquit,"id quod quaerebatur paene explicatum est, ut tota fere quaestio tractata videatur, tamen exspecto ea quae te pollicitus es, Luculle, ab Antiocho audita dicturum." "Equidem," inquit Hortensius,"feci plus quam vellem: totam enim rem Lucullo integram servatam oportuit. Et tamen fortasse servata est: a me enim ea quae in promptu erant dicta sunt, a Lucullo autem reconditiora(<reconditus 比較n.pl目的) desidero." Tum ille,"Non sane," inquit,"Hortensi,conturbat me exspectatio tua, etsi nihil est iis qui placere volunt tam adversarium, sed quia non laboro quam valde ea quae dico probaturus(証明する) sim, eo minus conturbor; dicam enim nec mea nec ea in quibus, si non fuerint(間違っている), non vinci me malim quam vincere. Sed mehercule, ut quidem nunc se causa(=situation) habet, etsi hesterno sermone labefactata est, mihi tamen videtur esse verissima. Agam igitur, sicut Antiochus agebat (nota enim mihi res est. Nam et vacuo animo illum audiebam et magno studio, eadem de re etiam saepius), ut etiam majorem exspectationem mei faciam quam modo fecit Hortensius."

I∨ 10 そこでカトゥルスが言った、「昨日私たちの問題点は殆ど解明されてしまったので、もう問題の全体が論じ尽くされたと思われるほどだ。でもルクルスさん、あなたはアンティオコスから聞いたことを話してくれると約束したんだから、それを果たしてくれるのを私は期待していますよ」。「その通りだ」とホルテンシウスが言った、「私はちょっとやりすぎてしまいましたね。話をまるごと全部ルクルスさんのために残しておくべきでしたね。いや多分まだ残っていますよ。というのは、私はごく簡単なことだけを言いましたからね。ルクルスさんからもっと深遠なお話が聴けると思います」。するとルクルスが答えた、「ホルテンシウス、私は君にそんな風に期待されても平気だよ。人に褒められたいと思う人なら、そういう風に言われるのは大いにプレッシャーだろうがねえ。私は君たちに自分の学説を強く薦めようとは思っていないから平気なんだよ。というのは、私がここで言おうとしている学説は私自身のものじゃないし、仮にこの学説が間違っていても私は勝ち負けはどうでもいいんだ。しかし、私の学派の理論は昨日の議論でかなり揺らいでいるとはいえ、現状ではこの理論が一番正しいと思っている。だから、私はアンティオコスと同じやり方で論じようと思っている。(というのは彼の理論をよく知っているし、僕は彼の講義を全く先入観を持たずに非常に熱心に、しかも同じテーマについて何度も聞いている)だから、君たちは、さっきホルテンシウスが言った以上に、僕の話に期待してもらってもいいのだ」。

10 Here Catulus said, " It is true that our inquiry of yesterday was almost fully cleared up, so that nearly the whole of the subject now appears to have been handled ; but nevertheless I am waiting with interest for you, Lucullus, to fulfil your promise of telling us the doctrines that you heard from Antiochus." " For my part," said Hortensius, " I could wish that I had not gone so far, for the whole subject ought to have been reserved in its entirety for Lucullus. And yet perhaps it has been reserved, for it was the more obvious points that were expounded by me, whereas I look to Lucullus to give us the more abstruse doctrines." " Your expectancy, Hortensius," rejoined Lucullus, " does not, it is true, upset me, although there is nothing that so much handicaps people desirous of winning approval, but I am less upset bccause I do not mind how far I am successful in gaining assent for the views that I expound ; for the doctrines that I am going to state are not my own, nor are they ones about which, if they are unsound, I should not wish rather to be refuted than to carry the day. But I protest that even though my case was shaken by yesterday's discussion, it nevertheless appears to me to be profoundly true - at least as it stands at present. I will therefore adopt what used to be the procedure of Antiochus (for I am familiar with the subject, since I used to hear him with undistracted attention and with great interest, even more than once on the same topic), so as to cause even more to be expected of me than Hortensius did just now."

11. Cum ita esset exorsus, ad audiendum animos ereximus; at ille "Cum Alexandriae proquaestore," inquit," essem, fuit Antiochus mecum et erat iam antea Alexandriae familiaris Antiochi Heraclitus Tyrius, qui et Clitomachum multos annos et Philonem audierat, homo sane in ista philosophia, quae nunc prope dimissa revocatur, probatus et nobilis: cum quo Antiochum saepe disputantem audiebam, sed utrumque leniter. Et quidem isti libri duo Philonis, de quibus heri dictum a Catulo est, tum erant adlati Alexandriam tumque primum in Antiochi manus venerant: et homo natura lenissimus (nihil enim poterat fieri illo mitius) stomachari tamen coepit. Mirabar, nec enim umquam ante videram; at ille Heracliti memoriam implorans quaerere ex eo viderenturne illa Philonis aut ea num vel e Philone vel ex ullo Academico audivisset aliquando? Negabat; Philonis tamen scriptum agnoscebat,nec id quidem dubitari poterat, nam aderant mei familiares, docti homines, P. et C. Selii et Tetrilius Rogus, qui se illa audivisse Romae de Philone et ab eo ipso illos duos libros dicerent descripsisse.

11 ルクルスがこのように話し始めたので、僕達は彼の話に注意を向けた。さて、彼は次のように言った。「私が前財務官としてアレクサンドリアにいた時にアンティオコスは私と一緒だった。私が行く前にすでに彼の友人のティルスのヘラクレイトスがアレクサンドリアに来ていた。ヘラクレイトスはクレイトマコス(前187~109、カルネアデスの弟子、フィロンの師匠)とフィロンの長年の弟子で、その学派ではよく知られた人だった。この学派(=アカデメイア派)はほぼ廃れたが今(=前1世紀)また復活している。私はアンティオコスがヘラクレイトスと議論をしているのをよく聞いたものだ。二人とも話し方は穏やかだった。丁度そのころ、昨日カトゥルス君が言及したフィロンの二冊の本がアレクサンドリアにもたらされて、初めてアンティオコスの手に入った。すると、普段はおとなしいアンティオコス(実際彼ほど平和的な人は中々いないものだ)が怒り始めたのだ。私は驚いた。そんなアンティオコスをそれまで見たことがなかった。彼はヘラクレイトスに覚えがあるかどうか聞いた。つまり、これが本当にフィロンの学説だと思うかとか、この学説をフィロン自身か誰かアカデメイア派の人から聞いたことがあるかと、ヘラクレイトスに質問した。するとヘラクレイトスは聞いたことがないと言ったが、フィロンが書いた物であることは認めた。それは疑いようがなかった。というのは、学のある私の友人プブリウス・セリウスとガイウス・セリウスとテトリリウス・ロゴスがその場にいて、自分たちもローマでフィロンからこの学説を聞いたことがあって、この二冊の本を彼から借りて写させてもらったと言ったからだ。

11  On his beginning in this strain we aroused our attention to listen to him ; whereupon he proceeded : " When I was deputy-quaestor at Alexandria,'(a) Antiochus was in my company, and Antiochus's friend, the Tyrian Herachtus, was at Alexandria already ; he had been for many years a pupil of both Clitomachus and Philo, and was undoubtedly a person of standing and distinction in the school of philosophy in question, which after having been almost abandoned is now being revived (b) ; I often used to hear Antiochus arguing with Heraclitus, both however in a gentle manner. And indeed those two volumes of Philo mentioned yesterday by Catulus had then reached Alexandria and had then for the first time come into Antiochus's hands ; whereupon though by nature one of the gentlest of people (in fact nothing could have been kinder than he was) he nevertheless began to lose his temper. This surprised me, as I had never seen him do so before ; but he kept appealing to Heraclitus's recollection and asking him whether he really thought that those doctrines were Philo's, or whether he had ever heard them either from Philo or from any member of the Academy.(a) Heraclitus always answered No ; but still he recognized it as a work of Philo's, and indeed this could not be doubted, for my learned friends Publius and Gaius Selius and Tetrilius Rogus (b) were there to say that they had heard these doctrines from Philo at Rome and had copied down the two books in question from Philo's own manuscript.

12. Tum et illa dixit Antiochus quae heri Catulus commemoravit a patre suo dicta Philoni, et alia plura, nec se tenuit quin contra suum doctorem librum etiam ederet, qui Sosus inscribitur. Tum igitur et cum Heraclitum studiose audirem contra Antiochum disserentem et item Antiochum contra Academicos, dedi Antiocho operam(=注目する) diligentius, ut causam ex eo totam cognoscerem. Itaque compluris dies adhibito Heraclito doctisque compluribus et in iis Antiochi fratre, Aristo, et praeterea Aristone et Dione, quibus ille secundum fratrem plurimum tribuebat, multum temporis in ista una disputatione consumpsimus. Sed ea pars quae contra Philonem erat praetermittenda est, minus enim acer est adversarius is qui ista quae sunt heri defensa negat Academicos omnino dicere. Etsi enim mentitur, tamen est adversarius lenior. Ad Arcesilam Carneademque veniamus."

12 そこでアンティオコス(=ストア派、独断派に傾倒している)が例の、カトゥルス君のお父さまがフィロン(=懐疑派)について言った話として昨日紹介された話(=後出)をしたのである。それどころかアンティオコスは彼の師匠であるフィロンを反駁する『ソーサス(=ストア派の哲学者の名前)』という本を出すに至ったのだ。それから、私はヘラクレイトスがアンティオコスに反論するのも、アンティオコスがアカデメイア派(=新アカデメイア派、懐疑派)を批判するのも熱心に聞いたが、その間、アンティオコスの言う事に大いに注目して、彼の口からその理論の全体を学んだのである。そうやって、私たちは何日もの間ヘラクレイトスと数名の学者たち(その中にはアンティオコスの弟アリストス、アリストスの次に才能があるとアンティオコスに思われているアリストンとディオン)を集めて、このただ一つの問題(=懐疑派批判)の討論に多大な時間を捧げたのだ。しかしながら、フィロンへの反論の部分は省略したほうがいいだろう。なぜなら、フィロンは、カトゥルス君が昨日擁護したような理論(=ストア派寄りの独断的な理論)をアカデメイア派は言っていないと言うのだが、フィロンはそれほど強力な論敵ではないからである。というのは、フィロン(前154~83)は嘘を言っているものの、論敵としてはそれほど手強くない。だからアルケシラオス(前316~240、アカデメイア派学頭、懐疑派)とカルネアデス(=アカデメイア派学頭、懐疑派、前214~129)の話をしよう」。

12 Then Antiochus put forward the views that yesterday Catulus told us (c) had been put forward in regard to Philo by his father, and also a number of others, and did not restrain himself even from publishing a book against his own teacher,(d) the book to which is given (e) the title of Sosus. On this occasion therefore when I heard both Heraclitus earnestly arguing against Antiochus and also Antiochus against the Academics, I gave my attention more closely to Antiochus, in order to learn from him his whole case. Accordingly when we had for quite a number of days had Heraclitus with us and quite a number of other learned men, among them Antiochus's brother Aristus,(f) and also Aristo and Dio, to whom he used to assign the greatest authority next to his brother, we spent a great deal of time in this single discussion. But we must pass over the part of it that was directed against Philo, for he is a less keen opponent who declares that those doctrines maintained yesterday (g) are not the doctrines of the Academy at all ; for though what he says is not true, he is a milder adversary. Let us come to Arcesilas and Carneades."

V 

13. Quae cum dixisset, sic rursus exorsus est: " Primum mihi videmini"―me autem [nomine] appellabat,―"cum veteres physicos nominatis, facere idem quod seditiosi cives solent cum aliquos ex antiquis claros viros proferunt quos dicant fuisse popularis ut eorum ipsi similes esse videantur. Repetunt ii a P. Valerio qui exactis regibus primo anno consul fuit, commemorant reliquos qui leges popularis de provocationibus tulerint cum consules essent; tum ad hos notiores, C. Flaminium qui legem agrariam aliquot annis ante secundum Punicum bellum tribunus plebis tulerit invito senatu et postea bis consul factus sit, L. Cassium, Q. Pompeium; illi quidem etiam P. Africanum referre in eundem numerum solent. Duos vero sapientissimos et clarissimos fratres P. Crassum et P. Scaevolam aiunt Ti. Graccho auctores legum fuisse, alterum quidem (ut videmus) palam, alterum (ut suspicantur) obscurius. Addunt etiam C. Marium, et de hoc quidem nihil mentiuntur. Horum nominibus tot virorum atque tantorum expositis eorum se institutum sequi dicunt.

∨ 13  こう言うとルクルスは再び話し始めた、「そもそも君たちが―これは僕のことを指していた―昔の自然哲学者の名前を挙げるときには、世の中を混乱させようとする一部の市民(=シーザーも含む)が昔の偉人の名前を持ちだしてくるのと同じ事をしていると思う。自分たちを彼らに擬するために彼らを民衆派だったと言うのだ。王が追放されて後の最初の執政官だったプブリウス・ウァレリウス(~前530)の名前をいつも出してくる。さらに執政官のときに上訴を認める法律を作った人たちや、もっと有名な人たち、第二ポエニ戦争の数年前に護民官として元老院の反対のなか農地法をり、あとで二度執政官になったガイウス・フラミニウス(~217、ハンニバルとの戦いで戦死)に言及し、さらにルキウス・カッシウス、クィントゥス・ポンペイウス(前141年の執政官)に行く。また彼らはプブリウス・アフリカヌスをその中に含めるのが普通である。一方、二人の特に賢くて有名なプブリウス・クラッスス(前180~130、最高神祇官)とプブリウス・スカエウォラ(~前115)兄弟はティベリウス・グラックス(前163~133)を助けて法律を書いたと言っている(一方は我々が知るように公然と、他方は推測されているように隠れてであるが)。またガイウス・マリウスも民衆派に数える。これも嘘ではない。このような多くの有名人の名前を並べて、彼らは自分たちがこの人たちの意志を引き継いでいると言うのである。

13 When he had said this he started again as follows : " In the first place I feel that you gentlemen" - it was to me that he was actually speaking, - " when you cite the names of the old natural philosophers, are doing just what citizens raising a sedition usually do, when they quote some famous personages of antiquity as having been of the people's party, so as to make themselves appear to resemble them. For they go back to Publius Valerius who was consul in the first year after the expulsion of  the kings, and they quote all the other persons who when consuls carried popular legislation about processes of appeal ; then they come to the better known cases of Gaius Flaminius, who when tribune of the plebs some years before the second Punic War carried an agrarian law against the will of the senate and afterwards twice became consul, and of Lucius Cassius and Quintus Pompeius ; indeed these people have a way of including even Publius Africanus in the same list. But they say that the two very wise and distinguished brothers Publius Crassus and Pubhus Scaevola were supporters of the laws of Tiberius Gracchus, the former (as we read) openly, the latter  (as they suspect) more covertly. They also add Gaius Marius, and about him at all events they say nothing that is untrue. After parading all this list of names of men of such distinction they declare that they themselves are following the principle set up by them.

14. Similiter vos, cum perturbare ut illi rem publicam sic vos philosophiam bene iam constitutam velitis, Empedoclem, Anaxagoram, Democritum, Parmenidem, Xenophanem, Platonem etiam et Socratem profertis. Sed neque Saturninus, ut nostrum inimicum potissimum nominem, simile quicquam habuit veterum illorum nec Arcesilae calumnia conferenda est cum Democriti verecundia. Et tamen isti physici raro admodum, cum haerent aliquo loco, exclamant quasi mente incitati―Empedocles quidem ut interdum mihi furere videatur―abstrusa esse omnia, nihil nos sentire, nihil cernere, nihil omnino quale sit posse reperire: majorem autem partem (=Acc.absol)mihi quidem omnes isti videntur nimis etiam quaedam affirmare plusque profiteri se scire quam sciant.

14 それと同じように君たち(=懐疑派)は、彼らが国家を混乱させようとするように、既に確立している哲学の世界をかき乱そうとして、エンペドクレス、アナクサゴラス、デモクリトス、パルメニデス、クセノファネス、プラトン、さらにソクラテスまでも持ち出してくるのだ。けれども、わが家の最強の政敵でもあるサトゥルニヌス(=マリウス派、~前100)は、昔の政治家たちと似たところは何もないし、アルケシラオスの恥知らずな詭弁はデモクリトスの謙虚な理論とは似ても似つかぬものなのである。しかし、君達のいう自然哲学者たちは、何かで行き詰まることがあってもーエンペドクレスは時々かなり狂気に陥るようだがー興奮して「全ては隠されている、我々は何も感じることは出来ない、何も識別出来ない、何がどのようであるかを見出すことは出来ない」と叫びだすことはまずない。それどころか、多くの場合、君達のいう自然哲学者たちは皆、あまりにも多くのことを肯定し、実際以上のことを知っていると主張しているように思われる。

14 Similarly your school, whenever you want to upset an already well-established system of philosophy just as they did a political system, quote Empedocles, Anaxagoras, Democritus, Parmenides, Xenophanes, and even Plato and Socrates. But neither had Saturninus - to cite in particular the name of the enemy of my family - any feature resembling those men of old, nor can the chicanery of Arcesilas be compared with the modesty of Democritus." And nevertheless your natural philosophers do rather rarely, when brought to a standstill at some topic, cry out in an excited sort of manner - Empedocles indeed in a way that sometimes makes me think him raving - saying that all things are hidden and that we perceive nothing, discern nothing, are utterly unable to discover the real nature of anything ; although for the most part all your school seem to me at all events to be only too confident in some of their assertions and to profess to know more than they really do.

15. Quodsi illi tum in novis rebus quasi modo nascentes haesitaverunt, nihilne tot saeculis, summis ingeniis, maximis studiis explicatum putamus? nonne cum iam philosophorum disciplinae gravissimae constitissent, tum exortus est ut in optima re publica Ti. Gracchus qui otium perturbaret, sic Arcesilas qui constitutam philosophiam everteret, et in eorum auctoritate delitisceret qui negavissent quicquam sciri aut percipi posse? Quorum e numero tollendus est et Plato et Socrates: alter quia reliquit perfectissimam disciplinam, Peripateticos et Academicos, nominibus differentis, re congruentis, a quibus Stoici ipsi verbis magis quam sententiis dissenserunt. Socrates autem de se ipse detrahens in disputatione plus tribuebat iis quos volebat refellere; ita cum aliud diceret atque sentiret, libenter uti(<utor) solitus est ea dissimulatione quam Graeci ειρονειαν[Greek: eironeian] vocant: quam ait etiam in Africano fuisse Fannius, idque propterea vitiosum in illo non putandum quod idem fuerit in Socrate.

15 また、たとえ彼らが生まれたばかりの人間のように当時の新しい問題に行き詰まったとしても、これまでの長い年月の間に、最高の知性による優れた研究によって何も明らかにされなかったと我々は思うのだろうか?平和をかき乱すティベリウス・グラックスがどこよりも立派な国に現れたように、哲学の秩序をくつがえすアルケシラオスは、哲学者たちの立派な教義が定着した頃になって現れたのではないだろうか。そして、彼はかつて「何も知ることは出来ないし知覚することも出来ない」と言った哲学者たちの権威を自分の後ろ盾にしたのではないだろうか。しかし、この哲学者のなかにプラトンとソクラテスを含めるべきではない。プラトンは完璧な教えを残し、ペリパトス派(=独断派)とアカデメイア派(=古アカデメイア派=独断派)を残した人である。この二つの学派は名前は異なるが中身は同じであり、さらに、これらはストア派(=独断派)とは言葉使いが違うだけで、考え方は同じである。一方、ソクラテスは、議論の中で自分は退いた立場をとり、むしろ自分が反駁しようとする相手を目立たせようとした。このように、ソクラテスは考えている事とは異なることを口にして、ギリシア人がアイロニーと呼ぶ「知らないふり」を好んで用いたのである。ファンニウス(前122年の執政官)の話では、このやり方はアフリカヌス(=スキピオ)も使ったやり方で、ソクラテスがやったのと同じだから、卑怯なやり方と見なすべきではないと言っている。

15 But if those old thinkers found themselves floundering like babies just born in a new world, do we imagine that all these generations and these consummate intellects and elaborate investigations have not succeeded in making anything clearer ? Is it not the case that, just as in the noblest of states Tiberius Gracchus arose to disturb the atmosphere of peace, so when the most authoritative schools of philosophy had now come to a standstill, then there arose Arcesilas to overthrow the established philosophy, and to lurk behind the authority of those whom he asserted to have denied the possibility of all knowledge and perception ? From the list of these we must remove both Plato and Socrates - the former because he left behind him a most consummate system of thought, the Peripatetic School and the Academy, which have different names but agree in substance, and from which the Stoics themselves disagreed more in terms than in opinions. As for Socrates, he used to depreciate himself in discussion and to assign greater weight to those whom he wished to refute ; thus, as he said something other than what he thought, he was fond of regularly employing the practice of dissembling that the Greeks call irony, which Fannius says was also a feature of Africanus, and one not to be deemed a fault in him, for the reason that Socrates had the same habit.

VI 

16. Sed fuerint illa vetera, si voltis, incognita; nihilne est igitur actum quod investigata sunt postea quam Arcesilas Zenoni (ut putatur) obtrectans nihil novi reperienti sed emendanti superiores immutatione verborum, dum huius definitiones labefactare volt, conatus est clarissimis rebus tenebras obducere? Cuius primo non admodum probata ratio, quamquam floruit cum acumine ingeni tum admirabili quodam lepore dicendi, proxime a Lacyde solo retenta est, post autem confecta a Carneade, qui est quartus ab Arcesila, audivit enim Hegesinum qui Euandrum audierat Lacydi discipulum, cum Arcesilae Lacydes fuisset. Sed ipse Carneades diu tenuit, nam nonaginta vixit annos, et qui(=those who) illum audierant, admodum floruerunt, e quibus industriae plurimum in Clitomacho fuit (declarat multitudo librorum), ingeni non minus in Hagnone, in Charmada eloquentiae, in Melanthio Rhodio suavitatis. Bene autem nosse Carneadem Stratoniceus Metrodorus putabatur.

∨I 16 しかし、君たちが望むなら、昔は懐疑論はまだ知られていなかったことにしてもよい。しかし、アルケシラオスが、ゼノンは何も新しいことは発見せず、先人たちの考えを言葉の上だけで修正しただけだと(普通考えられているように)批判して、ゼノンの定義を無効にしようと、明々白々な事実を懐疑の闇で覆い隠そうとしてから以降、この問題が探求されたことによって何も達成されていないと言うのだろうか。アルケシラオスは鋭い頭脳と巧みな弁舌で有名になった人ではあるが、彼の理論は当初それほど認められることはなく、後にラキュデスだけが引き継ぎ、その後、アルケシラオスから四代目にあたるカルネアデスが完成することになる。というのは、カルネアデスはヘゲシヌスに学び、ヘゲシヌスはエウァンドルスに学び、エウァンドルスはラキュデスの弟子であり、ラキュデスはアルケシラオスの弟子だからである。ところで、カルネアデスは九十年も生きたために長く学頭を努めたので、彼の弟子もすでに有名となっている。そのなかで最も研究熱心だったのはクレイトマコスだった(著作の多さがそのことを示している)。また能力にかけてはアエスキネス(=ハグノンの)も引けをとらず、カルマデスは雄弁で、ロドスのメランティウスは弁舌の巧さですぐれていた。ストラトニケア(カリア)のメトロドロスはカルネアデスのことをよく知っていると思われていた。

16 " But let us grant if you wish that those ancient doctrines represented no real knowledge ; has nothing then been achieved by their having been under examination ever since the time when Arcesilas, criticizing Zeno (so it is supposed) as making no new discoveries but only correcting his predecessors by verbal alterations, in his desire to undermine Zeno's definitions attempted to cover with darkness matters that were exceedingly clear ? His system was at first not very much accepted, although he was distinguished both by acuteness of intellect and by a certain admirable charm of style, and at the first stage it was preserved by Lacydes only, but afterwards it was completed by Carneades, who is the fourth in Hne from Arcesilas, having attended the courses of Hegesinus " who had attended Evander, the pupil of Lacydes as Lacydes had been the pupil of Arcesilas. But Carneades himself held the school for a long time, for he lived to be ninety, and those who had been his pupils were of considerable eminence, Clitomachus being the one among them most distinguished for industry (as is proved by the large number of his books), though there was an equal amount of talent in Hagnon, of eloquence in Charmades, and of charm in Melanthius of Rhodes. But the Metrodorus who was a pupil of Stratonicus was believed to have been well acquainted with Carneades.

17. Jam Clitomacho Philo vester operam multos annos dedit. Philone autem vivo patrocinium Academiae non defuit. Sed quod nos facere nunc ingredimur ut contra Academicos disseramus, id quidam e philosophis et ii quidem non mediocres faciendum omnino non putabant, nec vero esse ullam rationem disputare cum iis qui nihil probarent, Antipatrumque Stoicum qui multus in eo fuisset reprehendebant; nec definiri aiebant necesse esse quid esset cognitio aut perceptio aut (si verbum e verbo volumus) comprehensio, quam καταληψιν[Greek: katalepsin] illi vocant, eosque(主語) qui persuadere vellent esse aliquid quod comprehendi et percipi posset inscienter(愚かな) facere(動詞) dicebant, propterea quod nihil esset clarius εναργειαι[Greek: enargeiai](ut Graeci: perspicuitatem(明白性、明晰さ) aut evidentiam nos, si placet, nominemus fabricemurque si opus erit verba, ne hic sibi―me appellabat jocans―hoc licere putet soli(与格)): sed tamen orationem nullam putabant illustriorem ipsa evidentia reperiri posse nec ea quae tam clara essent definienda censebant. Alii autem negabant se pro hac evidentia quicquam priores fuisse dicturos, sed ad ea quae contra dicerentur dici oportere putabant, ne qui fallerentur.

17 そしてクレイトマコスに長年学んだのが君たちの学派のフィロンだ。そのフィロンが死ぬまでアカデメイア派を維持したのである。ところが、我々がやろうとしていること、即ちアカデメイア派(=新アカデメイア派=懐疑派)を批判することは、多くの哲学者たちの中でも主要な人たち(=独断派、エピクテトスたち)たちが反対した。何物をも認めない人たちと議論しても無意味だと言い、この議論に熱心だったアンティパトロス(=タルソス、ストア派、独断派、~前129年)を批判したのだ。さらに彼らは「認識」や「知覚」、あるいはストア派がカタレープシスと呼ぶものを直訳した「把握」が何であるかを定義する必要はないと言ったのである(=ストア派は定義した)。把握したり知覚できるものがあると懐疑派を説得しようとするのは愚かなことで、それは把握されたもののエナルゲイア(=自明性)以上に明白なものはないからと言うのである。(ギリシア語のエナルゲイアは明白性とか自明性と訳せるだろう。また造語が彼―私のことを当てこすっている―の独占でないと教えるために、必要なら何か言葉を作ってもいい)。つまり、自明性以上に明白な議論は見つけ出せないし、これほど明白なものを定義する必要はないと彼らは考えたのである。一方、この自明性を率先して擁護する必要がないという人たちも、それに反対する議論に騙されないために、自明性を否定する議論には反駁すべきだと考える人たちもいた。

17 Again Philo of your school for  many years gave his attention to Clitomachus ; and while Philo lived the Academy did not lack advocacy. But the undertaking upon which we are now entering, the refutation of the Academics, was entirely ruled out by some of the philosophers, and those indeed men of no inconsiderable standing, and they held that there was really no sense in arguing with thinkers who sanctioned nothing as proved, and they criticized the Stoic Antipater for spending much time in this ; and they also asserted that there was no need to define the essential nature of knowledge or perception or (if we wish to give a literal translation) ' mental grasp,' the Stoic term catalepsis,(a) and maintained that those who tried to prove that there is something that can be grasped and perceived were acting unscientifically, because there was nothing clearer than enargeia (b) (as the Greeks call it : let us term it perspicuousness or evidentness, if you will, and let us manufacture terms if necessary, so as not to let our friend here " - this was a jocular shot at me - " think that he has a monopoly of this licence) : well, they thought that no argument could be discovered that was clearer than evidentness itself, and they deemed that truths so manifest did not need defining. But others said that they would not have opened proceedings with any speech in defence of this evidentness, but held that the proper course was for argument to be directed to answering the case for the prosecution, so that they might not be somehow taken in.

18. Plerique tamen et definitiones ipsarum etiam evidentium rerum non improbant et rem idoneam de qua quaeratur et homines dignos quibuscum disseratur putant. Philo autem dum nova quaedam commovet quod ea sustinere vix poterat quae contra Academicorum pertinaciam dicebantur, et aperte mentitur, ut est reprehensus a patre Catulo, et, ut docuit Antiochus, in id ipsum se induit quod timebat. Cum(対応する主文はなく次のcumで再言される) enim ita negaret quicquam esse quod comprehendi posset (id enim volumus esse ακαταληπτον[Greek: akatalepton]), si illud esset, sicut Zeno definiret, tale visum (iam enim hoc pro φαντασιαι[Greek: phantasiai] verbum satis hesterno sermone trivimus(<tero)), visum igitur impressum effictumque ex eo unde esset quale esse non posset ex eo unde non esset (id nos a Zenone definitum rectissime dicimus,qui(=how) enim potest quicquam comprehendi ut plane confidas perceptum id cognitumque esse, quod est tale quale vel falsum esse possit?) ―hoc cum infirmat tollitque Philo, judicium tollit incogniti et cogniti; ex quo efficitur nihil posse comprehendi ― ita imprudens eo quo minime volt revolvitur. Quare omnis oratio contra Academiam suscipitur(始める) a nobis ut retineamus eam definitionem quam Philo voluit evertere; quam nisi obtinemus, percipi nihil posse concedimus.

18 しかも、多くの哲学者は自明なものそれ自体を定義することには反対していない。この問題は探求するに値するし、懐疑派の人たちとも議論するに値すると考えている。しかし、フィロンは新しい理論を作るときに、アカデメイア派の懐疑論の頑迷に対する批判に抗しきれなくて、カトゥルス君の父親の言うように、フィロンは明らかな嘘を言って、アンティオコスの言うように、自分が恐れる所にはまり込んだのである。というのは、フィロンは、もし把握出来るものがゼノンの定義するような「表象」(我々はファンタシアに相当するこの語について昨日十分に議論した)であるなら、把握出来るものは何もない(これを我々はアカタレープトンと言う)と言ったからである。ゼノンの定義する表象とは、元となる物から生み出されて刻印される表象で、元とならない物から由来することがありえないようなものである。(このゼノンの定義は非常に正確だと我々は考える。というのは、虚偽でありうるような物は、知覚され認識されたとはっきり思えるように把握できないからである)ところが、フィロンはこの定義を否定して捨て去ることで、知と無知の判断をやめてしまった。その結果、何も把握出来るものがなくなってしまったのである。そして愚かなことに彼は自分が最も望まない所に陥ってしまった。そういうわけで、我々はフィロンが覆そうとしたこの定義を守るために、これからアカデメイア派を批判する議論を行うのである。そして、もし我々がこれに成功しないなら、何も認識できないということを認めなければならない。

18 Still a good many of them do not object to definitions even of evident things themselves, and they think that any fact is a suitable matter for investigation and that human beings deserve to have their views discussed. But Philo, in raising certain revolutionary doctrines because he was scarcely able to withstand the usual arguments against the obstinacy of the Academics, manifestly propounds what is not true, as he was blamed for doing by the elder Catulus, and also, as Antiochus proved, himself slipped into the very position that he was afraid of. For when he thus maintained that there was nothing that could be grasped (that is the expression that we choose in rendering acatalepton (a)), if that ' presentation(表象) ' of which he spoke (for we have by this time sufficiently habituated ourselves by our yesterday's conversation to this rendering of pkaniasia) was, as Zeno defined it, a presentation impressed and moulded from the object from which it came in a form such as it could not have if it came from an object that was not the one that it actually did come from (we declare that this definition of Zeno's is absolutely correct, for how can anything be grasped in such a way as to make you absolutely confident that it has been perceived and known, if it has a form that could belong to it even if it were false ?) - when Philo weakens and abolishes this, he abolishes the criterion between the unknowable and the knowable ; which leads to the inference that nothing can be grasped - so incautiously does he come round to the position that he most wants to avoid. Therefore the whole defence of the case against the Academy is undertaken by us on the line of preserving the process of definition which Philo wished to overthrow ; and unless we succeed in upholding it, we admit that nothing can be perceived.

VII.

19. Ordiamur igitur a sensibus: quorum ita clara judicia et certa sunt ut si optio naturae nostrae detur et ab ea deus aliqui requirat(問う) contentane sit suis integris incorruptisque sensibus an postulet melius aliquid, non videam quid quaerat amplius. Nec vero hoc loco exspectandum est dum de remo inflexo aut de collo columbae respondeam, non enim is sum qui quidquid videtur tale dicam esse quale videatur. Epicurus hoc viderit,et alia multa; meo autem judicio ita est maxima in sensibus veritas, si et sani sunt ac valentes et omnia removentur quae obstant et impediunt. Itaque et lumen mutari saepe volumus et situs earum rerum quas intuemur et intervalla aut contrahimus aut diducimus multaque facimus usque eo dum aspectus ipse fidem faciat sui judicii. Quod idem fit in vocibus, in odore, in sapore, ut nemo sit nostrum qui in sensibus sui cujusque generis judicium requirat acrius.

∨II 19 では、我々はまず感覚から始めよう。感覚の判断は非常に明白で確かであるから、もし人間に選択の機会が与えられて、どこかの神様が人間に対して完璧で誤りのない自分の感覚に満足しているか、もっと何かよいものが欲しいかと尋ねるとするなら、私はこれ以上何を要求すればいいか分からないほどである。ここで私が立ち止まって水中のオールが曲って見えることや鳩の首の色が色々と異なって見えることを説明する必要はない。目に見える物の本質はその物の見え方次第だとは私は思わないからである。エピクロスはこの問題でも他の多くの問題同様に抜かりなく反論してくれるだろう。私は私で、感覚が健全でありそれを邪魔する障碍物が全て取り除かれている限り、感覚には最大の真実があると考えている。だから、我々は、自分たちの観察が信用できるようになるまで、光を変えたり、見ている対象の位置を変えたりするし、対象への距離を縮めたり広げたりするのである。音と匂いと味についても同様にして、誰もそれぞれの感覚の判断力の不足を嘆く必要がないようにするのである。

19 " Let us begin therefore from the senses, whose verdicts are so clear and certain that if human nature were given the choice, and were interrogated by some god as to whether it was content with its own senses in a sound and undamaged state or demanded something better, I cannot see what more it could ask for. Nor indeed is it necessary to delay at this point while I answer about the case of the bent oar (a) or the pigeon's neck, for I am not one to assert that every object seen is really such as it appears to be. Let Epicurus see to that, and a number of other matters ; but in my judgement the senses contain the highest truth, given that they are sound and healthy and also that all obstacles and hindrances are removed. That is why we often desire a change of the light and of the position of the objects that we are observing, and diminish or enlarge their distances from us, and take various measures, until mere looking makes us trust the judgement that it forms. The same is done in the case of sounds and smell and taste, so that among us there is nobody who desiderates keener powers of judgement in the senses, each in its class.

20. Adhibita vero exercitatione et arte, ut oculi pictura teneantur, aures cantibus, quis est quin cernat quanta vis sit in sensibus? Quam multa vident pictores in umbris et in eminentia quae nos non videmus! quam multa quae nos fugiunt in cantu exaudiunt in eo genere exercitati, qui primo inflatu tibicinis Antiopam esse aiunt aut Andromacham,cum id nos ne suspicemur quidem! Nihil necesse est de gustatu et odoratu loqui, in quibus intellegentia, etsi vitiosa, est quaedam tamen. Quid de tactu, et eo(=tactu) quidem quem philosophi interiorem vocant, aut doloris aut voluptatis,in quo Cyrenaici solo putant veri esse judicium quia sentiatur? Potestne igitur quisquam dicere inter eum qui doleat et inter eum qui in voluptate sit, nihil interesse? aut ita qui sentiet non apertissime insaniat?
 
20 訓練を受けて技術を身につけることで、目は絵画を、耳は歌を理解できるようになると、感覚にどれほど豊かな能力があるかに誰でも気づくはずだ。画家たちは我々には見えないものを背景や前景にどれほど沢山見るだろうか! 音楽の訓練をした人は、音楽のなかに我々には分からない音をどれほど沢山聞き分けるだろうか! 彼らは笛の一吹きを聞くだけで、我々が何も分からないうちに、その劇が『アンティオペ』なのか『アンドロマケ』なのかを聞き分けるのだ。味覚や臭覚についてはもう言う必要はないだろう。それらの持つ認識力はたとえ欠点はあっても相当のものである。触覚についても同様である。また哲学者たちが内的な触覚と呼んで、苦痛と快楽を見分ける感覚についてもそうである。キレネ派の哲学者はこの感覚だけが真実を見分けられると考えている。なぜなら、真実は感じるものだからというのである。実際、苦しんでいる人と楽しんでいる人の間に何の違いもないと言えるだろうか。あるいは、苦と楽には違いがないと考える人は頭がおかしくないと言えるだろうか?

20 But when we add practice and artistic training, to make our eyes sensitive to painting and our ears to music, who is there who can fail to remark the power that the senses possess ? How many things painters see in shadows and in the foreground which we do not see ! how many things in music that escape us are caught by the hearing of persons trained in that department of art, who when the fluteplayer blows his first note say 'That is Antiope ' or ' Andromache,' (a) when we have not even a suspicion of it ! It is unnecessary to talk at all about the faculties of taste and smell, which possess a certain discernment, although it is of a defective sort. Why speak of touch, and indeed of the internal tactual sense, as the philosophers call it, perceptive of either pain or pleasure, the sole basis, as the Cyrenaics think, of our judgement of truth, caused by the mere process of sensation ? Is it therefore possible for anybody to say that there is no difference between a person experiencing pain and a person experiencing pleasure, or would not the holder of this opinion be a manifest lunatic ?
 
21. Atqui qualia sunt haec quae sensibus percipi dicimus, talia sequuntur ea quae non sensibus ipsis percipi dicuntur, sed quodam modo sensibus, ut haec: 'Illud est album, hoc dulce, canorum illud, hoc bene olens, hoc asperum.' Animo iam haec tenemus comprehensa, non sensibus. 'Ille' deinceps 'equus est, ille canis.' Cetera series deinde sequitur, majora nectens, ut haec, quae quasi expletam rerum comprehensionem amplectuntur: 'si homo est, animal est mortale, rationis particeps.' Quo e genere nobis notitiae rerum imprimuntur, sine quibus nec intellegi quidquam nec quaeri disputarive potest.

21  しかしながら、感覚によって知覚された(と我々が呼ぶ)ものの性格は、感覚によって直接知覚されるのではなく「それは白い、これは甘い、それは調和がとれている、これはいい匂いがする」などある意味で感覚を通じて知覚されたものにも受け継がれる。この種の知覚は感覚による把握ではなくて心による把握である。続いて「それは馬である、それは犬である」が来る。次に、そのほかの物が来て、より多くのものを結びつける。例えば、「もしそれが人間なら、死すべき動物であり、理性を備えている」のように、複数の対象を含んだ把握となる。この種の判断から対象の概念が我々の心に刻印されるのである。そのような概念なしに我々は何も理解出来ないし探求できないし議論できないのである。
 
21 But then whatever character belongs to these objects which we say are perceived by the senses must belong to that following set of objects which are said to be perceived not by actual sensation but by a sort of sensation, as for example : ' Yonder thing is white, this thing is sweet, that one is melodious, this fragrant, this rough.' This class of percepts consists of comprehensions grasped by our mind, not by our senses. Then ' Yonder object is a horse, yonder a dog.' Next follows the rest of the series linking on a chain of larger percepts, for instance the following, which embrace as it were a fully completed grasp of the objects : ' If it is a human being, it is a rational mortal animal.' From this class of percept are imprinted upon us our notions of things, without which all understanding and all investigation and discussion are impossible.

22. Quodsi essent falsae notitiae (εννοιασ[Greek: ennoias] enim notitias appellare tu videbare)― si igitur essent hae falsae aut ejus modi visis impressae qualia visa a falsis discerni non possent, quo tandem iis modo uteremur? quo modo autem quid cuique rei consentaneum esset, quid repugnaret, videremus? Memoriae quidem certe, quae non modo philosophiam sed omnis vitae usus omnisque artis una maxime continet, nihil omnino loci relinquitur. Quae potest enim esse memoria falsorum? aut quid quisquam meminit, quod non animo comprehendit et tenet? Ars vero quae potest esse nisi quae non ex una aut duabus, sed ex multis animi perceptionibus constat? Quam si subtraxeris, qui distingues artificem ab inscio? Non enim fortuito hunc artificem dicemus esse, illum negabimus, sed cum alterum percepta et comprehensa tenere videmus, alterum non item. Cumque artium aliud ejus modi genus sit ut tantum modo animo rem cernat, aliud ut moliatur aliquid et faciat, quo modo aut geometres cernere ea potest quae aut nulla sunt aut internosci(区別する) a falsis non possunt, aut is qui fidibus utitur, explere numeros(リズム) et conficere versus(歌)? Quod idem in similibus quoque artibus continget, quarum omne opus est in faciendo atque agendo. Quid enim est quod arte effici possit, nisi is qui artem tractabit multa perceperit?

22 しかし、もしその概念が間違っているなら(君はエンノイアを「概念」と呼んでいたね)つまり、概念が間違っているか、あるいは、虚偽なものと区別できない表象によって刻印されているなら、そんな概念をどう扱うべきだろうか? どれがそれぞれの事実に合致しているか、どれが合致していないかを、どうやって見分けたらいいだろうか。とにかく、記憶には哲学だけでなく人生のあらゆる活動とあらゆる技術の全てが含まれているから、もうその中に場所は残っていないのである。虚偽な物の記憶がどうしてあり得るだろうか? それとも、心で把握しても掴んでもいないどんなものを人は記憶するだろうか? 一つや二つの認識ではなく数多くの認識(知覚)から成り立っていないどんな技術があるだろうか? もし技術というものをなかったら、どうやって専門家と一般人を見分けるだろうか? 我々は当てずっぽうで誰かを専門家で誰かがそうでないとは言わない。認識や知識を持っていると思う人を専門家といい、そうでない人を一般人と言うのである。さらに、技術のなかでも、ある技術はただ対象を観察するだけなのに対して、別の技術は何かをしたり作り出したりする。では、幾何学者は虚偽なものと区別できないものや存在しないものを、どうやって観察できるだろうか。あるいは、弦楽奏者は、どうやってリズムを完成したり音楽を作ったりするだろうか。同じ事が似たような技術にも当てはまるのであり、何かをしたり何かを作ったりするときに技術が必要なのである。というのは、技術を扱う人が多くのことを認識していないなら、技術によって何ができるというのだろうか?

22 But if false notions existed (I understood you to employ (b) ' notions ' to render ennoiai) - well, if there were these false notions or notions imprinted on the mind by appearances of a kind that could not be distinguished from false ones, how pray could we act on them ? how moreover could we see what is consistent with any given fact and what inconsistent ? At all events no place at all is left for memory, the one principal foundation not only of philosophy but of all the conduct of life and all the sciences. For how can there possibly be a memory of what is false ? or what can anyone remember that he does not grasp and hold in his mind ? But what science can there be that is not made up of not one nor two but many mental percepts ? And if you take away science, how will you distinguish between the craftsman(a) and the ignoramus ? for we shall not pronounce one man to be a craftsman, and the other not, just casually, but when we see the one retain what he has perceived and grasped, and the other not. And as one class of sciences is of such a nature as only to envisage facts mentally, and another such as to do or to make something, how can the geometrician envisage things that are either nonexistent or indistinguishable from fictitious things, or the player on the harp round off his rhythms and complete his verses ? and the same result will also occur in the other crafts of the same class which are solely exercised in making and doing, for what can be effected by a craft unless its intending practitioner has accumulated many percepts ?

VIII.

23. Maxime vero virtutum cognitio confirmat percipi et comprehendi multa posse. In quibus solis inesse etiam scientiam dicimus (quam nos non comprehensionem modo rerum sed eam stabilem quoque et immutabilem esse censemus), itemque sapientiam, artem vivendi, quae ipsa ex sese habeat constantiam. Ea autem constantia si nihil habeat percepti et cogniti, quaero unde nata sit aut quo modo? Quaero etiam, ille vir bonus qui statuit omnem cruciatum perferre, intolerabili dolore lacerari potius quam aut officium prodat aut fidem, cur has igitur sibi tam gravis leges imposuerit cum quam ob rem ita oporteret(そうすべき理由を) nihil haberet comprehensi, percepti, cogniti, constituti? Nullo igitur modo fieri potest ut quisquam tanti aestimet aequitatem et fidem, ut ejus conservandae causa nullum supplicium(犠牲) recuset, nisi iis rebus assensus sit quae falsae esse non possint.

∨III 23 何より倫理学を学ぶと人間が多くのことを把握して知覚できることを確信できる。多くのことの把握のなかにこそ知識は存在すると言えるのである(知識とは物事の把握であるだけでなく、その把握が確かで変わらないことであると我々は考える)。知恵、即ち生きる技術もまた同様であって、それ自身に一貫性を備えている。この一貫性が認識や知覚と何の関係もないとしたら、この一貫性はどこからどのようにして生まれるというのだろうか。義務や信義を裏切るくらいならどんな拷問を受けてもどんな苦痛に引き裂かれてもかまわないという立派な人は、どうしてそんなに厳格な掟を自分自身に課すのだろうか。その理由は、まさに彼が把握し知覚し認識し確信した事実の中にあるのだ。公正さと信義を高く評価して、それを守るためにはどんな犠牲も厭わないという人がいるのも、まさに彼が虚偽ではありえない事実を受け入れているからである。

23 " The greatest proof however of our capacity to perceive and grasp many things is afforded by the  study of Ethics. Our percepts alone we actually pronounce to form the basis of knowledge (which in our view is not only a grasp of facts but a grasp that is also permanent and unchangeable), and likewise of wisdom, the science of living, which is its own source of consistency. But if this consistency had nothing that it grasped and knew, whence, I ask, or how would it be engendered ? consider also the ideal good man, who has resolved to endure all torments and to be mangled by intolerable pain rather than betray either his duty or his promise - why, I ask, has he saddled himself with such burdensome rules as this when he had no grasp or perception or knowledge or certainty of any fact that furnished a reason why it was his duty to do so ? It is therefore absolutely impossible that anybody should set so high a value upon equity and good faith as to refuse no torture for the sake of preserving it, unless he has given his assent to things that cannot possibly be false.

24. Ipsa vero sapientia si se ignorabit sapientia sit necne, quo modo primum obtinebit nomen sapientiae? deinde quo modo suscipere aliquam rem aut agere fidenter audebit cum certi nihil erit quod sequatur? cum vero dubitabit quid sit extremum et ultimum bonorum ignorans quo omnia referantur, qui poterit esse sapientia? Atque etiam illud perspicuum est, constitui(確立) necesse esse initium(原理) quod sapientia cum quid agere incipiat sequatur, idque initium esse naturae(この世界の事実) accommodatum(適応して). Nam aliter appetitio (eam enim volumus esse ορμην[Greek: hormen]), qua ad agendum impellimur et id appetimus quod est visum, moveri non potest;

24 そもそも、もし知恵自身が自分のことを知恵であるどうかを知らないなら、どうして知恵という名前を持てるだろうか? さらに、知恵が従うべき確かな事が何もないなら、どのようにして知恵は何かを受け入れたり、自信をもって行動したり出来るだろうか? それどころか、知恵が、全ての基準となるべき究極の善が何であるかを知らず自信が持てないのに、どうして知恵でありうるだろうか。さらにまた、知恵が何かの行動を始めるときに、従うべき原理が確立していなければならないし、その原理がこの世の事実に適ったものでなければならないことは明白である。というのは、我々は「欲求」(これはギリシア哲学でホルメーのことだが)によって行動に駆り立てられて、目にした物を求めるのであるが、この欲求が起きるのはこの事があるからである。 

24 As for wisdom herself, if she does not know whether she is wisdom or not, how in the first place will she make good her claim to the name of wisdom ? next, how will she venture with confidence to plan or execute any undertaking when there will be nothing certain for her to act upon ? indeed, when she will be hesitating in ignorance of what the final and ultimate good to which all things are to be referred really is, how can she possibly be wisdom ? This other point moreover is manifest : there must be a first principle established for wisdom to follow when she embarks on any action, and this first principle must be consistent with nature ; for otherwise appetition (our chosen equivalent for the term horme), by which we are impelled to action and seek to get an object presented to our vision, cannot be set in motion ;

25. Illud autem quod movet prius oportet videri,eique credi,quod fieri non potest si id quod visum erit discerni non poterit a falso. Quo modo autem moveri animus(精神) ad appetendum potest, si id quod videtur non percipitur accommodatumne naturae sit an alienum? Itemque si quid offici sui sit non occurrit animo, nihil umquam omnino aget, ad nullam rem umquam impelletur, numquam movebitur. Quodsi aliquid aliquando acturus est, necesse est id ei verum quod occurrit videri.

25 この欲求を引き起こす物は、まず目によって見られて信じられなければならないが、これは、目にした物が虚偽な物と区別されなければ不可能である。ところが、もし目にした物がこの世の事実に適っているか否かを知覚しなければ、どうして精神が欲求へと動かされることがあるだろうか? 同じく、精神が自分の義務は何か分からなければ、精神は決して行動に移ることはないし、何にも駆り立てられることはないし、動かされることもないだろう。もしいつか何かを行おうとするなら、精神に起こったことが真実であると思われなければならないのである。 

25 but the thing that sets it in motion must first of all be seen, and must be believed in, which cannot take place if an object seen will be indistinguishable from a false one ; but how can the mind be moved to appetition if it does not perceive whether the object seen is consistent with nature or foreign to it ? And moreover if it has not struck the mind what its function is, it will never do anything at all, never be driven towards any object, never make a movement ; whereas if it is at some time to do something, what strikes it must seem to it to be true.

26. Quid quod, si ista vera sunt, ratio omnis tollitur quasi quaedam lux lumenque vitae? tamenne in ista pravitate(つむじ曲がり) perstabitis? Nam quaerendi initium ratio attulit, quae perfecit virtutem, cum esset ipsa ratio confirmata quaerendo. Quaestio autem est appetitio cognitionis quaestionisque finis inventio; at nemo invenit falsa, nec ea quae incerta permanent inventa esse possunt, sed, cum ea quae quasi involuta(覆われた) fuerunt aperta sunt, tum inventa dicuntur. Sic et initium quaerendi et exitus percipiendi et comprehendendi tenetur. Itaque argumenti conclusio quae est Graece αποδειχισ[Greek: apodeixis], ita definitur: 'ratio quae ex rebus perceptis ad id quod non percipiebatur adducit.'
 
26 ところが、君たち(=アカデメイア派、懐疑派)の学説が真実ならば、人生の光とも言うべき理性はすっかり取り去られてしまうが、それでいいのか? 君たちの学派はそんな奇妙なことを主張し続けるのだろうか。というのは、理性が探求を始めるのであり、理性が探求によって鍛えられたときに、美徳がもたらされるからである。一方、探求とは認識への欲求であり、探求の目的は発見である。ところが、誰も虚偽なものを発見することはないし、不確かであり続ける物が発見されることもありえない。いわば隠れていたものが明らかにされたとき、発見されたと言うのである。探求の始まりと知覚と把握の終点はこのように理解される。だからギリシア哲学でアポデイクシスと呼ばれる「証明」は、「論理が知覚された物から知覚されていない物へと向かうこと」と定義されているのである。

26 What about the total abolition of reason,'life's dayspring and source of light,'(a) that must take place if your doctrines are true ? will your school continue steadfast in such perversity all the same ? For it is reason that initiated research, reason (b) which has perfected virtue, since reason herself is strengthened by pursuing research ; but research is the appetition for knowledge, and the aim of research is discovery ; yet nobody discovers what is false, and things that remain continually uncertain cannot be discovered : discovery means the ' opening up of things previously veiled ' '(c) - this is how the mind holds both the commencement of research and the final act of perceiving and grasping. Therefore this is the definition of logical proof, in Greek αποδειξισapodeixis : ' a process of reasoning that leads from things perceived to something not previously perceived.'

IX 

27. Quodsi omnia visa ejus modi essent qualia isti dicunt, ut ea vel falsa esse possent neque ea posset ulla notio discernere, quo modo quemquam aut conclusisse aliquid aut invenisse diceremus aut quae esset conclusi argumenti fides? Ipsa autem philosophia, quae rationibus progredi debet, quem habebit exitum? Sapientiae vero quid futurum est? quae neque de se ipsa dubitare debet neque de suis decretis quae philosophi vocant δογματα[Greek: dogmata], quorum nullum sine scelere prodi poterit; cum enim decretum proditur, lex(法、掟) veri rectique proditur, quo e vitio et amicitiarum proditiones et rerum publicarum nasci solent. Non potest igitur dubitari quin decretum nullum falsum possit esse sapientique satis non sit non esse falsum sed etiam stabile, fixum, ratum esse debeat, quod movere nulla ratio queat. Talia autem neque esse neque videri possunt eorum ratione qui illa visa, e quibus omnia decreta sunt nata, negant quicquam a falsis interesse.

IX 27 もし全ての表象が君たちの言うように虚偽であるかもしれず、どんな概念によってもそれらを区別出来ないなら、一体どのようにして誰かが何かを証明したとか発見したとか言えるだろうか。あるいは、証明がどうして信用出来るだろうか? また、論理を使って進まなければならない哲学にどんな出口があるというのか? それに、知恵は一体どうなるのか? 知恵は自分自身を疑ってはならないし、自分の教義(これを哲学者たちはドグマの複数形でドグマタと呼ぶ)を疑うことは許されない。自分の教義を裏切るなどは道義的にも許されない行為である。というのは、教義を裏切ることは、真実と正しさの法を裏切ることであり、このような悪事が許されるなら、友人や国家も裏切ることにもなるからである。だから、賢者のもっている教義が決して虚偽ではありえないことは疑いようがない。いや虚偽でないだけではなく、確固として定まっており、いかなる論理によっても揺るがされない確かなものでなければならない。ところが、あらゆる教義が生み出される元となる表象が虚偽なものと異なるところがないと言う人たちの論理では、教義は確かなものではありえないことになってしまう。

27 " In fact if all sense-presentations were of such a kind as your school say they are, so that they could possibly be false without any mental process being able to distinguish them, how could we say that anybody had proved or discovered anything, or what trust could we put in logical proof ? Philosophy herself must advance by argument - how will she find a way out ? And what will happen to Wisdom ? it is her duty not to doubt herself or her 'decisions,' which philosophers term dogmata, any of which it will be a crime to abandon ; for the surrender of such a 'decision' is the betrayal of the moral law, and that sin is the common source of betrayals of friends and country. Therefore it cannot be doubted that no 'decision' of a wise man can be false, and that it is not sufficient for them not to be false but they must also be firmly settled and ratified, immovable by any argument '(a) ; but such a character cannot belong or seem to belong to them on the theory of those who maintain that the sense-presentations from which all decisions spring differ in no way from false presentations.

28. Ex hoc illud est natum quod postulabat Hortensius, ut id ipsum(⇒nihil posse perpici) saltem(少なくとも) perceptum a sapiente diceretis(<dico), nihil posse percipi. Sed Antipatro hoc idem postulanti, cum diceret ei qui affirmaret nihil posse percipi, unum tamen illud(⇒nihil posse perpici) dicere percipi posse consentaneum esse,ut alia non possent,Carneades acutius resistebat. Nam tantum abesse dicebat ut id consentaneum esset, ut maxime etiam repugnaret. Qui enim negaret quicquam esse quod perciperetur, eum nihil excipere; ita necesse esse ne id ipsum(=何も知覚できないということ) quidem, quod(理由) exceptum non esset, comprehendi et percipi ullo modo posse.

28 ここから、ホルテンシウスが要求したこと、即ち、懐疑派は少なくとも「何も知覚できないということだけを賢者は知覚している」と言うべきだという要求が生まれる。けれども、アンティパトロス(=ストア派)が同じことを要求して、何も認識できないと主張する人々が、ほかの事は知覚できなくても「何も知覚できない」ことだけは知覚できると言うことは矛盾ではないと言った時、カルネアデスはいつもより激しく反論した。そんなことを言うのは矛盾ではないどころか完全に矛盾しているとカルネアデスは言ったものである。つまり、何も知覚できないと言う人は何も例外にはしない。「何も知覚できない」ということも例外ではない以上は、そのことも決して把握したり知覚したり出来ないと言ったものである。 

28 From this sprang the demand put forward by Hortensius, that your school should say that the wise man has perceived at least the mere fact that nothing can be perceived. But when Antipater used to make the same demand, and to say that one who asserted that nothing could be perceived might yet consistently say that this single fact could be perceived, namely that nothing else could, Carneades with greater acumen used to oppose him ; he used to declare that this was so far from being consistent that it was actually grossly inconsistent : for the man who said there was nothing that was perceived made no exception, and so not even the impossibility of perception could itself be grasped and perceived in any way, because it had not been excepted.

29. Antiochus ad istum locum pressius videbatur accedere(攻撃する): quoniam enim id haberent Academici decretum (sentitis enim iam hoc me δογμα[Greek: dogma] dicere), nihil posse percipi, non debere eos in suo decreto sicut in ceteris rebus fluctuare, praesertim cum in eo summa consisteret, hanc(regulaに性が一致) enim esse regulam(基準) totius philosophiae, constitutionem(確立) veri falsi, cogniti incogniti; quam rationem quoniam susciperent(受け入れる) docereque vellent quae visa accipi oporteret, quae repudiari, certe hoc ipsum ex quo omne veri falsique judicium esset percipere eos debuisse; etenim duo esse haec maxima in philosophia, judicium veri et finem bonorum, nec sapientem posse esse qui aut cognoscendi esse initium ignoret aut extremum expetendi, ut aut unde proficiscatur aut quo perveniendum sit nesciat; haec autem habere dubia neque iis ita confidere ut moveri non possint, abhorrere(離れている) a sapientia plurimum. Hoc igitur modo potius erat ab his postulandum ut hoc unum saltem, percipi nihil posse, perceptum esse dicerent. Sed de inconstantia totius illorum sententiae, si ulla sententia cujusquam esse potest nihil approbantis, sit ut opinor dictum satis.

29 アンティオコスはこの点をもっと辛辣に攻撃しているようだった。つまり、アカデメイア派(=懐疑派)は「何も知覚できない」ということを教義(これがドグマである事はすでに述べた)としている以上は、この自分たちの教義については、ほかの事と同じように揺らいではならない。というのは、何といってもここにアカデメイア派の心髄があるからだ。実際、この教義こそは彼らの哲学全体の基準であり、真実と虚偽の確立、知と無知の確立だからである。この論理を彼らも受け入れて、どの表象を受け入れ、どの表象を斥けるべきかを教えようとしているのだから、彼らも真実と虚偽の判断の全ての基準となるこの教義を少なくとも知覚しているべきだ。というのは、哲学における二つの最も大きな問題は真理の判断と究極の善であり、認識の出発点も欲求(ホルメー)の終着点も知らず、どこから始めてどこに至るべきかを知らない賢者などありえないからである。それなのに、これらの事に疑いを持って、これらの事に確固たる信頼が持てないことほど、知恵とかけ離れたことはない。だから、この「何も知覚できない」ということだけは知覚するということを、彼らに要請しなければならない、と。さて、何も認めない人でも理論を持つことができるという彼らの理論全体の矛盾について、充分に語られたと思う。

29 Antiochus used to seem to come more closely to grips with this position ; he argued that because the Academics held it as a 'decision' (for you realize by now that I use that term to translate dogma) that nothing could be perceived, they were bound not to waver in their own ' decision ' as they did in everything else, particularly when it was the keystone of their system, for this was the measuring-rod that applied to the whole of philosophy, the test of truth and falsehood, of knowledge and ignorance ; and that since they adopted this method, and desired to teach what sense-presentations ought to be accepted and what rejected, they unquestionably ought to have perceived this decision itself, the basis of every criterion of truth and falsehood ; for (he said) the two greatest things in philosophy were the criterion of truth and the end of goods, and no man could be a sage who was ignorant of the existence of either a beginning of the process of knowledge or an end of appetition, and who consequently did not know from what he was starting or at what he ought to arrive ; but to be in doubt as to these matters and not to feel immovably sure of them was to be very widely remote from wisdom. On these lines therefore they ought to have been required rather to say that this one thing at least was perceived - the impossibility of perceiving anything. But about the inconsistency of the whole of their theory, if anybody holding no positive view at all can be said to have any theory, enough, as I think, may have been said.

X.

30. Sequitur disputatio copiosa illa quidem, sed paulo abstrusior―habet enim aliquantum a physicis―, ut verear ne majorem largiar ei qui contra dicturus est libertatem et licentiam. Nam quid eum facturum putem de abditis rebus et obscuris qui lucem eripere conetur? Sed disputari poterat subtiliter, quanto quasi artificio natura fabricata esset primum animal omne, deinde hominem maxime, quae vis esset in sensibus, quem ad modum primum visa nos pellerent, deinde appetitio ab his pulsa sequeretur, tum ut sensus ad res percipiendas intenderemus. Mens(心) enim ipsa, quae sensuum fons est atque etiam ipsa sensus est, naturalem vim habet quam intendit ad ea quibus movetur. Itaque alia visa sic arripit(つかむ) ut iis statim utatur, alia quasi recondit(蓄える), e quibus memoria oritur. Cetera autem similitudinibus construit, ex quibus efficiuntur notitiae rerum, quas Graeci tum εννοιασ[Greek: ennoias], tum  προληψεισ[Greek: prolepseis] vocant. Eo cum accessit ratio argumentique conclusio rerumque innumerabilium multitudo, tum et perceptio eorum omnium apparet et eadem ratio perfecta his gradibus ad sapientiam pervenit.

X 30 これから始める話(=アンティオコスの『ソーサス』)は長くなるし少々複雑である。自然科学と多少関係する部分があるからだが、その結果として、私を批判する人に反論する機会をより多く与えるかもしれない。なぜなら、知恵の光を奪おうとする人たち(=懐疑派)が、隠れたこと曖昧なことをどうするつもりなのか見当がつかないからである。一方、自然がどれほど多くの技術を使って全ての生き物をつくり、次いで人間を作ったか、どんな能力が感覚にあって、どのようにして感覚の表象が我々に衝撃を与え、その衝撃から欲求が生まれ、さらに、我々が物事の知覚のためにどのように感覚を利用するかについては、詳細に論じる事が出来る。というのは、心自身が感覚の源であるとともに感覚そのものであって、自然に適った力をもっており、自分が刺激を受けた表象に対して、その力を利用するからである。こうして、心はある表象はすぐに利用するために捉え、ある表象は記憶するためにしまい込むのである。それ以外の表象を心は類似性に従って集めて、そこから物事の概念を作る(ギリシア語でエンノイアやプロレプシスと呼ばれるものである)。そこへ論理、証明、無数の事物が加わって、それら全ての物の知覚が生まれ、この論理がこの段階を踏んで完成して最後に知恵に到達するのである。

" Next comes (a) a discussion which though very fully developed is a little more recondite, for it contains a certain amount of matter derived from natural  philosophy ; so that I am afraid that I may be bestowing greater liberty and even licence upon the speaker who is to oppose me, for what can I suppose that one who is endeavouring to rob us of light (b) will do about matters that are hidden in darkness ? (c) Still,it would have been possible to discuss in minute detail the amount of craftsmanship that nature has employed in the construction first of every animal, then most of all in man,- the power possessed by the senses, the way in which we are first struck by the sense-presentations, next follows appetition (a) imparted by their impact, and then we direct the senses to perceive the objects. For the mind itself, which is the source of the sensations and even is itself sensation, has a natural force which it directs to the things by which it is moved. Accordingly some sense-presentations it seizes on so as to make use of them at once, others it as it were stores away, these being the source of memory, while all the rest it unites into systems by their mutual resemblances, and from these are formed the concepts of objects which the Greeks term sometimes ennoiai and sometimes prolepseis. When thereto there has been added reason and logical proof and an innumerable multitude of facts, then comes the clear perception of all these things, and also this same reason having been by these stages made complete finally attains to wisdom.

31. Ad rerum igitur scientiam vitaeque constantiam aptissima cum sit mens hominis, amplectitur maxime cognitionem et istam καταληψιν[Greek: katalepsin], quam ut dixi verbum e verbo exprimentes comprehensionem dicemus, cum ipsam per se amat (nihil est enim ei veritatis luce dulcius),tum etiam propter usum. Quocirca et sensibus utitur et artes efficit(もたらす), quasi sensus alteros, et usque eo philosophiam ipsam corroborat(強める) ut virtutem efficiat, ex qua re una vita omnis apta sit. Ergo ii qui negant quicquam posse comprehendi haec ipsa eripiunt vel instrumenta vel ornamenta vitae, vel potius etiam totam vitam evertunt funditus ipsumque animal orbant animo, ut difficile sit de temeritate eorum perinde ut causa postulat dicere.

31 心は事物を知り人生を確かなものにすることに最も適しているだけではない。心は知識とそして君達のいうカタレプシスが好きなのである。カタレプシスとは(既に直訳したように)「把握」のことだが、心はこれを利用するためだけでなく(心にとって真実の光ほど好ましいものはないので)それ自体を愛するのである。それゆえに心は感覚を利用して技術を作り出し、それを新たな感覚とする。そして哲学自体を活気付けて美徳をもたらせて、この美徳によって人生全体を秩序づけるのである。だから、何も把握できないという人たちは、こういった人生の道具と飾りを奪うことになる。さらには人生全体を根底から覆して、生き物から心を奪うのである。その結果、必要に応じて、彼らの独善性を語ることも困難となるのである。

31 Since therefore the mind of man is supremely well adapted for the knowledge of things and for consistency of life, it embraces information very readily, and your catalepsis, which as I said we will express by a literal translation as 'grasp,' is loved by the mind both for itself (for nothing is dearer to the mind than the light of truth) and also for the sake of its utility. Hence the mind employs the senses, and also creates the sciences as a second set of senses, and strengthens the structure of philosophy itself to the point where it may produce virtue, the sole source of the ordering of the whole of life. Therefore those who assert that nothing can be grasped deprive us of these things that are the very tools or equipment of life, or rather actually overthrow the whole of life from its foundations and deprive the animate creature itself of the mind that animates it, so that it is difficult to speak of their rashness (a) entirely as the case requires.

 32. Nec vero satis constituere possum quod sit eorum consilium aut quid velint. Interdum enim cum adhibemus ad eos orationem ejus modi: 'Si ea quae disputentur vera sint, tum omnia fore incerta,' respondent: 'Quid ergo istud ad nos? num nostra culpa est? naturam accusa, quae in profundo veritatem, ut ait Democritus, penitus(深く) abstruserit(隠す).' Alii autem elegantius, qui etiam queruntur(不満を言う) quod eos insimulemus(非難する) omnia incerta dicere, quantumque intersit inter incertum et id quod percipi non possit docere conantur eaque distinguere. Cum his igitur agamus qui haec distinguunt, illos qui omnia sic incerta dicunt ut stellarum numerus par an impar sit quasi desperatos aliquos relinquamus. Volunt enim (et hoc quidem vel maxime vos animadvertebam moveri) probabile aliquid esse et quasi veri simile, eaque se uti regula(物差し) et in agenda vita et in quaerendo ac disserendo.

32 私は彼らの考えが何なのか、彼らは何が言いたいのかを充分にはっきりさせることができない。一方、彼らに「もし君たちの言うことが真実なら、全ては不確かとなってしまう」と言葉を向けると、彼らはこう答えるだろう、「それが僕達に何の関係がある? それは僕達のせいではない。悪いのは自然だ。デモクリトスが言うように、自然が真理を深みに隠したのだ」と。それに対して、別の人達(=カルネアデスたち)はもっと巧みに答えてくるかもしれない。つまり、全ては不確かだと言ったと非難されるのは心外だ、不確かなことと知覚できないことは違うのだと言って、この二つを区別しようとするだろう。では、この区別する人たちと議論する間は、星の数が偶数か奇数かという問題のように全てのものは不確かだと言う人たちを「絶望派」とでも名付けて脇に置いておこう。というのは、この区別する人たちは(君たちはこの学説に大きく影響されていることを私は気づいている)、真実らしいもの、真実に似ているものがあると言い、彼らはこの基準を人生においても探求においても議論においても使うと言っているからだ。

Nor indeed can I fully decide what their plan is or what they mean. For sometimes when we address them in this sort of language, 'If your contentions are true, then everything will be uncertain,' they reply, ' Well, what has that to do with us ? surely it is not our fault ; blame nature for having hidden truth quite away, in an abyss, as Democritus says.'(b) But others make a more elaborate answer, and actually complain because we charge them with saying that everything is uncertain, and they try to explain the difference between what is uncertain and what cannot be grasped, and to distinguish between them. Let us therefore deal with those who make this distinction, and leave on one side as a hopeless sort of persons the others who say that all things are as uncertain as whether the number of the stars is odd or even. For they hold (and this in fact, I noticed,(c) excites your school extremely) that something is ' probable,' or as it were (d) resembling the truth, and that this provides them with a canon of judgement both in the conduct of life and in philosophical investigation and discussion.

XI.

33. Quae ista regula est veri et falsi, si notionem veri et falsi, propterea quod ea non possunt internosci, nullam habemus? Nam si habemus, interesse oportet ut inter rectum et pravum, sic inter verum et falsum; si nihil interest, nulla regula est, nec potest is cui est visio(表象) veri falsique communis ullum habere judicium aut ullam omnino veritatis notam. Nam cum dicunt hoc se unum tollere ut quicquam possit ita videri ut non eodem modo(同時に) falsum etiam possit videri, cetera autem concedere, faciunt pueriliter. Quo enim omnia judicantur sublato reliqua se negant tollere: ut si quis quem oculis privaverit, dicat ea quae cerni possent se ei non ademisse. Ut enim illa oculis modo agnoscuntur, sic reliqua visis, sed propria veri, non communi veri et falsi nota. Quam ob rem sive tu probabilem visionem sive probabilem et quae non impediatur, ut Carneades volebat, sive aliud quid(別の何か) proferes quod sequare,ad visum illud de quo agimus tibi erit revertendum.

XI 33 では、真実と虚偽を区別できない場合には真実と虚偽を分ける概念はないというのなら、真実と虚偽を分ける君たちのその基準は何なのだ? というのは、もし真実と虚偽を分ける概念があるなら、善と悪が違うように真実と虚偽を区別できるはずだからである。もし真実と虚偽を区別できないのなら、それを区別する基準もないはずだ。さらに真実と虚偽の表象を区別できない人には、真理に対する判断力も、真理の目印(σημειον、徴証)も全く持つことができないだろう。というのは、彼らはほかのことは認めるくせに、「真実であると同時に虚偽であるとは思えない表象がある」ということだけは否定するという、児戯に類することをするからである。彼らは全てを判断するための手段を取り上げていながら、そのほかのものは残しているのだ。それはまるで人の目を奪っておいて、見る対象となる物は奪わないと言っているようなものである。見る対象は目によって認識される、それと同じように、そのほかのものは表象によって識別されるのだが、それは真実に固有の目印によって識別されるのであって、けっして真実にも虚偽にもある目印によるのではない。したがって、もし君が、真実らしい表象か、あるいは、カルネアデスの言う、真実らしくて邪魔されていない表象か、あるいは、何か君が基準としている表象を持ち出してくるなら、君は私達の言う表象に戻って来ざるをえないのだ。

What is this canon of truth and falsehood, if we have no notion of truth and falsehood, for the reason that they are indistinguishable ? For if we have a notion of them, there must be a difference between true and false, just as there is between right and wrong ; if there is none, there is no canon, and the man who has a presentation of the true and the false that is common to both(a) cannot have any criterion or any mark of truth at all. For when they say that they only remove the possibility of anything (b) presenting an appearance of such a sort that a false thing could not present the same appearance, but that they allow everything else, they act childishly. Having abolished the means by which all things are judged, they say they do not abolish the remaining sources of knowledge ; just as if anybody were to say that when he has deprived a man of his eyes he has not taken away from that man the possible objects of sight. For just as the objects of sight are recognized only by means of the eyes, so everything else is recognized by means of sense-presentations ; but they are recognized by a mark that belongs specially to what is true, and is not common to the true and the false. Therefore if you bring forward 'probable presentation,'or 'probable and unhampered presentation,' (c) as Carneades held, or something else, as a guide for you to follow, you will have to come back to the sense-presentation that we are dealing with.

34. In eo autem, si erit communitas cum falso, nullum erit judicium, quia proprium in communi signo notari non potest; sin autem commune nihil erit, habeo quod volo: id enim quaero quod ita mihi videatur verum ut non possit item(=eodem modo) falsum videri. Simili in errore versantur, cum convicio veritatis coacti perspicua a perceptis volunt distinguere et conantur ostendere esse aliquid perspicui, verum illud quidem impressum in animo atque mente, neque tamen id percipi atque comprehendi posse. Quo enim modo perspicue dixeris album esse aliquid, cum possit accidere ut id quod nigrum sit album esse videatur? aut quo modo ista aut perspicua dicemus aut impressa subtiliter, cum sit incertum vere inaniterne moveatur? Ita neque color neque corpus nec veritas nec argumentum nec sensus neque perspicuum ullum relinquitur.

34 ところが、その表象の中に虚偽の表象と共通するものがあるなら、表象の真偽を判断できなくなってしまう。目印が共通なので表象の特徴が見分けられないからである。しかしながら、もし逆に共通なものなどないのなら、私の望み通りのものが手に入る。「真実であると同時に虚偽であるとは思えない表象」を私は求めているからである。ところが、真実の呼び声に促された人たちは、知覚されたものと明白なものを区別して、明白なものは存在するが、それが真実として心に刻まれたとしても、決して知覚されたり把握されたり出来ないことを証明しようとして、いつも同じ袋小路に陥ってしまうのである。というのは、そんなことを証明したら、黒いものも白く見えるかもしれないから、何かを明らかに白いとはもう言えなくなってしまう。あるいは、心の受けた刺激が本当のものか根拠のないものかは確かではないのだから、我々は何かを明白だとか正確に刻印されたと言えなくなってしまう。そうなれば、色彩も肉体も真実も議論も感覚も明白なものは何も無くなってしまうのである。

But if this has community with a false presentation, it will contain no standard of judgement, because a special property cannot be indicated by a common mark ; while if on the contrary there is nothing in common between them, I have got what I want, for I am looking for a thing that may appear to me so true that it could not appear to me in the same way if it were false. They are involved in the same mistake when under stress of truth's upbraiding they desire to distinguish between things perceived and things perspicuous, and try to prove that there is such a thing as something perspicuous which although a true imprint on the mind and intellect is nevertheless incapable of being perceived and grasped. For how can you maintain that something is perspicuously white if it can possibly occur that a thing that is black may appear white, or how shall we pronounce the things in question either perspicuous or accurately imprinted if it is uncertain whether the mental experience is true or unfounded ? In this way neither colour nor solidity nor truth nor argument nor sensation nor anything perspicuous is left.

35. Ex hoc illud iis usu venire(起こる) solet ut quidquid dixerint a quibusdam interrogentur: 'Ergo istuc quidem percipis?' Sed qui ita interrogant, ab iis irridentur. Non enim urguent, ut coarguant(証明する) neminem ulla de re posse contendere neque asseverare(主張する) sine aliqua ejus rei quam sibi quisque placere dicit certa et propria nota. Quod est igitur istuc vestrum probabile? Nam si quod cuique occurrit et primo quasi aspectu probabile videtur id confirmatur, quid eo levius?

35 このために、彼ら(=懐疑派)が何か言ったことに対して、誰かに「それは君が知覚したことなのかね」と聞かれることになる。そう聞いた人に彼らは笑ってすますだけだ。というのは、彼らは、自分が言いたいことを主張したり肯定したりするには適当で確かな証拠が必要だということ(=ストア派の主張)など思ってもみない(=懐疑派には)からである。それなら君たちのいう真実らしさとは何なのだ? というのは、もし誰かが何かに出会って一目でそれを真実らしいと思っただけでそれを肯定するなら、これほど軽率なことはないからである。

35 This is why it is their usual experience that, whatever they say,some people ask them 'Then anyway you do perceive that, do you ? ' But they laugh at those who put this question ; for their effort is not aimed at proving that it cannot ever happen that a man may make a positive assertion about a thing without there being some definite and peculiar mark attached to the thing that he in particular professes to accept. What then is the probability that your school talk about ? For if what a particular person happens to encounter, and almost at first glance thinks probable, is accepted as certain, what could be more frivolous than that ?

36. Sin ex circumspectione(慎重に) aliqua et accurata consideratione quod visum sit id se dicent sequi, tamen exitum non habebunt,primum quia iis visis inter quae nihil interest aequaliter omnibus abrogatur fides: deinde, cum dicant posse accidere sapienti ut cum omnia fecerit diligentissimeque circumspexerit exsistat(現れる) aliquid quod et veri simile videatur et absit longissime a vero, ne(⇒poteruntを否定) si(⇒accedant) magnam partem quidem, ut solent dicere, ad verum ipsum aut quam proxime accedant(近づく), confidere sibi poterunt. Ut enim confidant, notum iis esse debebit insigne(=nota) veri, quo obscurato et oppresso quod tandem verum sibi videbuntur attingere(到達する)? Quid autem tam absurde dici potest quam cum ita loquuntur: 'Est hoc quidem illius rei signum aut argumentum, et ea re(そのために) id sequor, sed fieri potest ut id quod significatur aut falsum sit aut nihil sit omnino'? Sed de perceptione hactenus. Si quis enim ea quae dicta sunt labefactare volet, facile etiam absentibus nobis veritas se ipsa defendet.

36 一方、仮に彼らがよく見回してじっくり考えた後に、感覚の表象に従っていると言うとしても、やっぱり袋小路である。なぜなら、第一に、表象が区別できないのだからどの表象も信用出来ないし、第二に、賢者が最善を尽くして慎重に見回しても、そこに現れる物は真実に似ているように思えるが真実とは遠くかけ離れた物であると彼らは言う。だから、多くの場合、彼らがよく言うように、真実それ自体に非常に近づくことがあるとしても、彼らは自信が持てないはずだ。なぜなら、彼らが自信をもつためには、真実の目印が彼らにも必要だからである。ところが、その目印が曖昧で隠れたものであるなら、いったいどんな真実に彼らは到達できると言うのだろうか? だから、次のような言い方ほど馬鹿げたものがあるだろうか。「これは求めている対象の目印かあるいは証拠である。だからこれに従うが、それが指し示すものは虚偽かまたは全く存在しないかもしれない」と。しかし、知覚についてはここまでにする。というのは、私がいま述べたことを否定する人が現れても、真実は我々の助けがなくても容易に自分自身を守るはずだからである。

36  While if they assert that they follow a sense-presentation after some circumspection and careful consideration, nevertheless they will not find a way out, first because presentations that have no difference between them are all of them equally refused credence ; secondly, when they say that it can happen to the wise man that after he has taken every precaution and explored the position most carefully something may yet arise that while appearing to resemble truth is really very far remote from truth, they will be unable to trust themselves, even if they advance at all events a large part of the way, as they are in the habit of saying, towards the actual truth, or indeed come as near to it as possible. For to enable them to trust their judgement, it will be necessary for the characteristic mark of truth to be known to them, and if this be obscured and suppressed, what truth pray will they suppose that they attain to ? What language moreover could be more absurd than their formula, ' It is true that this is a token or a proof of yonder object, and therefore I follow it, but it is possible that the object that it indicates may be either false (a) or entirely non-existent ' ? But enough on the subject of perception ; for if anybody desires to upset the doctrines stated, truth will easily conduct her own defence, even if we decline the brief.

XII.

37. His satis cognitis quae iam explicata sunt, nunc de assensione atque approbatione quam Graeci συνκαταθεσιν[Greek: synkatathesin] vocant, pauca dicemus-non quo non latus locus(テーマ) sit, sed paulo ante jacta sunt fundamenta. Nam cum vim quae esset in sensibus explicabamus, simul illud aperiebatur, comprehendi multa et percipi sensibus, quod fieri sine assensione non potest. Deinde cum inter inanimum et animal hoc maxime intersit quod animal agit aliquid (nihil enim agens ne cogitari quidem potest quale sit), aut ei sensus adimendus est aut ea quae est in nostra potestate(自分の自由になる) sita reddenda assensio.

XII 37 今までに説明したことは充分わかったことにして、次にギリシア哲学のシュンカタテシスに相当する「同意」と「承認」(=『アカデミカ1』40)について少し触れておこう。というのは、この問題が些細なことだからではなく、少し前(=20)に既に基本的なことを話したからである。感覚がもつ能力について説明したときに、感覚によって多くのことが把握され知覚されることを明らかにしたが、この把握と知覚は同意なしには不可能なのである。次に、無生物と生物が最も異なる点は生物は何らかの行動をすることであるから(何の行動もしないような生物を考えることはできない)、生物から感覚を奪うことができない以上は、我々の自由意志である「同意」が生物にもあるとみなすべきである。

37 " Now that we are sufficiently acquainted with the matters already unfolded, let us say a few words on the subject of ' assent ' (b) or approval (termed in Greek συνκαταθεσισsyncatathesis) - not that it is not a wide topic, but the foundations have been laid a little  time back. For while we were explaining (c) the power  residing in the senses, it was at the same time disclosed that many things are grasped and perceived by the senses, which cannot happen without the act of assent. Again, as the greatest difference between an inanimate and an animate object is that an animate object performs some action (for an entirely inactive animal is an utterly inconceivable thing), either it must be denied the possession of sensation or it must be assigned a faculty of assenting as a voluntary act.


38. At vero animus quodam modo eripitur iis quos neque sentire neque assentiri volunt. Ut enim necesse est lancem(皿) in libra(天秤) ponderibus impositis deprimi(下げる), sic animum perspicuis(明白なもの) cedere. Nam quo modo non potest animal ullum non appetere id quod accommodatum ad naturam appareat (Graeci id οικειον[Greek: oikeion] appellant), sic non potest objectam rem perspicuam non approbare. Quamquam, si illa de quibus disputatum est vera sunt, nihil attinet de assensione omnino loqui; qui enim quid percipit assentitur statim. Sed haec etiam sequuntur, nec memoriam sine assensione posse constare nec notitias rerum nec artis, idque quod maximum est, ut sit aliquid in nostra potestate(何かが自由になる), in eo qui rei nulli assentietur non erit: ubi igitur virtus, si nihil situm est in ipsis nobis?

38 その一方で、感覚を働かすことも同意することも否定する人たちは、ある意味で精神を奪われた人たちである。天秤の皿に重りを置けば必ず下がるのと同じように、精神は明白なものに従うのである。というのは、どんな生物も自然に合致していると思われるものを欲求せずにはいられないのと同じように(ギリシア哲学のオイケイオンである)、生き物は自分が出会った明白な物に同意せずにはいられない。いやそれどころか、もしこれまでの議論が正しければ、同意について語る必要はまったくない。というのは、物事を知覚する人は直ちに同意するからである。しかし、次の点も重要である。つまり、同意なしには記憶も生まれないし物事の概念も学問も生まれないということである。さらに最も重要なことは、我々には自由意志があるが、何物にも同意しない人間には自由意志がないということになる。しかし自由意志がなければ、美徳はいったいどこにあるというのだ。

38  But on the other hand persons who refuse to exercise either sensation or assent are in a manner robbed of the mind itself ; for as the scale of a balance must necessarily sink when weights are put in it, so the mind must necessarily yield to clear presentations : since just as no animal can refrain from seeking to get a thing that is presented to its view as suited to its nature (the Greeks term it oikeion), so the mind cannot refrain from giving approval to a clear object when presented to it. Nevertheless, assuming the truth of the positions discussed, all talk whatever about assent is beside the mark ; for he who perceives anything assents immediately. But there also follow (a) the points that without assent memory, and mental concepts of objects, and sciences, are impossible ; and most important of all, granting that some freedom of the will exists, none will exist in one who assents to nothing ; where then is virtue, if nothing rests with ourselves?

39. Maxime autem absurdum vitia in ipsorum esse potestate neque peccare quemquam nisi assensione, hoc idem in virtute non esse, cujus omnis constantia et firmitas ex iis rebus constat quibus assensa est et quas approbavit. Omninoque ante videri aliquid quam agamus necesse est eique quod visum sit assentiatur. Quare qui aut visum aut assensum tollit, is omnem actionem tollit e vita.

39 何よりおかしいのは、悪事は自由意志によるし同意になしには成り立たないのに、美徳の場合には同意は必要ないと言うことである。というのは、美徳の堅実さと不変性は美徳が同意して受け入れた事から成り立っているからである。概して、我々は行動する前には必ず何らかの表象を目にする必要があり、その表象に同意する必要がある。したがって、表象や同意を否定する者は、人生のあらゆる行動を否定する者である。

39 And what is most absurd is that men's vices should be in their own power and that nobody should sin except with assent, but that the same should not be true in the case of virtue, whose sole consistency and strength is constituted by the things to which it has given its assent and so to say approval.(b) And speaking generally, before we act it is essential for us to experience some presentation, and for our assent to be given to the presentation ; therefore one who abolishes either presentation or assent abolishes all action out of life.

XIII.

40. Nunc ea videamus quae contra ab his disputari solent. Sed prius potestis totius eorum rationis quasi fundamenta cognoscere. Componunt igitur primum artem(理論) quandam de iis quae visa dicimus, eorumque et vim(意味) et genera definiunt, in his quale sit id quod percipi et comprehendi possit, totidem verbis quot Stoici. Deinde illa exponunt duo quae quasi contineant omnem hanc quaestionem:(1) quae ita videantur ut etiam alia eodem modo videri possint nec in iis quicquam intersit, non posse,eorum alia percipi alia non percipi: (2) nihil interesse autem, non modo si omni ex parte ejusdem modi(よく似ている) sint sed etiam si discerni non possint. Quibus positis unius argumenti conclusione tota ab his causa comprehenditur. Composita ea conclusio sic est: 'Eorum, quae videntur, alia vera sunt, alia falsa; et quod falsum est id percipi non potest. Quod autem verum visum est id omne tale est ut ejusdem modi etiam falsum possit videri; et quae visa sunt ejus modi ut in iis nihil intersit, non potest accidere ut eorum alia percipi possint, alia non possint. Nullum igitur est visum quod percipi possit.'


XIII 40 つぎに彼らが反論としてよく言うことを見てみよう。しかし、その前に彼らの学説(=懐疑説)の全体のいわば根本を君たちに知ってもらおう。彼らはまず最初に我々が表象と呼んでいる物について理論を組み立てて、その能力と種類を定義している。そして、その中で知覚と把握の対象となりうるものの性質を、ストア派と同じくらい詳しく定めている。次に彼らはいわばこの研究の全体をまとめた二つの命題を提示する。それは(1)ある物が別の物と同じように見える可能性があって、しかも両者の間に違いがない場合には、その内の一方が知覚できて他方が知覚できないということはありえない。(2)両者に違いがないのは、両者がすべての部分においてよく似ている場合だけでなく、両者の違いが見分けられない場合も、同じように起こる。これらを提示してから、彼らはたった一つの推論の中に全ての命題を含ませた。その推論とは次のようなものである。「表象のうちのあるものは真実であり、あるものは虚偽である。虚偽であるものは知覚できない。一方、あらゆる真実の表象は虚偽の表象とよく似ている可能性がある。そして、そのような区別できない表象のうちのあるものが知覚できて、あるものは知覚できないということはあり得ない。したがって、表象は知覚できない。」

40 Now let us examine the arguments usually advanced by this school on the other side. But before that, this is an opportunity for you to learn the ' foundations ' (c) of their whole system. Well,they begin by constructing a 'science of presentations'(as we render the term), and define their nature and classes, and in particular the nature of that which can  be perceived and grasped,(d) at as great a length as do the Stoics. Then they set out the two propositions that ' hold together ' the whole of this investigation, namely, (1) when certain objects present an appearance of such a kind that other objects also could present the same appearance without there being any difference between these presentations, it is impossible that the one set of objects should be capable of being perceived and the other set not capable ; but (2), not only in a case in which they are alike in every particular is there no difference between them, but also in a case in which they cannot be distinguished apart. Having set out these propositions, they include the whole issue within a single syllogistic argument ; this argument is constructed as follows : ' Some presentations are true, others false ; and what is false cannot be perceived. But a true presentation is invariably of such a sort that a false presentation also could be of exactly the same sort ; and among presentations of such a sort that there is no difference between them, it cannot occur that some are capable of being perceived and others are not. Therefore there is no presentation that is capable of being perceived.'(a)

41. Quae autem sumunt ut concludant id quod volunt, ex his duo sibi putant concedi, neque enim quisquam repugnat: ea sunt haec,'quae visa falsa sint, ea percipi non posse,' et alterum: 'Inter quae visa nihil intersit, ex iis non posse,alia talia esse ut percipi possint, alia ut non possint.' Reliqua vero multa et varia oratione defendunt, quae sunt item duo, unum: 'quae videantur, eorum alia vera esse, alia falsa,' alterum: 'omne visum, quod sit a vero, tale esse, quale etiam a falso possit esse.'

41 ところで、これらの命題は彼らが自分たちの主張(=表象は知覚できない)を証明していると考えているものであるが、そのうちで次の二つの命題は誰もが認めるものだと考えているし、実際、誰もこの二つには反対しない。その一つ目は「虚偽の表象は知覚できない」であり、二つ目は「区別できない表象のうちのあるものが知覚できて、あるものは知覚できないということはあり得ない」。上記の命題の残りの部分も彼らは長々とした議論によって弁護している。それは二つあって、その一つ目は「表象のうちのあるものは真実で、あるものは虚偽である」であり、二つ目は「あらゆる真実の表象は虚偽の表象とよく似たものである可能性がある」である。

41 Now of the propositions that they take as premisses from which to infer the desired conclusion, two they assume to be granted, and indeed nobody disputes them : these are, that false presentations cannot be perceived, and the second, that of presentations that have no difference between them it is impossible that some should be such as to be capable of being perceived and others such as to be incapable. But the remaining premisses they defend with a long and varied discourse, these also being two, one, that of the objects of presentations some are true, others false, and the other,that every presentation arising from a true object is of such a nature that it could also arise from a false object.

42. Haec duo proposita non praetervolant, sed ita dilatant(広げる), ut non mediocrem curam adhibeant et diligentiam; dividunt enim in partis,et eas quidem magnas, primum in sensus, deinde in ea quae ducuntur a sensibus et ab omni consuetudine, quam obscurari volunt(主張する), tum perveniunt ad eam partem ut ne ratione quidem et conjectura ulla res percipi possit. Haec autem universa concidunt etiam minutius; ut enim de sensibus hesterno sermone vidistis, item faciunt de reliquis(感覚から導かれるもの等), in singulisque rebus, quas in minima dispertiunt(区分する), volunt efficere iis omnibus quae visa sint veris(=omnibusにかかる) adjuncta esse falsa quae a veris nihil differant; ea cum talia sint, non posse comprehendi.

42 この二つの命題については彼らは簡単に済ませることなく、入念にしかも熱意を込めて詳論している。つまり、彼らはこれを多くのしかも大きな章に分けて論じている。その第一章は感覚についてであり、第二章は感覚から導かれるものと一般的な経験から導かれるものについてである。この経験について彼らは確実性を欠いていると主張する。次に来る章では、理性によろうが推論によろうが何物も知覚できないと言っている。この総体的な議論はさらに細かい部分に分けられている。感覚に関する昨日の議論で我々が見たように、彼らはそれ以外のことについても同じようにしている。つまり個々の対象を細部に分類し、その全てについて真実の表象が、真実の表象となんら異なることのない虚偽の表象と密接に結びついていることを証明しようとする。そして、感覚の表象がこのようなものであるからには、把握することは不可能であると言うのである。

42 These two propositions they do not skim over, but develop with a considerable application of care and industry ; they divide them into sections, and those of wide extent : first, sensations ; next, inferences from sensations and from general experience, which they deem to lack clarity ; then they come to the section proving the impossibiUty of perceiving anything even by means of reasoning and inference. These general propositions they cut up into still smaller divisions, employing the same method with all the other topics as you saw in yesterday's discourse that they do with sensation, and aiming at proving in the case of each subject, minutely subdivided, that all true presentations are coupled with false ones in no way differing from the true, and that this being the nature of sense-presentations, to comprehend them is impossible.

XIV.

43. Hanc ego subtilitatem(精巧) philosophia quidem dignissimam judico sed ab eorum causa,qui ita disserunt,remotissimam. Definitiones enim et partitiones, et horum luminibus utens oratio, tum similitudines dissimilitudinesque et earum tenuis et acuta distinctio fidentium est hominum illa vera et firma et certa esse quae tutentur(弁護する), non eorum qui clament nihilo magis vera illa esse quam falsa. Quid enim agant si, cum aliquid definierint, roget eos quispiam num illa definitio possit in aliam rem transferri quamlibet? Si posse dixerint, quid dicere habeant cur illa vera definitio sit? si negaverint, fatendum sit, quoniam vel illa vera definitio transferri non possit in falsum, quod ea definitione explicetur, id percipi posse, quod minime illi volunt. Eadem dici poterunt in omnibus partibus.

XI∨ 43 この精密さは哲学にとってはとても相応しいものだとは思うが、このような主張する人たちの立場とは無縁のものだと思う。定義や分類や明確な言語表現、類似と相違とその詳細な区分は、自分たちが主張する学説が真実で確実なものであることに自信をもっている人のすることで、自分たちの学説は真実でも虚偽でもないと主張する人たちのすることではない。彼らが何かの定義をしたあとで、その定義はほかのどんなもの(=虚偽のもの)にも適用できるのかと尋ねられたらどうするのか。もし適用できるというなら、その定義が真実である理由を(=真実と虚偽の区別をしないで)どう説明するのか。もし適用できないというなら、この真実である定義は虚偽の対象に適用できないのだから、その定義によって説明できる(=真実な)ものが知覚できることを認めねばならない。ところが、彼らはこれを認めようとしない。この議論は彼らの学説のすべての部分に当てはまる。

43  " In my own judgement this minuteness although no doubt highly worthy of philosophy is at the same time absolutely remote from the position of the authors of this line of argument. For definitions and partitions, and language employing figures (a) of this class, as also comparisons and distinctions and their subtle and minute classification, are the weapons of persons who are confident that the doctrines they are defending are true and established and certain, not of those who loudly proclaim that they are no more true than false. For what would they do if, when they have defined something, somebody were to ask them whether that particular definition can be carried over to any other thing you like ? If they say it can, what proof could they put forward that the definition is true ? if they say it cannot, they would have to admit that, since even this true definition cannot be applied to a false object(a), the object explained by the definition can be perceived, and this they will not allow at any price. The same argument it will be possible to employ at every section of the discussion.

44. Si enim dicent ea de quibus disserent se dilucide perspicere(わかる) nec ulla communione visorum impediri, comprehendere ea se fatebuntur. Sin autem negabunt vera visa a falsis posse distingui, qui poterunt longius progredi? Occurretur(反論される) enim, sicut occursum est. Nam concludi argumentum non potest nisi iis quae ad concludendum sumpta erunt ita probatis ut falsa ejusdem modi nulla possint esse: Ergo si rebus comprehensis et perceptis(知覚された) nisa et progressa ratio hoc efficiet, nihil posse comprehendi, quid potest reperiri quod ipsum sibi repugnet magis? Cumque ipsa natura accuratae orationis hoc profiteatur(公言する), se aliquid patefacturam(明らかにする) quod non appareat et quo(目的) id facilius assequatur(達成する) adhibituram et sensus et ea quae perspicua sint, qualis est istorum oratio qui omnia non tam esse quam videri volunt? Maxime autem convincuntur cum haec duo pro congruentibus(矛盾しない) sumunt tam vehementer repugnantia, primum esse quaedam falsa visa, quod cum volunt declarant quaedam esse vera, deinde ibidem inter falsa visa et vera nihil interesse: at primum sumpseras tamquam interesset-ita priori posterius, posteriori superius(=prior) non jungitur.

44 彼らがもし自分の議論の対象を完璧な明確さで理解しており、真実と虚偽の表象の共通性によって邪魔されていないと言うのなら、彼らはその対象を把握していることを認めるはずだ。ところが、もし真実の表象と虚偽の表象を見分けられないと言うのなら、どうやってこの先の議論を進めることが出来るというのだろう。なぜなら、彼らに対するこれまでの批判は、この先の議論にも当てはまるからである。というのは、君たちは、証明の前提とする命題に、それとよく似た虚偽の命題が存在し得ないことを、まず証明しないかぎり、何かを証明することは不可能だからである。したがって、もし把握され知覚された対象によって議論を進めることによって、何も把握できないことを証明するなら、これほど矛盾した議論があるだろうか。正確な議論の本質は、明らかでないものを明らかにすることであって、それをより容易に行うために明白なものと感覚とを利用するはずなのに、全ての物は存在するように見えるだけだと主張する人たちの議論はどうなるのだろう。次に示す完全に矛盾した二つの命題が両立していると彼らが考えている時点で、彼らの論理は破綻しているのである。つまり、彼らは、一方で、「虚偽の表象が存在する」というが、そう言うことはつまり「真実の表象が存在する」と言っていることになる。その一方で、「虚偽の表象と真実の表象は区別できない」と言っている。しかし、最初の命題では両者(=真実の表象と虚偽の表象)が区別できるかのように言っている。つまり、最初の命題は後の命題とは両立しないし、後の命題は最初の命題とは両立しないのである。


44 For if they say that they can see through the matters that they are discussing with complete clearness, and are not hampered by any overlapping (b) of presentations, they will confess that they can 'comprehend ' them. But if they maintain that true presentations cannot be distinguished from false ones, how will they be able to advance any further ? for they will be met as they were met before ; since valid inference is not possible unless you accept the propositions taken as premisses as so fully proved that there cannot possibly be any false propositions that resemble them : therefore if a process of reasoning that has carried through its procedure on the basis of things grasped and perceived arrives at the conclusion that nothing can be grasped, what more self-destructive argument could be discovered ? And when the very nature of accurate discourse professes the intention of revealing something that is not apparent, and of employing sensations and manifest presentations to facilitate the attainment of this result, what are we to make of the language of these thinkers who hold that everything does not so much exist as seem to exist ? But they are most completely refuted when they assume as mutually consistent these two propositions that are so violently discrepant, first, that some presentations are false, a view that clearly implies that some are true, and then in the same breath that there is no difference between false presentations and true ones : but your first assumption implied that there is a difference - thus your major premiss and your minor are inconsistent with one another.

45. Sed progrediamur longius et ita agamus ut nihil nobis assentati(おもねる) esse videamur; quaeque ab iis dicuntur sic persequamur ut nihil in praeteritis(見落とされた) relinquamus. Primum igitur perspicuitas illa quam diximus satis magnam habet vim ut ipsa per sese ea quae sint nobis ita ut sint indicet. Sed tamen ut maneamus in perspicuis firmius et constantius, majore quadam opus est vel arte vel diligentia ne ab iis quae clara sint ipsa per sese quasi praestigiis(詐欺) quibusdam et captionibus(誤謬) depellamur. Nam qui voluit subvenire erroribus Epicurus iis qui videntur conturbare veri cognitionem, dixitque sapientis esse opinionem(憶断、推測、哲学用語としては初出、以下動詞opinorも同じ) a perspicuitate sejungere, nihil profecit: ipsius enim opinionis errorem nullo modo sustulit.

45 だが、我々は議論を先に進めよう。そして、自分たちの説の方に偏っていると思われないように進めないといけない。そして懐疑派の説についての説明では何も見落としがないようにしせねばならない。まず最初に、我々が先に言及した明白性は充分大きな力を持っているので、それだけで対象をありのままに我々に示してくれるものである。しかしながら、明白なものに我々が確固とした信頼をもって留まるためには、屁理屈や勘違いによって、それ自身明白であるものを手放してしまうことがないように、もっと技術を磨いて最新の注意を払わなければいけない。というのは、エピクロスは、真実の認識の邪魔をすると思われるこれらの勘違いを取り除こうとして、憶断と明白性を区別することが賢者の仕事であると言ったが、何の役にも立たなかった。彼は憶断自体の誤りを少しも取り除かなかったからである。

45 " But let us advance further and proceed in such a manner as not to appear to have been unduly partial to our own views ; and let us go through the doctrines of these thinkers so thoroughly as to leave nothing passed over. First then what we have termed 'perspicuity ' has sufficient force of itself to indicate to us things that are as they are. But nevertheless, so that we may abide by things that are perspicuous with more firmness and constancy, we require some further exercise of method or of attention to save ourselves from being dislodged by 'trickeries ' (a) and captious arguments from positions that are clear in themselves. For Epicurus who desired to come to the relief of the errors that appear to upset our power of knowing the truth, and who said that the separation of opinion from perspicuous truth was the function of the wise man, carried matters no further, for he entirely failed to do away with the error connected with mere opinion.

XV.

46. Quam ob rem cum duae causae perspicuis et evidentibus rebus adversentur, auxilia totidem(同数の) sunt contra comparanda(準備する). Adversatur enim primum quod parum defigunt(集中する) animos et intendunt(緊張させる) in ea quae perspicua sunt ut quanta luce ea circumfusa sint possint agnoscere(理解する); alterum est quod fallacibus et captiosis interrogationibus circumscripti(騙される) atque decepti quidam, cum eas dissolvere non possunt, desciscunt a veritate. Oportet igitur et ea quae pro perspicuitate responderi possunt in promptu habere(用意する), de quibus iam diximus, et esse armatos ut occurrere(立ち向かう) possimus interrogationibus eorum captionesque discutere(破壊する), quod deinceps facere constitui(私は決心した).

X∨ 46 したがって、明白なもの、自明なものに対して二つの阻害要因があるとき、それに対する援軍も同じ数だけ用意しなければならない。第一の阻害要因は、明白なものはどれほどの明白さに満ちているかを理解できるほどに、人々が明白なものに対して精神を充分集中していないことである。第二の阻害要因は、詭弁に満ちたあやふやな質問に妨げられ騙されて、その質問を論破できずに、真理を手放してしまう人がいることである。だから、我々は明白さを擁護できるすでに述べたような反論を用意しておく必要がある。そして、そうして武装して彼らの質問に答えて、彼らの詭弁を撃退できる必要がある。私はこれを次にやるつもりである。

46 " Therefore inasmuch as things perspicuous and evident are encountered by two obstacles, it is necessary to array against them the same number of assistances. The first obstacle is that people do not fix and concentrate their minds on the perspicuous objects enough to be able to recognize in how much light they are enveloped ; the second is that certain persons, being entrapped and taken in by fallacious and captious arguments, when they are unable to refute them, abandon the truth. It is therefore necessary to have ready the counter-arguments, of which we have already spoken, that can be advanced in defence of perspicuity, and to be armed so that we may be able to meet their arguments and shatter their captions ; and this I have decided on as my next step.

47. Exponam igitur generatim(種類ごとに) argumenta eorum, quoniam ipsi etiam illi solent non confuse loqui. Primum conantur ostendere multa posse videri esse quae omnino nulla sint, cum animi inaniter moveantur eodem modo rebus iis quae nullae sint ut iis quae sint. Nam cum dicatis, inquiunt, visa quaedam mitti a deo, velut ea quae in somnis videantur quaeque oraculis, auspiciis, extis declarentur (haec enim aiunt probari(承認されている) Stoicis, quos contra disputant(批判する)), quaerunt quonam modo,falsa visa quae sint, ea deus efficere possit probabilia: quae autem plane proxime ad verum accedant,efficere non possit? aut si ea quoque possit, cur illa non possit quae perdifficiliter, internoscantur tamen? et si haec, cur non inter quae nihil sit omnino?

47 それでは、彼らの学説を順序正しく見ていこう。というのは、彼らはけっして混乱した話し方はしないからだ。まず最初に彼らは、全く存在しない多くのものが存在するように見える可能性があることを示そうとする。というのは、精神は全く存在しない物からも存在する物からと同じ様に無意味に影響されるからだというのである。そして、彼らは言う、君たちの学派が、例えば夢で見るものや神託や占いや生贄に示されるもののように、神から送られる表象があるという時(彼らが批判するストア派はこれらを受け入れていると言われている)、神は(=夢のような)虚偽な表象を真実らしく出来るのに、どうして真実に最も近い虚偽の表象を真実らしく出来ないだろうかと、彼らは問うのだ。あるいは、もし神にこれが出来るのなら、真実と区別できるがそれが難しい虚偽の表象をどうして真実らしく出来ないだろうかと問う。そして、もし神にこれができるのなら、真実と区別できない虚偽の表象をどうして真実らしく出来ないだろうかと問うのである。

47  I will therefore set out their arguments in classified form, since even they themselves make a practice of orderly exposition. They first attempt to show the possibility that many things may appear to exist that are absolutely non-existent, since the mind is deceptively affected by non-existent objects in the same manner as it is affected by real ones. For, they say, when your school asserts that some presentations are sent by the deity - dreams for example, and the revelations furnished by oracles, auspices and sacrifices (for they assert that the Stoics against whom they are arguing accept these manifestations) - how possibly, they ask, can the deity have the power to render false presentations probable and not have the power to render probable those which approximate absolutely most closely to the truth ? or else, if he is able to render these also probable, why cannot he render probable those which are distinguishable, although only with extreme difficulty, from false presentations ? and if these, why not those which do not differ from them at all ?

48. Deinde, cum mens moveatur ipsa per sese, ut et ea declarant(明らかにする) quae cogitatione depingimus et ea quae vel dormientibus vel furiosis videntur non numquam, veri simile(もっともらしい、ありそうな) est sic etiam mentem moveri ut non modo non internoscat vera visa illa sint anne falsa sed ut in iis nihil intersit omnino: ut si qui(=quis) tremerent et exalbescerent vel ipsi per se motu mentis aliquo vel objecta terribili re extrinsecus, nihil ut esset qui(adv=par quoi、Gaffiotに掲載あり) distingueretur tremor ille et pallor neque ut quicquam interesset inter intestinum(内面の) et oblatum. Postremo si nulla visa sunt probabilia quae falsa sint, alia ratio est; sin autem sunt, cur non etiam quae non facile internoscantur? cur non ut plane nihil intersit? praesertim cum ipsi dicatis sapientem in furore sustinere se ab omni assensu, quia nulla in visis distinctio appareat.

48 次に、心に思い描いたものや稀に夢や幻覚で見るものによって明らかなように、心は自分自身によって動かされるので、心は表象が真実か虚偽かを見分けられないだけでなく、真実の表章と虚偽の表象は区別できないというのが真実に近い、と彼らはいう。例えば、誰かが震えて青くなった原因が心の動きか外部の恐ろしい出来事なのかどちらかである場合がそうである。その人が震えて青くなった原因を見分ける材料は存在しないし、心の内部と外部との間には何の違いもない。そして、最後に彼らは言う、もし虚偽の表象はけっして真実らしくないのなら、話は別である。しかし、もし(=ストア派が言うように)虚偽の表象が真実らしいのなら、真実と容易に区別できない虚偽の表象がどうして真実らしくないだろうか? 真実と何の違いもない虚偽の表象がどうして真実らしくないだろうか。何より賢者は心が乱れている時に同意を控えるのは、表象の間に何の違いも明らかではないからだと、君たちは言うではないか、と。

48 Then, since the mind is capable of entirely self-originated motion, as is manifest by our faculty of mental imagination and by the visions that sometimes appear to men either when asleep or mad, it is probable that the mind may also be set in motion in such a manner that not only it cannot distinguish whether the presentations in question are true or false but that there really is no difference at all between them : just as if people were to shiver and turn pale either of themselves as a result of some mental emotion or in consequence of encountering some terrifying external object, with nothing to distinguish between the two kinds of shivering and pallor, and without any difference between the internal state of feeling and the one that came from without. Lastly, if no false presentations at all are probable, it is another story ; but if some are, why are not even those that are difficult to distinguish ? why not those that are so much like true ones that there is absolutely no difference between them ? especially as you yourselves say that the wise man when in a state of frenzy restrains himself from all assent because no distinction between presentations is visible to him.

XVI

49. Ad has omnis visiones inanis Antiochus quidem et permulta dicebat et erat de hac una re unius diei disputatio. Mihi autem non idem faciendum puto, sed ipsa capita dicenda. Et primum quidem hoc reprehendendum quod captiosissimo(インチキな) genere interrogationis utuntur, quod genus minime in philosophia probari(認める) solet, cum aliquid minutatim et gradatim additur aut demitur. Soritas hoc vocant, quia acervum(山) efficiunt uno addito grano(粒). Vitiosum sane et captiosum genus! Sic enim ascenditis 'Si tale visum objectum(前に置かれる) est a deo dormienti ut probabile sit, cur non etiam ut valde veri simile? cur deinde non ut difficiliter a vero internoscatur? deinde ut ne internoscatur quidem? postremo ut nihil inter hoc et illud intersit? ' Huc si perveneris me tibi primum quidque(Gildersleeve's p.202 primum quidque = each thing in order) concedente, meum vitium fuerit; sin ipse tua sponte processeris, tuum.

X∨I 49 このようなあらゆる幻影や幻覚に対して、アンティオコスは実に多くのことを語ったし、この一つの問題で一日じゅう議論したものだった。しかし私は同じことはせずに要点だけを述べることにする。まず第一に彼が批判したのは、彼らが極めてインチキ臭い論法を用いていることである。それは何かをわずかずつ漸進的に付け加えたり引き去ったりする論法で、決して哲学では認められないやり方である。彼らはこのような議論の仕方をソリテス(=砂山のパラドックス、堆積の議論、漸進論法)と呼んでいるが、これは砂を一粒付け加えることで砂山を作ることから来ている。これはもちろん間違ったインチキな議論の仕方である。というのは、君たち(=懐疑派)は「もし神が眠っている人に真実らしい表象を送るのなら、どうして真実に似た表象を送らないだろうか? その次に、神はどうして真実と区別するのが困難な表象を送らないだろうか。さらに、神はどうして真実と全く区別できない表象を送らないだろうか。最後に、神はどうして真実と何の違いもない表象が送らないだろうか?」と、このように進めていくのだ。もし君達がこの結論に至るまでの間、私が各段階を順番に受け入れたなら、それは私の責任となる。しかし、君たちが勝手にここに到達したのなら、君たちの責任である。

49 " In answer to all these ' unfounded sense-presentations ' (a) Antiochus indeed used to advance a great many arguments, and also he used to devote one  whole day's debate to this single topic ; but I do not think that I had better do the same, but state merely the heads of the argument. And as a first point one must criticize them for employing an exceedingly captious kind of argument, of a sort that is usually by no means approved of in philosophy - the method of proceeding by minute steps of gradual addition or withdrawal. They call this class of arguments soritae (b) because by adding a single grain at a time they make a heap. It is certainly an erroneous and captious kind of argument ! for you go on mounting up in this way : ' If a presentation put by the deity before a man asleep is of such a character that it is probable, why not also of such a character that it is extremely like a true one ? then, why not such that it can with difficulty be distinguished from a true one ? then, that it cannot even be distinguished ? finally, that there is no difference between the one and the other ? ' If you reach this conclusion owing to my yielding to you each successive step, the fault will have been mine ; but if you get there of your own accord, it will be yours.

50. Quis enim tibi dederit aut omnia deum posse aut ita facturum esse si possit? quo modo autem sumis ut,si quid cui simile esse possit, sequatur ut etiam difficiliter internosci possit? deinde ut ne internosci quidem? postremo ut eadem sint? ut, si lupi canibus similes sunt, eosdem dices ad extremum. Et quidem honestis similia sunt quaedam non honesta et bonis non bona et artificiosis minime artificiosa: quid dubitamus igitur affirmare nihil inter haec interesse? Ne repugnantia quidem videmus? Nihil est enim quod de suo genere in aliud genus transferri possit. At si efficeretur(証明される), ut inter visa differentium generum nihil interesset, reperirentur quae et in suo genere essent et in alieno. Quod fieri qui potest?

50 そもそも、神は全能だと誰が君に認めたというのか、あるいは神が全能だとしても、さっきのようなことをすると誰が君に認めたのか。一方で、君たちは、もし何かが何かに似ているなら、その二つをどうして「区別するのが困難」と考えるのか? さらに、そこからどうして「全く区別できない」になって、最後にどうして「同じもの」になるのか? それで行けば、もし狼が犬に似ているなら、最後には両者が同じだと君たちは言うことになる。実際、不名誉なことは名誉なことに似ているし、善くない事は善い事に似ているし、芸術的でないことは芸術的なことに似ている。するときっとこれらの間には何の違いもないと言い出すのだ。しかし、我々には全然違いがないと見えるだろうか。というのは、一方の種類から他方の種類に移せるようなものは何一つないからである。しかし、異なる種類の表象の間に何の違いもないことがもし証明されるなら、その異なる種類の両方に属するような表象が見つかるはずである。そんなことがどうして起きるだろうか。

50 For who will have granted you either that the deity is omnipotent, or that even if he can do as described he will ? and how do you make such assumptions that, if it is possible for x to resemble y, it will follow that only with difficulty can x and y be known apart ? and then, that they cannot even be known apart ? and finally, that they are identical ? for example, if wolves are like dogs, you will end by saying that they are identical. And it is a fact that some honourable things are like dishonourable ones and some good things like not good ones and some artistic things like inartistic ones ; why do we hesitate therefore to aver that there is no difference between these ? Have we no eye even for incongruities ? for there is nothing that cannot be carried over from its own class into another class. But if it were proved that there is no difference between presentations of different classes, we should find presentations that belonged both to their own class and to one foreign to them ; how can this possibly occur ? 

51. Omnium deinde inanium visorum una depulsio(追い払うこと) est, sive illa(=visa) cogitatione informantur(形作る), quod fieri solere concedimus, sive in quiete(眠り) sive per vinum sive per insaniam. Nam ab omnibus ejusdem modi visis perspicuitatem, quam mordicus tenere debemus, abesse dicemus. Quis enim, cum sibi fingit aliquid et cogitatione depingit, non simul ac(~するやいなや) se ipse commovit(動き出す) atque ad se revocavit, sentit quid intersit inter perspicua et inania? Eadem ratio est somniorum. Num censes Ennium, cum in hortis cum Ser.Galba vicino suo ambulavisset, dixisse: 'Visus sum mihi cum Galba ambulare?' At cum somniavit, ita narravit:

             visus Homerus adesse poeta.

Idemque in Epicharmo:

     Nam videbar somniare med(=me) ego esse mortuum.

Itaque simul ut experrecti(目覚める) sumus visa illa contemnimus neque ita habemus ut ea quae in foro gessimus.

51 あらゆる幻影や幻覚を追い払う唯一の方法がある。それらが我々がその可能性を認めるように、空想で作られたものであっても、睡眠か酒か狂気によって作られたものであっても同じである。それは全てこの種の表象には我々が頑固に固執する明白さが欠けていると宣言することである。空想で幻影を描いたとしても、自分が目覚めて我に帰るやいなや、明白なものと空虚なものの違いに誰が気づかないだろうか? 夢も同じ事である。エンニウスが隣人のセルヴィウス・ガルバと庭を散歩しているときに「私はガルバと一緒に散歩していると思う」と言いはしない。夢を見たときに彼は「自分は詩人ホメロスといっしょにいたと思う」と言ったのである。エピカルモスも同じ様に「僕は自分が死んだ夢を見たと思った」と言ったのである。このように我々は目覚めるやいなや、夢を軽視して、広場で経験した事とは違う扱いをするのである。

51 Consequently there is only one way of routing the difficulty about unreal presentations, whether depicted by the imagination, which we admit frequently to take place, or in slumber or under the influence of wine or of insanity : we shall declare that all presentations of this nature are devoid of perspicuity, to which we are bound to cling tooth and nail. For who when feigning to himself an imaginary picture of some object, the moment he bestirs himself and recalls his self-consciousness does not at once perceive the difference between perspicuous presentations and unreal ones ? The same applies to dreams. Do you fancy that when Ennius (a) had been walking in his grounds with his neighbour Servius Galba he used to say, ' Methought I was walking with Galba' ? But when he had a dream he told the story in this way :

             Methought the poet Homer stood beside me.

And the same in the case of Epicharmus (b) :

    For methought I had a dream that I myself was dead and gone.

And so as soon as we wake up we make light of that kind of visions, and do not deem them on a par with the actual experiences that we had in the forum.

XVII.

52. At enim dum videntur eadem est in somnis species eorumque quae vigilantes videmus! Primum interest: sed id omittamus. Illud enim dicimus, non eandem esse vim neque integritatem dormientium et vigilantium nec mente nec sensu. Ne vinolenti quidem quae faciunt eadem approbatione(同意) faciunt qua sobrii(しらふの): dubitant, haesitant, revocant se interdum,iisque quae videntur imbecillius assentiuntur, cumque edormiverunt illa visa quam levia fuerint intellegunt. Quod idem contingit insanis, ut et incipientes furere sentiant et dicant aliquid quod non sit id videri sibi, et cum relaxentur sentiant atque illa dicant Alcmaeonis(=Alcmaeoの属格):

 'Sed mihi ne utiquam(けっして~ない) cor consentit cum oculorum aspectu'.

X∨II 52 ところが、映像を見ている間は、睡眠中に見る映像と目覚めている時に見る映像とに何の違いもない、と懐疑派は言う。しかし、二つはそもそも違うものである。それはあとで考えるとして、眠っている人と起きている人とでは精神と感覚の能力も健全さも違うということを指摘しておきたい。酔っぱらいの行動には、素面の人間の場合と同じ同意を伴っていないのである。つまり、酔っぱらいはしっかりしていないし確信がない。時々我に返るが、自分に見えるものには弱々しく同意する。そして一眠りして酔いが覚めたときには、自分が見たものがどれほど軽微なものかが分かるのである。同じ事が気が狂った人間にも起こる。最初は自分の狂気を感じて、次に存在していないものが見えると言いだす。そして落ち着いてくると、感覚を取り戻して、アルクマイオンが言ったのと同じ事を言う。「私の心は目に見えているものに同意できない」と。

52" But you will say that at the time when we are experiencing them the visions we have in sleep have the same appearance as the visual presentations that we experience while awake ! To begin with, there is a difference between them ; but do not let us dwell on that, for our point is that when we are asleep we have not the same mental or sensory power and fulness of function as we have when awake. Even men acting under the influence of wine do not act with the same decision as they do when sober : they are doubtful and hesitating and sometimes pull themselves up, and they give a more feeble assent to their sense-presentations and, when they have slept it off, realize how unsubstantial those presentations were. The same happens to the insane : at the beginning of their attack they are conscious that they are mad, and say that something is appearing to them that is not real ; and also when the attack is subsiding they are conscious of it, and say things like the words of Alcmaeon (c) :  But my mind agrees in no way with the vision of my eyes.

 53. At enim ipse sapiens sustinet se in furore, ne approbet falsa pro veris. Et alias quidem saepe(=同意を控える), si aut in sensibus ipsius est aliqua forte gravitas(鈍さ) aut tarditas(鈍いこと) aut obscuriora sunt quae videntur aut a perspiciendo temporis brevitate excluditur. Quamquam totum(全体の) hoc, sapientem aliquando sustinere assensionem, contra vos est. Si enim inter visa nihil interesset, aut semper sustineret aut numquam. Sed ex hoc genere toto perspici potest levitas orationis(⇒genere) eorum, qui omnia cupiunt confundere. Quaerimus gravitatis, constantiae, firmitatis, sapientiae judicium: utimur exemplis somniantium, furiosorum, ebriosorum. Illud attendimus(気づく) in hoc omni genere quam inconstanter loquamur? Non enim proferremus vino aut somno oppressos aut mente captos tam absurde, ut tum diceremus interesse inter vigilantium visa et sobriorum et sanorum(正気な) et eorum qui essent aliter(そうでない) affecti, tum nihil interesse.

53 それに対して、賢者は狂気に陥っても、虚偽なものを真実なものとして同意するようなことはしない、と懐疑派は言う。またそのほかに感覚が圧迫されたり鈍化した場合や、見たものが明確でない場合や、観察する時間が少なくてよく見えない場合なども、賢者は同意を控える、と。しかしながら、賢者が時々同意を控えるというのは、懐疑派の意見としては全くおかしなことである。というのは、もし表象の間に何の違いもないなら、賢者は常に同意を控えるか、まったく控えないかどちらかのはずだからである。ところが、これまでの懐疑派の全ての議論から見られるのは、全てを混乱させようとする人たちの言葉の軽さである。我々が求めているのは、知恵の印である重厚さであり安定性であり確実さなのだ。それなのに、我々が使っている例は寝ている人や狂人や酔っぱらいである。こういう懐疑派の全体的なやり方から、我々は実に矛盾した議論をしていることに気がつくはずだ。我々は酒と睡魔に襲われている人たちや精神異常の人を持ち出して、目覚めて素面で正気な人が見る物と、眠っていたり異常な精神状態にある人の見る物の間に違いがあるとかないとか言うべきではないだろう。

53 But you will say that the wise man in an attack of madness restrains himself from accepting false presentations as true. So indeed he often does on other occasions, if his own senses happen to contain an element of heaviness or slowness, or if the presentations are rather obscure, or if he is debarred by lack of time from a close scrutiny. Although this admission, that the wise man sometimes withholds his assent, goes wholly against your school ; for if presentations were indistinguishable, he would either withhold his assent always or never. But out of all this what is 'perspicuous' is the lack of substance in the case put by these thinkers, who aspire to introduce universal confusion. What we are looking for is a canon of judgement proper to dignity and consistency, to firmness and wisdom, what we find are instances taken from dreamers, lunatics and drunkards. Do we notice in all this department how inconsistent that talk is ? If we did, we should not bring forward people who are tipsy or fast asleep or out of their minds in such a ridiculous fashion as at one moment to say that there is a difference between the presentations of the waking and sober and sane and of those in other conditions, and at another moment to say that there is no difference.

54. Ne hoc quidem cernunt, omnia se reddere incerta, quod nolunt,(ea dico incerta quae αδηλα[Greek: adela] Graeci)? Si enim res se ita habeant ut nihil intersit utrum ita cui videantur ut insano an sano, cui possit exploratum(確かめた) esse de sua sanitate? quod velle efficere non mediocris insaniae est. Similitudines vero aut geminorum aut signorum anulis impressorum pueriliter consectantur. Quis enim nostrum(我々の誰が) similitudines negat esse, cum eae plurimis in rebus appareant? sed si satis est ad tollendam cognitionem similia(類似) esse multa multorum, cur eo non estis contenti, praesertim concedentibus nobis? et cur id potius contenditis quod rerum natura non patitur, ut non (in suo quidque genere sit tale quale est nec sit in duobus aut pluribus nulla re differens ulla communitas)?  Ut si sint et ova ovorum et apes apium simillimae, quid pugnas igitur? aut quid tibi vis in geminis? Conceditur enim similis esse, quo contentus esse potueras; tu autem vis eosdem plane esse, non similis, quod fieri nullo modo potest.

54 懐疑派は自分たちが全てを不確実にしようとしていることに気づかないのだろうか? しかもこれは彼らも望まないことである(不確実と訳したのはギリシア語のアデーラである)。もし狂人に見える物と正気の人間に見える物との間に違いがないのなら、自分が正気であることも確かめられなくなってしまう。こんな状況にしたいと思うことこそひどく狂っているのではないか。一方、彼らは双子の類似性や印鑑の押し跡の類似性を子供みたいに熱心に追求しているが、我々の誰がそうした類似性を否定するだろうか。多くの物についてのそうした類似性は明らかだからである。しかし、認識力を否定するほど多くの物の中に多くの類似性が見られるのなら、どうして君たちはそれで満足しないのだろうか。しかも、我々もそれは認めているのである。しかるに、どうして君たちは自然に反することまで主張するのだ? どんな物にもそれ自身の特徴があり、二つ以上の物の間にはあらゆる点で異なることのない共通性など存在しないことを、どうして否定するのか? 例えば、卵は卵同士似ているし、ミツバチはミツバチ同士似ているとして、君たちは何が不満なのだ? 君たちは双子に何を望むのだ? なぜなら、似ていることが認められても、それで君たちは満足できずに、似ているのではなくて全く同じだと言うのだ。しかし、それはあり得ないことである。

54 Do they not even see that they make everything uncertain -  a position which they repudiate (I use ' uncertain ' to translate the Greek αδηλαadela) ? for if objects are so constituted that it makes no difference whether they appear to anybody as they do to a madman or as they do to a sane person, who can be satisfied of his own sanity ? to desire to produce this state of affairs is in itself no inconsiderable mark of insanity. But the way in which they harp on cases of resemblance between twins or between the seals stamped by signet-rings is childish. For which of us denies that resemblances exist, since they are manifest in ever so many things ? but if the fact that many things are like many other things is enough to do away with knowledge, why are you not content with that, especially as we admit it, and why do you prefer to urge a contention utterly excluded by the nature of things, denying that everything is what it is in a class of its own and that two or more objects never possess a common character differing in nothing at all (a) ? For example , granting that eggs are extremely like eggs and bees like bees, why therefore do you do battle ? Or what are you at in this matter of twins ? for it is granted that two twins are alike, and that might have satisfied you ; but you want them to be not alike but downright identical, which is absolutely impossible.

55. Dein confugis(逃げこむ) ad physicos(自然学者), eos qui maxime in Academia irridentur(あざける), a quibus ne tu quidem iam te abstinebis(遠ざかる), et ais Democritum dicere innumerabilis esse mundos et quidem sic quosdam inter sese non solum similis sed undique perfecte et absolute ita pares, ut inter eos nihil prorsus(まったく) intersit [et eos quidem innumerabiles], itemque homines. Deinde postulas ut, si mundus ita sit par alteri mundo ut inter eos ne minimum quidem intersit, concedatur tibi ut in hoc quoque nostro mundo aliquid alicui sic sit par ut nihil differat, nihil intersit; cur enim, inquies, cum ex illis individuis(原子) unde omnia Democritus gigni affirmat, in reliquis mundis et in iis quidem innumerabilibus innumerabiles Q. Lutatii Catuli non modo possint esse sed etiam sint, in hoc tanto mundo Catulus alter non possit effici(作る)?

55 そして君たちは、アカデメイア派の間で嘲笑の的となっている自然哲学者たちに助けを求めるのだ。君たちは自然哲学者から離れられないのだ。そしてデモクリトスが無数の世界が存在してそれらの幾つかは似ているだけではなく全く同じで何の違いもないと言ったという話をもちだす。人間についても同じことが言える、と。そして、もし一つの世界が別の世界と同じで少しの違いもないのなら、我々のこの世界でも何かが何かと同じで何の違いもないということを認めるべきだと君たちは言っているのだ。例えば、デモクリトスが「そこから全てのものが生まれる」と主張するあの原子によって、ほかの無数の世界には無数のクイントゥス・ルタティウス・カトゥルスが存在する可能性があるだけでなく実際に存在するのに、この広い世界にもう一人のカトゥルスがどうして作り出せないだろうかと、君たちは言うのだ。

55 Then you fly for refuge to the natural philosophers, the favourite butts of ridicule in the Academy, from whom even you can no longer keep your hands, and you declare that Democritus says that there are a countless number of worlds, and what is more that some of them to such an extent not merely resemble but completely and absolutely match each other in every detail that there is positively no difference between them, and that the same is true of human beings. Then you demand that if one world so completely matches another world that there is not even the smallest difference between them, it shall be granted to you that in this world of ours likewise some one thing so completely matches some other thing that there is no difference or distinction between them ; for what is the reason, you will say, why whereas in the rest of the worlds, countless numbers as they are, there not only can be but actually are a countless number of Quintus Lutatius Catuluses, arisen out of those atoms out of which Democritus declares that everything comes into existence, yet in this vast world another Catulus cannot possibly be produced ?

XVIII.

56. Primum quidem me ad Democritum vocas, cui non assentior potiusque refello(反駁する) propter id quod dilucide(明らかに) docetur(証明する) a politioribus(より洗練された) physicis singularum rerum singulas proprietates esse. Fac enim antiquos illos Servilios, qui gemini fuerunt, tam similis quam dicuntur: num censes etiam eosdem fuisse? Non cognoscebantur foris, at domi: non ab alienis, at a suis. An non videmus hoc usu venisse(起こる) ut, quos numquam putassemus a nobis internosci posse, eos consuetudine adhibita tam facile internosceremus uti ne minimum quidem similes viderentur?

XVIII 56 そもそも君たちがデモクリトスを引き合いに出しても、僕はデモクリトスの言うことに同意しないどころかむしろ反対しているのだ。なぜなら、個々の物に個々の特徴があることが彼より進んだ自然哲学者たちによってはっきり証明されているからである。例えば、むかし双子のセルウィリウスがそっくりだったと言われているが、その二人を君たちは全く同じ人間だったと言うのかね。彼らは自分の家の外では見分けがつかなかったとしても、自分の家では見分けがついた。他人は見分けられなかったが、身内は見分けられたのだ。我々がとても見分けられないと思っている人も、慣れてくると簡単に見分けられて、少しも似ていないと思えるようになるのを、我々は知らないだろうか?

56 " In the first place indeed you summon me before Democritus ; whose opinion I do not accept but rather reject, on the ground of the fact that is lucidly proved by more accomplished natural philosophers," that particular objects possess particular properties. For suppose that the famous Servilius twins of old days did resemble each other as completely as they are said to have done : surely you do not think that they were actually identical ? Out of doors they were not known apart, but at home they were ; they were not by strangers, but they were by their own people. Do we not see that it has come about that persons whom we thought we should never be able to know apart we have come by the exercise of habit to know apart so easily that they did not appear to be even in the least degree alike ?

57. Hic pugnes licet, non repugnabo; quin etiam concedam illum ipsum sapientem de quo omnis hic sermo est, cum ei res similes occurrant(起こる) quas non habeat dinotatas(=denotatas、dinotoは羅和辞典には記載があるが無い単語),retenturum assensum nec umquam ulli viso assensurum, nisi quod tale fuerit quale falsum esse non possit. Sed et ad ceteras res habet quandam artem qua vera a falsis possit distinguere, et ad similitudines istas usus adhibendus est. Ut mater geminos internoscit consuetudine oculorum, sic tu internosces si assueveris(慣れる). Videsne ut in proverbio(周知である) sit ovorum inter se similitudo? Tamen hoc accepimus(聞く), Deli(デロス島、属格、位格) fuisse complures salvis rebus(栄えている) illis qui gallinas(雌鳥) alere permultas quaestus(商売) causa solerent; ii cum ovum inspexerant, quae id gallina peperisset(生む) dicere solebant.

57 ここで君たちが反論しても、もう僕は反論し返さない。なぜなら、ここでずっと話題にしてきた賢者なら自分が見分けのつかないほど似たものに出会った時に同意を控えて、どんな表象もそれが虚偽である可能性があるなら同意しないということを、僕がどうして認めないだろうか。しかし、賢者はそれ以外のものに対して真実と虚偽を区別する技術を賢者が持っているのだから、よく似たものを見分ける技術も身に付けられるはずだ。双子の母親は目が慣れれば双子を見分けられるように、君たちも慣れてくれば見分けられるのである。卵は見分けがつかない程よく似ていることは誰でも知っているし、君たちもそう思うだろう。しかし、我々が聞いた話では、まだ栄えていた頃のデロス島にいた多くの鶏屋は、卵を見てどの鶏が産んだものか見分けられたそうである。

57 At this point although you may show fight I shall not fight back ; indeed I will actually allow that the wise man himself who is the subject of all this discussion, when he encounters similar things that he has not got distinguished apart, will reserve his assent, and will never assent to any presentation unless it is of such a description as could not belong to a false presentation. But just as he has a definite technique applicable to all other objects to enable him to distinguish the true from the false, so to the resemblances you adduce he has to apply practice : just as a mother knows her twins apart by having familiarized her eyes, so you will know them apart if you habituate yourself. Are you aware that the likeness of one egg to another is proverbial ? yet we have been told that at Delos at the time of its prosperity a number of people were in the habit of keeping large numbers of hens for trade purposes ; these poultrykeepers used to be able to tell which hen had laid an egg by merely looking at it.

58. Neque id est contra nos, nam nobis satis est ova illa non internoscere, nihil enim magis assentiri par est, hoc illud esse, quasi inter illa omnino nihil interesset; habeo enim regulam ut talia visa vera judicem qualia falsa esse non possint; ab hac mihi non licet transversum(長さ), ut aiunt, digitum(指) discedere, ne confundam omnia. Veri enim et falsi non modo cognitio, sed etiam natura tolletur, si nihil erit quod intersit: ut etiam illud absurdum sit, quod interdum soletis dicere, cum visa in animos imprimantur, non vos id dicere, inter ipsas impressiones nihil interesse, sed inter species et quasdam formas eorum. Quasi vero non specie visa judicentur! quae fidem nullam habebunt sublata veri et falsi nota.

58 この話も我々の考えに合っている。というのは、我々が卵を見分けられないことに不満はないからである。なぜなら、それにも関わらず、この卵とあの卵とは何の違いもないというのと、両者は同じ卵であることに同意することは等しくないからである。というのは、我々は、虚偽ではありえないものを真実の表象であると判断するという基準をもっているからである。我々はこの基準から言わば一ミリも外れるようなことは許されない。さもなければ、我々はすべてを大混乱にしてしまう。なぜなら、もし真実と虚偽の違いがないのなら、真実と虚偽の認識も、真実と虚偽の本質も失われてしまうからである。そうなると、君たちがよく言っていることも馬鹿げたことになってしまう。君たちは、表象が心に刻まれた時、その刻印自体にではなく、その外見や形態に何の違いもないと言っているからだ。しかし、表象は外見でしか判断できないのだ。真実と虚偽の目印を取り上げてしまえば、表象には何の信頼性もなくなってしまう。

58 Nor does that go against us, for we are content not to be able to know those eggs apart, since to agree that this egg is the same as that egg, is nevertheless not the same thing as if there really were no distinction between them ; for I possess a standard enabling me to judge presentations to be true when they have a character of a sort that false ones could not have ; from that standard I may not diverge a finger's breadth, as the saying is, lest I should cause universal confusion. For not only the knowledge but even the nature of true and false will be done away with if there is no difference between them, so that even the remark that you have a way of occasionally making will be absurd - namely, that what you assert is not that when presentations are impressed on to the mind there is no difference between the imprints themselves, but that there is no difference between their ' species,' or so to say their classforms." As if forsooth presentations were not judged with reference to their class, and will have no reliability if the mark of truth and falsehood is abolished !

59. Illud vero perabsurdum, quod dicitis, probabilia vos sequi, si re nulla impediamini. Primum qui potestis non impediri, cum a veris falsa non distent(異なる)? deinde quod judicium est veri, cum sit commune falsi? Ex his illa necessario(副詞) nata est εποχη[Greek: epoche], id est assensionis retentio(制止、停止), in qua melius sibi constitit(首尾一貫している) Arcesilas, si vera sunt quae de Carneade non nulli(複主少なからぬ) existimant. Si enim percipi nihil potest, quod utrique visum est, tollendus assensus est. Quid enim est tam futile(むなしい) quam quicquam approbare non cognitum? Carneadem autem etiam heri audiebamus solitum esse eo delabi(陥る⇒ut) interdum, ut diceret opinaturum, id est peccaturum esse sapientem. Mihi porro non tam(⇒quam) certum est esse aliquid, quod comprehendi possit, de quo iam nimium etiam diu disputo, quam sapientem nihil opinari, id est, numquam assentiri rei vel falsae vel incognitae.


59 何も邪魔されなければ真実らしさに従うと君たちは言っていることも、全く馬鹿げたことだ。まず第一に、虚偽の表象が真実の表象と違いがないときに、どうして君たちは邪魔されずに観察できるというのか。第二に、真実の表象に虚偽の表象と区別できないものがあるときに、どのような真実の基準があるというのか。このために、必然的に例のエポケーすなわち同意の保留が生またのであり、カルネアデスについて多くの人が言っている事が正しいなら、これに関してはアルケシラオスの方がカルネアデスよりも一貫性がある。つまり、もしこの二人が考えるように何も知覚できないのなら、同意は否定されねばならない。実際、認識していない事を受け入れるほど虚しいことがあるだろうか。ところが、昨日も聞いたように、カルネアデスは賢者も憶断を持つ、すなわち誤りを犯すと言うところまで譲歩してしまったのだ。しかし、私にとっては、(これまで時間をかけて検討してきたように)何か把握出来るものが存在するということもさること ながら、賢者が何も憶断することはない、すなわち虚偽であったり認識されていない事に同意することはないということはさらに確かなことなのである。

59 But the height of absurdity is your assertion that you follow probabilities if nothing hampers you. In the first place how can you be unhampered when there is no difference between true presentations and false ? next, what criterion is there of a true presentation if one criterion belongs in common to a true one and a false ? These considerations necessarily engendered the doctrine of epoche,(a) that is, ' a holding back of assent,' in which Arcesilas was more consistent, if the opinions that some people hold about Carneades are true. For if nothing that has presented itself to either of them can be perceived, assent must be withheld ; for what is so futile as to approve anything that is not known ? But we kept being told yesterday that Carneades was also in the habit of taking refuge in the assertion that the wise man will occasionally hold an opinion, that is, commit an error. For my part, moreover, certain as I am that something exists that can be grasped (the point I have been arguing even too long already), I am still more certain that the wise man never holds an opinion, that is, never assents to a thing that is either false or unknown.

60. Restat illud, quod dicunt, veri inveniendi causa contra omnia dici oportere et pro omnibus. Volo igitur videre quid invenerint. 'Non solemus,' inquit, 'ostendere.' 'Quae sunt tandem ista mysteria? aut cur celatis quasi turpe aliquid sententiam vestram?' 'Ut qui audient,' inquit,'ratione potius quam auctoritate ducantur.' Quid si utroque? num pejus est? Unum tamen illud non celant, nihil esse quod percipi possit. An in eo(←illud) auctoritas nihil obest? Mihi quidem videtur vel plurimum; quis enim ista tam aperte perspicueque et perversa(ひねくれた) et falsa secutus(従う) esset, nisi tanta(⇒copia) in Arcesila, multo etiam major in Carneade et copia(大量) rerum et dicendi vis fuisset?

60 あと彼らの主張で残っているのは、真実を発見するためには全てについて賛否両論を闘わせなければならないというものだ。それで彼らが発見したものを私は知りたい。ところが、それは人に見せないことになっていると彼らは言うのだ。その秘密主義はなんなのだ? なぜ君たちは自分たちの考え方を恥ずかしい物であるかのように隠すのか? それは、自分たちの説を聞く人が権威にではなく理性に導かれるためだと言う。しかし、両方に導かれたらどうなのか? その方が悪いだろうか。ところが彼らはただ一つのこと、つまり知覚できるものは何もないという考えだけは隠していない。しかし、この考えには権威が影響していないのだろうか。私にはこの考えにはまさに権威が影響しているると思う。実際、もし豊富な知識と雄弁をもつアルケシラオスがいなかったら、いや、それよりさらにすぐれたカルネアデスがいなかったなら、これほど明らかにインチキな学説に誰が従っただろうか?

60 There remains their statement that for the discovery of the truth it is necessary to argue against all things and for all things. Well then, I should like to see what they have discovered. ' Oh,' he says, ' it is not our practice to give an exposition.' ' What pray are these holy secrets of yours, or why does your school conceal its doctrine like something disgraceful ? ' ' In order,' says he, ' that our hearers may be guided by reason rather than by authority.' What about a combination of the two ? is not that as good ? All the same, there is one doctrine that they do not conceal - the impossibility of perceiving anything. Does authority offer no opposition at this point ? To me at all events it seems to offer a very great deal ; for who would have adopted doctrines so openly and manifestly wrongheaded and false, unless Arcesilas had possessed so great a supply of facts and of eloquence, and Carneades an even much greater ?

XIX.

61. Haec Antiochus fere et Alexandreae tum et multis annis post, multo etiam asseverantius, in Syria cum esset mecum, paulo ante quam est mortuus. Sed iam confirmata causa te, hominem amicissimum―me autem appellabat―et aliquot annis minorem natu, non dubitabo monere: Tune(⇒sequere), cum tantis laudibus philosophiam extuleris(褒める) Hortensiumque nostrum dissentientem commoveris(かき乱す), eam philosophiam sequere(現直受2単) quae confundit vera cum falsis, spoliat(奪う) nos judicio, privat(奪う) approbatione, omnibus orbat(奪う) sensibus? Et Cimmeriis(キンメリー人、洞窟の中の暗闇に暮らす民族) quidem, quibus aspectum(見ること) solis sive deus aliquis sive natura ademerat(奪う) sive ejus loci quem incolebant(住む) situs(位置), ignes tamen aderant, quorum illis(彼ら) uti(使う) lumine licebat; isti(懐疑派) autem quos tu probas(認める) tantis offusis(満たす) tenebris ne scintillam(火花) quidem ullam nobis ad dispiciendum(見る) reliquerunt; quos si sequamur, iis vinculis(鎖) simus astricti (縛られた)ut nos commovere(動く) nequeamus.

XIX 61 以上のようなことをアンティオコスは当時アレクサンドリアにいたときに語ったのである。彼はそれから数年後の亡くなる少し前、私と一緒にシリアにいた時も、もっと熱心に語った。ところで、私は今こうして自分の学説を話し終えたので、私より年下で親友の君に(と僕を名指しした)遠慮無く忠告させてもらう。君は哲学を非常に賞賛してそれに反対するホルテンシウスを転向させたが、君は、真実と虚偽を区別しないで、我々から判断力を奪い、承認を否定し、あらゆる感覚を取り去るような哲学に従うのかね。しかし、神の仕業か住む場所のせいか何かで太陽を奪われたあのキンメリア人でさえも火を持っていて、その光を使うことが出来たのだ。それなのに、君が認める人たちは我々を大きな闇で覆ってしまって、物を見るための小さな光も奪ってしまったのだよ。我々がもし彼らに従うなら、鎖でがんじがらめにされて一歩も動けなくなってしまうよ。

61 " These virtually were the teachings advanced by Antiochus in Alexandria at the time mentioned, and also even much more dogmatically many years afterwards when he was staying with me in Syria a little before his death. But now that my case is established, I will not hesitate to give some advice to you as a very dear friend " - he was addressing myself - " and a person some years my junior : Will you, who have lauded philosophy so highly, and have shaken our friend Hortensius in his disagreement with you, follow a system of philosophy that confounds the true with the false, robs us of judgement, despoils us of the power of approval, deprives us of all our senses ? Even the people of Cimmeria, whom some god, or nature, or the geographical position of their abode, had deprived of the sight of the sun, nevertheless had fires, which they were able to employ for light ; but the individuals whose authority you accept have so beclouded us with darkness that they have not left us a single spark of light to give us a glimpse of sight ; and if we followed them, we should be fettered with chains that would prevent our being able to move a step.

62. Sublata enim assensione omnem et motum animorum et actionem rerum sustulerunt; quod non modo recte fieri, sed omnino fieri non potest. Provide etiam ne uni tibi istam sententiam minime liceat defendere. An tu, cum res occultissimas(極秘の計画) aperueris(明らかにする) in lucemque protuleris(公表する) juratusque dixeris ea te comperisse(発見する) (quod mihi quoque licebat qui ex te illa cognoveram), negabis esse rem ullam quae cognosci, comprehendi, percipi possit? Vide quaeso(頼む) etiam atque etiam ne illarum quoque rerum pulcherrimarum a te ipso minuatur auctoritas." Quae cum dixisset ille, finem fecit.

62 なぜなら、彼らは同意を取り上げてしまったことで、心の動きも行動も全てを取り上げてしまったんだからね。同意を否定するのは間違っているだけでなく不可能だ。気を付けたまえよ。君だけはこんな考え方を擁護することは許されない事なんだからね。君が例の陰謀計画(=カティリナ陰謀計画)を探りだして明るみに出した時に、君はそれを見つけたと誓いを立てて言った(君からをそれを聞いた知った私もまたそうすることができる)のに、その君が、認識したり把握したり知覚したり出来るものはないと言うのかね? あの立派な手柄の信憑性を君自身の手で損なうようなことはしないよう、くれぐれも気を付けたまえ」。彼はこう言うと話を終えた。

62 For by doing away with assent they have done away with all movement of the mind and also all physical activity ; which is not only a mistake but an absolute impossibility. Be careful too that you are not the one person for whom it is most illegitimate to uphold this theory of yours ; what, when it was you who exposed and brought to light a deeply hidden plot (a) and said on oath that you knew about it ' (b) (which I might have said too, having learnt about it from you), will you assert that there is no fact whatever that can be learnt and comprehended and perceived ? Pray take care again and again that you may not yourself cause the authority of that most glorious achievement also to be diminished." Having said this, he ended.

63. Hortensius autem vehementer admirans, quod quidem perpetuo(絶えず) Lucullo loquente fecerat, ut etiam manus saepe tolleret (nec mirum, nam numquam arbitror contra Academiam dictum esse subtilius), me quoque, jocansne(冗談か) an ita sentiens (non enim satis intellegebam) coepit hortari ut sententia desisterem(撤回する). Tum mihi Catulus, "Si te," inquit, "Luculli oratio flexit(転向させる), quae est habita memoriter(正確で) accurate copiose, taceo, neque te quo minus si tibi ita videatur sententiam mutes deterrendum(やめさせる) puto. Illud vero non censuerim(~ない方がいいと思う), ut ejus auctoritate moveare. Tantum enim non te modo monuit," inquit arridens, "ut caveres ne quis improbus tribunus plebis(護民官), quorum vides quanta copia semper futura sit, arriperet(出廷させる) te et in contione quaereret qui(=how) tibi constares(一貫性がある), cum idem negares quicquam certi posse reperiri, idem te comperisse dixisses. Hoc, quaeso, cave ne te terreat. De causa autem ipsa malim quidem te ab hoc dissentire. Sin cesseris(<cedo 従う譲る), non magnoopere mirabor. Memini enim Antiochum ipsum, cum annos multos alia sensisset, simul ac visum sit, sententia destitisse." Haec cum dixisset Catulus, me omnes intueri.

63 その話にホルテンシウスはしきりに感動していた。彼はルクルスの話している間ずっとそうで、時々両手を空に向けて上げるほどだった(それも当然だった。私が見ても、アカデメイア派(=懐疑派)への反論をこれほど上手くやった人はいないからだ)。ホルテンシウスは冗談か本気は知らないが(そこは私はよく分からなかった)僕に考えを変えるように勧め始めたのだ。するとカトゥルス君が僕に言った。「もし君がルクルスの話が気に入ったのなら、僕は何も言わないよ。もし君が考えを変える気になったのなら、僕は邪魔をしない。なにせルクルスの話は実によく出来ていたし量的にも不足はなかったからだ。だが、君は彼の名声に気圧されない方がいいと思う」。カトゥルス君は笑いながら言った、「ルクルスは君に忠告したようなものだよ。君は一方で確かな事を見つけるのは不可能だと言って、他方で確かな事を見つけたと言ったりしたら、破廉恥な民衆法廷が君を召喚して君の矛盾を追及するだろう、そんな法廷はいくらでもあるから気をつけろと。だが、そんなことを君は恐れてはいけない。我々の学説のためには君は相手の考えを否定してもらいたい。だがもし君が相手の考えに従うとしても、私はそんなに驚かない。というのも、私はアンティオコスが何年もの間別の考えを持っていたが、変えた方がいいと思った時に、その考えを捨てたのを覚えているからだ」。カトゥルス君がこう言うと、みんなは私の方を注目した。

63 Hortensius however, indicating emphatic admiration, as he had in fact done all through Lucullus's discourse, frequently even raising his hands in wonder (and that was not surprising, for I do not think the case against the Academy had ever been argued with more minute precision), began to exhort me also, whether in jest or earnest (for I could not quite make out), to abandon my opinion. Thereupon Catulus said to me, " If Lucullus's speech has won you over - and its delivery showed memory, concentration and fluency - , I am silent, and I do not think you ought to be frightened away from changing your opinion if you think fit to do so. But I should not advise your letting his authority influence you ; for he all but warned you just now," he said with a smile at me, " to be on your guard lest some wicked tribune of the people - and what a plentiful supply there will always be of them you are well aware - should arraign you, and cross-examine you in a public assembly as to your consistency in both denying the possibility of finding anything certain and asserting that you had discovered some certainty. Pray don't be alarmed by this ; but as to the actual merits of the case, although I should it is true prefer you to disagree with him, if you give in I shall not be greatly surprised, for I remember that Antiochus himself in spite of having held other views for a number of years abandoned his opinion as soon as he saw fit." After these words from Catulus, everybody looked towards me.

XX.

64. Tum ego non minus commotus quam soleo in causis majoribus, huius modi quadam oratione sum exorsus. "Me, Catule, oratio Luculli de ipsa re ita movit ut docti hominis et copiosi et parati et nihil praetereuntis eorum quae pro illa causa dici possent, non tamen ut ei respondere(反論する) posse diffiderem(望みを失う). Auctoritas autem tanta plane me movebat, nisi tu opposuisses non minorem tuam. Aggrediar(始める) igitur, si pauca ante quasi de fama mea dixero.

XX 64 それから私(=キケロ)は大きな裁判のときと同じくらいに緊張して、次のように話し始めた。「カトゥルス君よ、いま問題になっている事についてルクルスさんの今の話は本当によく出来ていて何の抜かりもなく彼の学識の深さをよく表していて、僕は深く感銘を受けましたが、そうは言っても僕が自信を無くして、もうぐうの音も出ないというほどではありませんでした。確かに、ルクルスさんの名声は大したもので僕も圧倒されそうになりましたが、君が負けずに自分の名前で押し返してくれたので、僕も一言いわせてもらいましょう。でも、その前に少し自分の評判についてお話しします。

64 Thereupon I, feeling quite as nervous as I usually do when I have a specially big case on, began what was almost a set speech on the following lines. " For my part, Catulus, Lucullus's speech on the actual merits of the issue has affected me as that of a scholarly, fluent and well-equipped person who passes by none of the arguments that can be advanced in support of the case put forward, though all the same not to the point of my distrusting my ability to answer him ; yet his great authority was unquestionably working upon me, had you not set against it your authority which is no smaller. I will therefore set about it, after a few preliminary remarks on the subject of my own reputation, if I may use the term.

65. Ego enim si aut ostentatione aliqua adductus aut studio certandi ad hanc potissimum philosophiam me applicavi, non modo stultitiam meam, sed etiam mores et naturam condemnandam puto. Nam, si in minimis rebus pertinacia(頑固) reprehenditur, calumnia(ごまかし) etiam coercetur(罰する), ego de omni statu(立場) consilioque(判断) totius vitae aut certare cum aliis pugnaciter aut frustrari(騙す) cum alios tum etiam me ipsum velim? Itaque, nisi ineptum(無意味) putarem in tali disputatione id facere quod cum de re publica disceptatur(議論する) fieri interdum solet, jurarem per Jovem deosque penates me et ardere studio veri reperiendi et ea sentire quae dicerem.

65 僕は自己顕示欲や闘争心から特にこの哲学の学派を選んだのでないし、そんなことをするのは愚かな事であるだけではなく、僕の性格に疑問符がついてしまう。実際、ごく些細な事で頑固さが批判され詭弁が禁じられているのだから、人生の生き方や人生の目的についての議論において、僕はただ勝ちたいがために人と争う積りはないし、人や自分自身を騙そうとする積りはない。だから、政治的な議論をするときにいつも慣例になっている事をこの種の議論で行うことが無意味な事でないなら、僕は宣誓する、真実を発見することに熱意を傾けて本当に思っていることだけ語ることを。

65 For if my own motive in choosing this particular school of philosophy for my adherence was some sort of ostentation or combativeness, I consider that  not merely my folly but even my moral character deserves condemnation. For if in the most trifling matters we censure obstinacy and actually punish chicanery, am I likely to want either to join battle with others for the sake of fighting, or to deceive not only others but myself also, when the entire system and principle of the whole of life is the issue ? Accordingly unless I thought it foolish in such a discussion to do what is customary occasionally in political controversy, I should swear by Jove and the gods of my household that I am fired with zeal for the discovery of the truth, and that I really hold the opinions that I am stating.

66. Qui enim possum non cupere(切望する) verum invenire, cum gaudeam, si simile veri quid invenerim? Sed,ut hoc pulcherrimum esse judico, vera videre, sic pro veris probare falsa turpissimum est. Nec tamen ego is sum qui nihil umquam falsi approbem, qui numquam assentiar, qui nihil opiner, sed quaerimus de sapiente. Ego vero ipse et magnus quidem sum opinator (non enim sum sapiens) et meas cogitationes sic derigo(合わせる), non ad illam parvulam Cynosuram(小熊座) qua

 fidunt duce nocturna Phoenices in alto,

ut ait Aratus, eoque directius gubernant quod eam tenent quae
 
 cursu interiore brevi convertitur orbe,

sed Helicen(大熊座) et clarissimos Septemtriones(北斗七星), id est, rationes has latiore specie, non ad tenue(小さい) elimatas(小さくした). Eo fit ut errem et vager latius. Sed non de me, ut dixi, sed de sapiente quaeritur. Visa enim ista cum acriter(激しく) mentem sensumve pepulerunt(駆り立てる), accipio iisque interdum etiam assentior (nec percipio tamen, nihil enim arbitror posse percipi)-non sum sapiens,itaque visis cedo nec possum resistere; sapientis autem hanc censet Arcesilas vim(⇒cavereと videre) esse maximam, Zenoni assentiens, cavere ne capiatur, ne fallatur videre(用心する)-nihil est enim ab ea cogitatione quam habemus de gravitate sapientis, errore, levitate, temeritate disjunctius(離れた). Quid igitur loquar de firmitate sapientis? quem quidem nihil opinari tu quoque, Luculle, concedis. Quod quoniam a te probatur (ut praepostere(順序を逆にして) tecum agam; mox referam me(戻る) ad ordinem), haec primum conclusio(推論) quam habeat vim considera.

66 実際、僕がもし真実に似たものを見つけることに喜びを感じるなら、どうして僕が真実を発見することを願わないでいられようか。しかしながら、僕は真実を見つけることが何よりすばらしい事であると思うが、虚偽を真実として受け入れることほど恥ずべきことはない。それにも関わらず、僕は虚偽を決して受け入れない人間ではないし、同意したことも憶断したこともない人間ではない。問題は賢者である。しかし、僕は賢者でないから憶断ばかりしているし、自分の考えを導くとき僕は小熊座のような小さな物には従わない。

「小熊座をフェニキア人は夜の海の導き手として信頼した」

とはアラートゥス(アラトス)の言葉だが、実際フェニキア人は小熊座を目印としていたのでまっすぐに航海できた。その

「小熊座は内側のコースを短い周期で回っている」。

そうではなくて、僕は大熊座と最も明るい北斗七星に従っている。つまり、もっと広い観点の論理に従っているのであり、細かいことに制限された論理ではないのだ。その結果、僕は間違うし迷子になる。しかし、それは僕の事であり、いま問題にしているのは賢者である。というのは、あなた達のいう表象が僕の心と感覚に強く影響を与えたら、僕はそれを受け入れるし、時には同意もする。(しかし知覚することはない。僕は何物も知覚できないと考えているから)。つまり、僕は賢者ではない。だから、表象には従うし抵抗することは出来ない。それに対して、アルケシラオスによれば、騙されたり罠にかかったりしない能力では賢者が最も優れていて、これはゼノンと同意見である。というのは、賢者の崇高さについての我々のイメージは、過失や軽率さや当てずっぽうからは程遠いものだからである。したがって、賢者の手堅さについては何を言う必要があるだろうか。それどころか、ルクルスさん、あなたは賢者が何も憶断することはないとまで言った。それなら(ここでは話しの順序が逆になっているが、そのうち本来の順序に戻すつもりだ)、まずは次の三段論法にどんな意味があるか考えて欲しい。

66 For how can I fail to be eager for the discovery of truth, when I rejoice if I have discovered something that resembles truth ? But just as I deem it supremely honourable to hold true views, so it is supremely disgraceful to approve falsehoods as true. And nevertheless I myself am not the sort of person never to give approval to anything false, never give absolute assent, never hold an opinion ; it is the wise man that we are investigating. For my own part however, although I am a great opinion-holder (a) (for I am not a wise man), at the same time the way in which I steer my thinking is not by that tiny star, the Cynosure, in which

Phoenicians place their trust by night
To guide them on the deep,

as Aratus (b) puts it, and steer the straighter because
they keep to her who revolves upon

An inner circle and an orbit brief,

but by Helice and the resplendent Septentriones, that is, by these theories of wider aspect, not fined down and over-subtilized. The result is that I roam and wander more widely ; but it is not I, as I said, but the wise man that is the subject of our inquiry. For when the presentations you talk of have struck my mind or my sense sharply I accept them, and sometimes I actually give assent to them (though nevertheless I do not perceive them, for I hold that nothing can be perceived) - I am not a wise man, and so I yield to presentations and cannot stand out against them ; whereas the strongest point of the wise man, in the opinion of Arcesilas, agreeing with Zeno, lies in avoiding being taken in and in seeing that he is not deceived - for nothing is more removed from the conception that we have of the dignity of the wise man than error, frivolity or rashness. What then shall I say about the wise man's firmness ? even you, Lucullus, allow that he never advances a mere opinion. And since you agree with this (to deal with you out of turn : I will soon return to a regular procedure), consider first the validity of this syllogism

XXI.

67. 'Si ulli rei sapiens assentietur umquam, aliquando etiam opinabitur; numquam autem opinabitur; nulli igitur rei assentietur.' Hanc conclusionem Arcesilas probabat, confirmabat enim et primum et secundum.(Carneades non numquam secundum illud dabat, assentiri aliquando. Ita sequebatur etiam opinari, quod tu non vis,et recte,ut mihi videris.) Sed illud primum, sapientem si assensurus esset etiam opinaturum, falsum esse et Stoici dicunt et eorum astipulator(支持者) Antiochus: posse enim eum falsa a veris et quae non possint percipi ab iis quae possint distinguere.

XXI 67  「もし賢者が何かに同意することがあるとすれば、いつかは憶断をすることになるだろう。ところが、賢者が憶断することは決してない。したがって、賢者は何物にも同意することはない。」この三段論法はアルケシラオスが認めたものである。なぜなら、彼は大前提と小前提をどちらも受け入れたからである。(カルネアデスは小前提を時に認めた(=賢者が憶断する)。すると「賢者は同意することがある」となり、「賢者も憶断する」となった。あなたはこの点を認めようとしないが、それは正しいと思う。) けれども、ストア派の人もストア派に同調するアンティオコスも「もし賢者が同意するなら憶断することになる」という大前提は誤りだと言っている。なぜなら、賢者は真実から虚偽を、知覚できる物から知覚できない物を区別出来るからと言うのである。

67 'If the wise ever assents to anyfhing, he will sometimes also form an opinion ; but he never will form an opinion ; therefore he will not assent to anything.' This syllogism Arcesilas used to approve, for he used to accept both the major premiss and the minor (Carneades used sometimes to grant as minor premiss that the wise man sometimes assents, so that it followed that he also holds an opinion, which you will not allow, and rightly, as I think). But the major premiss, that if the wise man did assent he would also hold an opinion, both the Stoics and their supporter Antiochus declare to be false, arguing that the wise man is able to distinguish the false from the true and the imperceptible from the perceptible.

68. Nobis autem primum, etiam si quid percipi possit, tamen ipsa consuetudo assentiendi periculosa esse videtur et lubrica(危険な). Quam ob rem cum tam vitiosum esse constet assentiri quicquam aut falsum aut incognitum, sustinenda est potius omnis assensio, ne praecipitet, si temere processerit. Ita enim finitima(近接した) sunt falsa veris eaque quae percipi non possunt eis quae possunt (si modo ea sunt quaedam: iam enim videbimus) ut tam in praecipitem locum non debeat se sapiens committere. Sin autem omnino nihil esse quod percipi possit a me sumpsero et, quod tu mihi das, accepero, sapientem nihil opinari, effectum illud erit, sapientem assensus omnes cohibiturum(抑制する), ut videndum tibi sit, idne malis an aliquid opinaturum esse sapientem. 'Neutrum,' inquies, 'illorum.' Nitamur(努力する) igitur nihil posse percipi; etenim de eo omnis est controversia.

68 一方、我々は、たとえ何かが知覚できるとしても、同意する習慣は危険であり躓きのもとであると考える。したがって、虚偽や未知の何かに同意することが大きな間違いなのは明らかである以上、あらゆる同意は控えねばならないのだ。軽率に進むことは大ケガの元だからである。それほど虚偽は真実と似ているのであり、知覚出来ない物は知覚出来る物と似ているのである(そのような物があるとしての話である。このことはあとで扱う)。だから、そんな危うい所に賢者は近づいてはいけないのである。さらに、もし僕が何物も知覚できないと考えて、同時に、あなたが僕に認めていること、つまり賢者は決して憶断しないということを僕が受け入れる場合にも、賢者はあらゆる同意を控えるということになる。そして、あなたはこの結果を受け入れないのなら、賢者も憶断するということを認めなければいけない。ところが、あなたはこのどちらも認めない。そこで僕たちは何物も知覚できないことを証明しよう。実際、全ての議論はここにかかっているからである。

68 But in our view, in the first place, even if anything could be perceived, nevertheless the mere habit of assenting appears dangerous and slippery, and therefore since it is agreed that to give assent to anything that is either false or unknown is so serious a fault, preferably all assent is to be withheld, to avoid having a serious fall if one goes forward rashly ; for things false lie so close to things true, and things that cannot be perceived to things that can (assuming there are such things, which we shall see soon), that it is the duty of the wise man not to trust himself to such a steep slope. But if on the contrary I assume on my own authority that there is nothing at all that can be perceived, and accept your admission that the wise man forms no opinion, this will prove that the wise man will restrain all acts of assent, so that you will have to consider whether you prefer this view or the view that the wise man will hold some opinion. 'Neither of those views,' you will say. Let us therefore stress the point that nothing can be perceived, for it is on that that all the controversy turns.

XXII.

69. Sed prius pauca cum Antiocho, qui haec ipsa quae a me defenduntur et didicit apud Philonem tam diu ut constaret diutius didicisse neminem, et scripsit de his rebus acutissime, et idem haec non acrius accusavit in senectute quam antea defensitaverat. Quamvis igitur fuerit acutus, ut fuit, tamen inconstantia levatur auctoritas. Quis enim iste dies illuxerit quaero qui illi ostenderit eam quam multos annos esse negitavisset(断固否定する) veri et falsi notam. Excogitavit aliquid? Eadem dicit quae Stoici. Paenituit illa sensisse? Cur non se transtulit ad alios et maxime ad Stoicos? eorum enim erat propria ista dissensio. Quid? eum Mnesarchi paenitebat? quid? Dardani? qui erant Athenis tum principes Stoicorum. Numquam a Philone discessit, nisi postea quam ipse coepit qui se audirent(弟子) habere.

XXII 69 しかし、その前にアンティオコスについて一言述べよう。彼は僕が支持している学説をフィロンのもとで誰よりも長く学んだことは確かだし、その学説について詳しい本を書いた人だ。しかも、その熱心に支持した学説を老年になってから同じぐらい熱心に批判した人でもある。彼の議論は鋭かったが、それでも意見を変えたことで彼の権威は大きく損なわれた。彼が長年の間頑強に否定してきた真実と虚偽の目印が急に正しいと思うようになったのは何時のことなのか、知りたいものだ。彼は何か思いついたのだろうか? 彼はストアと同じ事を言い出したのだ。彼は以前に考えていたことを後悔したのか? それなら、どうしてほかの学派、特にストア派に移らなかったのか? というのは、彼の反論はストア派の反論そのものだからである。どうしてだろう? 当時アテネのストア派のリーダーだったメネサルコスやダルダノスが気に入らなかったのか。アンティオコスは自分で講義を始めるまではフィロンのもとを離れなかったのだ。

69 " But first let us have a few words with Antiochus, who studied under Philo the very doctrines that I am championing for such a long time that it was agreed that nobody had studied them longer, and who also wrote upon these subjects with the greatest penetration, and who nevertheless in his old age denounced this system, not more keenly than he had previously been in the habit of defending it. Although therefore he may have been penetrating, as indeed he was, nevertheless lack of constancy does diminish the weight of authorlty. For I am curious to know the exact date of the day whose dawning light revealed to him that mark of truth and falsehood which he had for many years been in the habit of denying. Did he think out something original ? His pronouncements are the same as those of the Stoics. Did he become dissatisfied with his former opinions ? Why did he not transfer himself to another school, and most of all why not to the Stoics ? for that disagreement with Philo was the special tenet of the Stoic school. What, was he dissatisfied with Mnesarchus? or with Dardanus ? they were the leaders of the Stoics at Athens at the time. He never quitted Philo, except after he began to have an audience of  his own.
 

70. Unde autem subito vetus Academia revocata est? Nominis dignitatem videtur, cum a re ipsa descisceret, retinere voluisse, quod erant qui illum gloriae causa facere dicerent, sperare etiam fore ut ii qui se sequerentur Antiochii vocarentur. Mihi autem magis videtur non potuisse sustinere concursum(攻撃) omnium philosophorum. (Etenim de ceteris sunt inter illos non nulla communia: haec Academicorum est una sententia, quam reliquorum philosophorum nemo probet.) Itaque cessit, et ut ii qui sub Novis solem non ferunt, item ille cum aestuaret(暑い) veterum ut Maenianorum sic Academicorum umbram(日陰) secutus est.

70 どうして突然彼は古アカデメイア派(=独断派)を復活したのか? 彼は学問的には脱落者となりながら面目は保ちたかったのだと言われている。彼は名声のためにそうしたのだという人たちがいるからである。自分の後継者がアンティオコス派と呼ばれるようにしたいのだと言う人もいる。しかし、僕はむしろ彼が他の哲学者たち総攻撃に耐えられなかったからだと思う。(他の点では哲学者たちは意見が一致する点がないわけではないが、アカデメイア派のこの考え方(=知覚の否定)だけは、他の学派の哲学者たちは誰も容認できないのだ)。そこで、彼だけは引き下がって、新町の太陽の光が暑くて耐えられずに旧市街の古いバルコニーの日陰を求めるように、彼は古アカデメイア派(=プラトンの後継=独断派)に救いを求めたのだ。

70 But why this sudden revival of the Old Academy ? It is thought that he wanted to retain the dignity of the name in spite of abandoning the reality - for in fact some persons did aver that his motive was ostentation, and even that he hoped that his following would be styled the School of Antiochus. But I am more inclined to think that he was unable to withstand the united attack of all the philosophers (for although they have certain things in common on all other subjects, this is the one doctrine of the Academics that no one of the other schools approves) ; and accordingly he gave way, and, just like people who cannot bear the sun under the New Row(a), took refuge from the heat in the shade of the Old Academy, as they do in the shadow of the Balconies(b).

71. Quoque solebat uti argumento tum cum ei placebat nihil posse percipi, cum quaereret, Dionysius ille Heracleotes utrum comprehendisset certa illa nota qua assentiri(同意する) dicitis oportere―illudne quod multos annos tenuisset Zenonique magistro credidisset, honestum quod esset id bonum solum esse, an quod postea defensitavisset, honesti inane nomen esse, voluptatem esse summum bonum? ― qui ex illius commutata(変えた) sententia docere vellet nihil ita signari in animis nostris a vero posse quod non eodem modo possit a falso, is curavit ut quod argumentum ex Dionysio ipse sumpsisset(使う), ex eo(=Antiocho) ceteri sumerent. Sed cum hoc alio loco plura, nunc ad ea, quae a te, Luculle, dicta sunt.

71 アンティオコスが「何も知覚出来るものはない」と考えていた時いつも使っていた議論の仕方は、同意のために必要だとあなた達が言う確かな目印によって、ヘラクレイトスのディオニュソスが長年信奉してゼノンを師と仰いでいた考え方、つまり誠実さこそ唯一の善であるという考え方か、後に支持した考え方、つまり、誠実は名ばかりであり快楽こそ最高の善だという考え方のどちらを、彼は把握していたかと問うやり方だった。そして、アンティオコスはディオニュソスのこの宗旨変えから「我々の心に真実によって刻印されるもので虚偽によって同じ様に刻印されていないものはない」という考えを教えようとした。ところが、彼が出来たことは、ディオニュソスの例から証明しようとしたことを、アンティオコス自身が身をもって他人に証明することだったのである。この事については別の場所でもっとくわしく話そう。いまから、ルクルスさん、あなたによって話されたことに移ろう。

71  And as to the argument that he was in the habit of employing at the period when he held that nothing could be perceived, which consisted in asking which of his two doctrines had the famous Dionysius of Heraclea grasped by means of that unmistakable mark which according to your school ought to be the foundation of assent - the doctrine that he had held for many years and had accepted on the authority of his master Zeno, that only the morally honourable is good, or the doctrine that he had made a practice of defending afterwards, that morality is an empty name, and that the supreme good is pleasure ? - in spite of Antiochus's attempt to prove from Dionysius's change of opinion that no impression can be printed on our minds by a true presentation of a character that cannot also be caused by a false one, he yet ensured that the argument which he himself had drawn from Dionysius should be drawn by everybody else from himself(c). But with him I will deal more at length elsewhere ; I turn now, Lucullus, to what was said by you.

XXIII.

72. Et primum quod initio dixisti videamus quale sit; similiter(⇒atque) a nobis de antiquis philosophis commemorari(言及する) atque seditiosi solerent claros viros sed tamen popularis aliquos nominare. Illi cum res non bonas tractent, similes bonorum videri volunt. Nos autem dicimus ea nobis videri quae vosmet ipsi nobilissimis philosophis placuisse conceditis. Anaxagoras nivem(雪) nigram dixit esse. Ferres me, si ego idem dicerem? Tu ne si dubitarem quidem. At quis est? num hic sophistes(sic enim appellabantur ii qui ostentationis(みせびらかし) aut quaestus causa philosophabantur)?  maxima fuit et gravitatis et ingenii gloria.

XXIII 72 まずあなたが最初に言ったことを見てみましょう。僕達が過去の哲学者の名前を持ち出すのは、世の中を混乱させようとする連中が高名だが大衆受けのよい過去の人の名前をよく持ち出すのと似ている、とあなたは言う。しかし、彼らは悪事を企みながら過去の偉人たちに似ていると思われようとしたのだ。ところが、僕達は僕達の考えがあなた達も認める著名な哲学者たちの考えと同じだと言っているだけなのである。例えばアナコサゴラスは雪は黒いと言ったが、もし僕が同じ事を言ったらあなたは認めてくれるだろうか。僕が疑わしいと言ってもあなた達は認めてくれないだろう。しかし、アナクサゴラスとは誰なんだ? 単なるソフィストだとでも言うのか?(ソフィストとは名声や金儲けのために哲学をした人たちのことだ)。才能と学識の偉大さにおいてアナクサゴラスの名声は比類がなかったのである。
 
72 " And first let us see what we are to make of your remark at the beginning,(a)  that our way of recalling ancient philosopliers was like the seditionmongers' habit of putting forward the names of persons who are men of distinction but yet of popular leanings. Those people although they have unworthy designs in hand desire to appear like men of worth ; and we in our turn declare that the views we hold are ones that you yourselves admit to have been approved by the noblest of philosophers. Anaxagoras said (b) that snow is black : would you endure me if I said the same ? Not you, not even if I expressed myself as doubtful. But who is this Anaxagoras ? surely not a sophist (for that is the name that used to be given to people who pursued philosophy for the sake of display or profit) ? Why, he was a man of the highest renown for dignity and intellect.

73. Quid loquar de Democrito? Quem cum eo conferre possumus non modo ingenii magnitudine sed etiam animi, qui ita sit ausus ordiri(始める),'Haec loquor de universis'? Nihil excipit de quo non profiteatur(約束する). Quid enim esse potest extra universa? quis hunc philosophum non anteponit Cleanthi, Chrysippo, reliquis inferioris aetatis? qui mihi cum illo collati quintae classis videntur. Atque is non hoc dicit quod nos, qui veri esse aliquid non negamus, percipi posse negamus; ille verum plane negat esse; sensusque idem non obscuros dicit sed tenebricosos ― sic enim appellat eos. Is qui hunc maxime est admiratus, Chius(キオスの) Metrodorus initio libri qui est de natura, 'Nego(⇒scire nos 2回),' inquit, 'scire nos(1) sciamusne aliquid an nihil sciamus, ne id ipsum quidem, nescire (aut scire), scire nos(2), nec omnino sitne aliquid an nihil sit.'

73 デモクリトスについても同様である。彼は大胆にも「これは宇宙に関する私の考えである」といって始めたのだから、すぐれた才能と精神の偉大さにおいて彼もまた比類がいない。彼が論じていない物は何もないのだ。なぜなら、宇宙のほかに何もないからである。だから誰もがデモクリトスをクレアンテスやクリュシポスやその他の後代の哲学者たちよりも優れていると言う。彼らは僕にとってデモクリトスと比べたら最低ランクの哲学者である。ところが、その彼が僕達と意見を異にする。僕達は真実の存在を否定しないが、真実が知覚できることを否定する。それに対して、デモクリトスは真実の存在を否定する。デモクリトスは感覚は薄暗闇どころか真っ暗闇の中にあると言う。彼は実際にそう言ったのである。彼を崇拝者するキオスのメトロドーロスは、自然についての自分の本のはじめに言っている。「我々が何か知っているか何も知らないかについて我々は知らない(=scire nosを否定)。そのこと自体、つまり「知っている」(あるいは「知らない」)についても我々は知らない。さらに何か存在するのか何も存在しないのかについても我々は知らない」と彼はいう。

73 Why should I talk about Democritus ? Whom can we compare for not only greatness of intellect but also greatness of soul, with one who dared to begin, ' These are my utterances about the universe'(c) ? - he excepts nothing as not covered by his pronouncement, for what can be outside the universe ? Who does not place this philosopher before Cleanthes or Chrysippus or the rest of the later period, who compared with him seem to me to belong to the fifth class (d) ? And he does not mean what we mean, who do not deny that some truth exists but deny that it can be perceived ; he flatly denies that truth exists at all ; and at the same time says that the senses are (not dim but) ' full of darkness ' (e) - for that is the term he uses for them. His greatest admirer, the Chian Metrodorus, at the beginning of his volume On Nature says 'I deny that we know whether we know something or know nothing, and even that we know the mere fact that we do not know (or do know), or know at all whether something exists or nothing exists.'

74. Furere tibi Empedocles videtur: at mihi dignissimum(⇒sonum) rebus iis de quibus loquitur sonum(言葉) fundere(口に出す); num ergo is excaecat(盲目にする) nos aut orbat sensibus, si parum magnam vim censet in iis esse ad ea quae sub eos subjecta sunt judicanda? Parmenides, Xenophanes, minus bonis quamquam versibus sed tamen illi versibus, increpant(非難する) eorum arrogantiam quasi irati, qui cum sciri nihil possit audeant se scire dicere. Et ab iis aiebas removendum(考慮に入れない) Socratem et Platonem. Cur? an de ullis certius possum dicere? Vixisse cum iis equidem videor: ita multi sermones perscripti sunt, e quibus dubitari non possit quin Socrati nihil sit visum sciri posse. Excepit unum tantum, 'scire se nihil se scire,' nihil amplius(そのほか). Quid dicam de Platone? qui certe tam multis libris haec persecutus(書き留める) non esset, nisi probavisset, ironiam enim alterius, perpetuam praesertim, nulla fuit ratio persequi.


74 あなたの意見ではエンペドクレスは狂っているということだが、僕の考えでは、彼は自分の扱っている問題について最も相応しいことを述べていると思う。感覚には自分の前に現れたものを判断する充分な能力がないと彼が言うとき、彼は我々の視力やそのほかの感覚を奪ってしまったと言えるだろうか。パルメニデスとクセノファネスは、下手な詩ではあるが、何も知ることは出来ないのに自分は知ることができると言い張る人たちの傲慢さに腹を立てて非難している。あなたはこれらの自然哲学者の中からソクラテスとプラトンを除くべきだと言った(=14)。どうしてだろう? この二人については私は他のどんな哲学者のことよりよく知っている。彼らと共に生きていたとさえ思えるほどだ。それほど沢山の対話篇が伝えられているんだ。それを読めば、ソクラテスが何も知ることは出来ないと考えていたことは疑いようがない。彼は一つだけ「自分は何も知らないことを知っている」ということを例外としたがそれだけだ。プラトンだって同じだ。もし彼がこの考えを受け入れていなかったなら、彼はあれほど多くの本の中でこの考えを説明したりしなかっただろうし、他人の皮肉な言説をあれだけ延々と描いたりしなかったはずだ。

74  You think that Empedocles raves,(a) but I think that he sends forth an utterance most suited to the dignity of the subject of which he is speaking ; surely therefore he is not making us blind or depriving us of our senses if he holds the opinion that they do not possess sufficient force to enable them to judge the objects that are submitted to them ? Parmenides and Xenophanes - in less good verse it is true but all the same it is verse - inveigh almost angrily against the arrogance of those who dare to say that they know, seeing that nothing can be known. Also you said (b) that Socrates and Plato must not be classed with them. Why ? can I speak with more certain knowledge about any persons ? I seem to have actually lived with them, so many dialogues have been put in writing which make it impossible to doubt that Socrates held that nothing can be known ; he made only one exception, no more - he said that he did know that he knew nothing. Why should I speak about Plato ? he certainly would not have set out these doctrines in so many volumes if he had not accepted them, for otherwise there was no sense in setting out the irony of the other master, especially  as it was unending.

XXIV.

75. Videorne tibi non, ut Saturninus, nominare modo illustris homines, sed imitari(真似る) numquam nisi clarum, nisi nobilem? Atqui habebam molestos vobis, sed minutos, Stilponem, Diodorum, Alexinum, quorum sunt contorta et aculeata(辛辣な) quaedam σοφισματα[Greek: sophismata] (sic enim appellantur fallaces conclusiunculae(詭弁)). Sed quid eos colligam(集める), cum habeam Chrysippum, qui fulcire(支える) putatur porticum Stoicorum? Quam multa ille contra sensus, quam multa contra omnia quae in consuetudine probantur! At dissolvit(反駁する) idem. Mihi quidem non videtur; sed dissolverit sane. Certe tam multa non collegisset quae nos fallerent probabilitate magna, nisi videret iis resisti(反駁する) non facile posse.

XXIV 75 僕はあなたの政敵のサトゥルニヌスがしたように、有名人の名前を使うだけでなく、優れた著名な哲学者を常に手本にしていることをあなたは認めてくれるかな? さらに僕の味方には大物ではないがあなた達にとってやっかいな敵であるスティルポン(ゼノンの師)とディオドロス(逍遥学派)とアレクシヌスがいて、ひねくれたずる賢いソフィスマ(「虚偽の詭弁」(=誤謬推理)のギリシア語)を作っている。それより僕にはクリュシッポスがいるのに、どうして彼らを助けに呼ぶ必要があるだろう。彼はストア派の屋台骨を背負っていると思われているが、彼が感覚を否定する推論や、習慣的に受け入れられている事を尽く否定する推論を、どれほど多く集めたことだろう。しかし、彼はそれらの推論を論駁したのだと言う人もいるだろう。私にはそうは思えないが、そうだとしよう。しかし、クリュシッポスは、もしその真実らしさのために我々を欺く多くの推論に反駁することが容易ではないと思ったからこそ、そんな推論をあれほど沢山集めたに違いない。

75 XXIV. Do you agree that I do not merely cite the names of persons of renown, as Saturninus did, but invariably take some famous and distinguished thinker as my model ? Yet I had available philosophers who give trouble to your school, although they are petty in their method, Stilpo, Diodorus, Alexinus, the authors of certain tortuous and pungent sophismata (as the term is for little syllogistic traps) ; but why should I bring in them, when I have Chrysippus, supposed to be a buttress of the Stoics' Colonnade (a) ? What a number of arguments he produced against the senses, and against everything that is approved in common expcrience ! But he also refuted those arguments, you will say. For my own part I don't think that he did ; but suppose he did refute them, yet undoubtedly he would not have collected so many arguments to take us in with their great probability if he had not been aware that they could not easily be withstood.

76. Quid Cyrenaici tibi videntur, minime contempti philosophi? Qui negant esse quicquam quod percipi possit extrinsecus: ea se sola percipere quae tactu(触覚) intimo sentiant, ut dolorem, ut voluptatem, neque se quo quid colore aut quo sono sit scire, sed tantum sentire affici(刺激される) se quodam modo.

  Satis multa de auctoribus-quamquam ex me quaesieras nonne putarem post illos veteres tot saeculis inveniri verum potuisse tot ingeniis tantisque studiis quaerentibus. Quid inventum sit paulo post videro, te ipso quidem judice. Arcesilam vero non obtrectandi(けなす) causa cum Zenone pugnavisse, sed verum invenire voluisse sic intellegitur.

76 キュレネ派(=快楽主義)の哲学者たちをあなたはどう思っているだろうか? 彼らは決して軽んじるべき人たちではない。というのは、彼らは自分の外側にあるものは何も知覚出来ないと言っているからだ。我々は、苦痛や快楽のように、内的な接触によって感じるものだけを知覚出来るのであって、何かがどんな色でどんな音がするのかは知ることは出来ないのだ。ただ自分が何らかのやり方で何かされていることを感じることが出来るだけだ、と彼らは言うのである。

知覚を否定した有力な哲学者たちの例はこれで充分だろう。古代の哲学者たち亡きあとの長い年月の間に、多くの才能ある人々が現れて、この問題を熱心に研究してきたのに、ついに真実を発見することは出来なかったと思うのかと、あなたは聞いた。では実際に何が発見されたか、それは後でお見せするから、あなたに判断してもらいたい。そもそも、アルケシラオスがゼノンと論争したのは単にゼノンをやっつけたかったからではなく、真実を発見するためだったのだ。それは次のことから分かる。 
 
76 What do you think of the Cyrenaics, by no means despicable philosophers? they maintain that nothing external to themselves is perceptible, and that the only things that they do perceive are the sensations due to internal contact, for example pain and pleasure, and that they do not know that a thing has a particular colour or sound but only feel that they are themselves affected in a certain manner.

" Enough about authority - although you had put the question (b) to me whether I did not think that with so many able minds carrying on the search with such zealous energy, after so many ages since the old philosophers mentioned, the truth might possibly have been discovered. What actually has been discovered permit me to consider a little later, with you yourself indeed as umpire. But that Arcesilas did not do battle with Zeno merely for the sake of criticizing him, but really wished to discover the truth, is gathered from what follows.


77. Nemo unquam superiorum non modo expresserat sed ne dixerat quidem posse hominem nihil opinari, nec solum posse sed ita necesse esse sapienti; visa est Arcesilae cum vera sententia tum honesta et digna sapiente. Quaesivit de Zenone(ゼノンに) fortasse quid futurum esset, si nec percipere quicquam posset sapiens nec opinari sapientis esset. Ille, credo, nihil opinaturum quoniam esset quod percipi posset. Quid ergo id esset? Visum, credo. Quale igitur visum? Tum illum ita definisse, ex eo quod esset, sicut esset, impressum et signatum et effictum(形作る). Post requisitum(問う) etiamne(それでもかね?), si ejusdem modi esset visum verum quale vel falsum. Hic Zenonem vidisse acute nullum esse visum quod percipi posset, si id tale esset ab eo quod est ut ejusdem modi ab eo quod non est posset esse. Recte consensit Arcesilas ad definitionem additum: neque enim falsum percipi posse neque verum, si esset tale, quale vel falsum. Incubuit autem in eas disputationes, ut doceret nullum tale esse visum a vero, ut non ejusdem modi etiam a falso possit esse.


77 それは「人は憶断を避けることは出来る。それどころか賢者は常に憶断を避けることができる」とアルケシラオスが初めて表明したことである。これは歴代の哲学者たちが主張するどころか、誰も口にすることさえなかったことなのである。しかしこの考えはアルケシラオスにとっては正しい考えであり、同時に賢者にふさわしい誠実な考えであると思われた。そこで彼はおそらくゼノンに「もし賢者が何も知覚できずしかも憶断することもないとすれば、どういうことになるのか?」と尋ねたのだ。きっとゼノンは「賢者は憶断することはない。なぜなら賢者には知覚できるものがあるからだ」と答えたにちがいない。「それは何ですか?」とアルケシラオスが問うと「表象だ」とゼノンは答えただろう。「どんな表象ですか?」と問われるとゼノンは「それは元となる物から生み出されて刻印されるもので、元となる物と同じようなものである」と定義したのだ。そのあとアルケシラオスは「もし真実の表象が虚偽の表象とよく似たものであればどうなるのか」となおも尋ねた。ここでゼノンは聡明にも見ぬいた、「もし元となる物からの表象が元とならない物からの表象とよく似ていることがあり得るなら、知覚出来る表象はない」と。アルケシラオスはゼノンが付け加えたこの定義の正しさに同意した。というのは、虚偽が知覚されることはないし、真実もそれが虚偽とよく似ているなら、知覚出来ないからである。一方、アルケシラオスがこの議論を強調したのは「どんな真実の表象にも必ずそれとよく似た虚偽の表象があり得る」ということを教えるためである。

77 That it is possible for a human being to hold no opinions, and not only that it is possible but that it is the duty of the wise man, had not only never been distinctly formulated but had never even been stated by any of his predecessors ; but Arcesilas deemed this view both true and also honourable and worthy of a wise man. We may suppose him putting the question to Zeno, what would happen if the wise man was unable to perceive anything and if also it was the mark of the wise man not to form an opinion. Zeno no doubt replied that the wise man's reason for abstaining from forming an opinion would be that there was something that could be perceived. What then was this ? asked Arcesilas. A presentation, was doubtless the answer. Then what sort of a presentation ? Hereupon no doubt Zeno defined it as follows, a presentation impressed and sealed and moulded from a real object, in conformity with its reality. There followed the further question, did this hold good even if a true presentation was of exactly the same form as a false one ? At this I imagine Zeno was sharp enough to see that if a presentation proceeding from a real thing was of such a nature that one proceeding from a non-existent thing could be of the same form, there was no presentation that could be perceived. Arcesilas agreed that this addition to the definition was correct, for it was impossible to perceive either a false presentation or a true one if a true one had such a character as even a false one might have ; but he pressed the points at issue further in order to show that no presentation proceeding from a true object is such that a presentation proceeding from a false one might not also be of the same form.


78. Haec est una contentio(論争) quae adhuc permanserit. Nam illud, nulli rei assensurum esse sapientem, nihil ad hanc controversiam pertinebat. Licebat enim nihil percipere et tamen opinari-quod a Carneade dicitur probatum, equidem Clitomacho plus quam Philoni aut Metrodoro credens, hoc magis ab eo disputatum quam probatum puto. Sed id omittamus. Illud certe opinatione et perceptione sublata sequitur, omnium assensionum retentio(停止), ut, si ostendero(証明) nihil posse percipi, tu concedas numquam assensurum esse.


78 これだけが現在も争われているアルケシラオスの主張である。というのは、先程の「賢者は何物にも同意することはない」という彼の主張はこの論争とは別だったからである。確かに、賢者は何も知覚できないが憶断することはありえるし、カルネアデスがこれを認めたとも言われている(フィロンやメトロドーロスよりもクレイトマコスの話を信じるなら、カルネアデスはこれを認めたというより提案したのである)。しかしここではその説は取らない。つまり、知覚も憶断も出来ないとなるならば必然的に一切の同意を控えることになるから、もし何も知覚できるものはないことを僕が証明できるなら、賢者が同意することは決してないことをあなたも認めねばらならないだろう。

78 This is the one argument that has held the field down to the present day. For the point that the wise man will not assent to anything had no essential bearing on this dispute ; for he might perceive nothing and yet form an opinion - a view which is said to have been accepted by Carneades ; although for my own part, trusting Clitomachus more than Philo or Metrodorus, I believe that Carneades did not so much accept this view as advance it in argument. But let us drop that point. If the acts of opining and perceiving are abolished, it undoubtedly follows that all acts of assent must be withheld, so that if I succeed in proving that nothing can be perceived, you must admit that the wise man will never assent.

XXV.

79. Quid ergo est quod percipi possit, si ne sensus quidem vera nuntiant? quos tu, Luculle, communi loco(=topica論拠) defendis; quod ne ita facere posses, idcirco heri non necessario loco contra sensus tam multa dixeram. Tu autem te negas infracto remo neque columbae collo commoveri(乱される). Primum cur? Nam et in remo sentio(知っている) non esse id quod videatur, et in columba pluris videri colores nec esse plus uno(一つしかない). Deinde nihilne praeterea diximus? Maneant illa omnia, jacet ista causa. Veracis(真実を伝える) suos esse sensus dicit.Igitur semper auctorem(手本) habes eum qui magno suo periculo causam agat! Eo enim rem demittit(問題を突き詰める) Epicurus, si unus sensus semel in vita mentitus sit, nulli umquam esse credendum.

XXV 79 では、もし感覚が真実を伝えないとしたら、いったい知覚できるものとは何だろうか。ルクルスさん、あなたはありふれた方法で感覚を擁護しているが、あなたがそんなことを出来ないようにするために、僕は昨日不必要なほど多言を弄して感覚を否定する議論をやったのだ。それなのに、あなたは水中で曲がって見えるオールや鳩の首の色について問題ないと言ったのだ。第一、どうして問題ないんだ。それは、オールの場合は見えているものが事実でないことを僕は知っているし、鳩の首の色が複数に見えても実は一色であることも知っている。そのほかにも僕達は色々言わなかったかい? それでこっちの意見が正しければ、あなたの意見は駄目なんだ。それなのに、例の人(=エピクロス)は自分の感覚に間違いはないと言うんだ。あなたには自分を大きな危険にさらしてまで自分の説を主張している立派なお手本があるんだね。だって、エピクロスは、もし感覚が一つでも一生に一度でも真実を伝えないようなことがあるとするなら、どの感覚も信じられなくなるとまで言っているんだから。

79 " What is there then that can be perceived, if not even the senses report the truth ? You defend them, Lucullus, by a stock argument (a) ; but it was to prevent your being able to do it in that way that I had gone out of my way yesterday to say so much against the senses. Yet you assert (b) that the broken oar and the pigeon's neck don't upset you. In the first place why ? for in the instance of the oar I perceive that what is seen is not real, and in that of the pigeon that several colours are seen and really there are not more than one. In the next place, surely we said much beside that ! Suppose all our arguments stand, the case of you people collapses. His own senses, quoth he,(c) are truthful ! If so, you always have an authority, and one to risk his all in defence of the cause ! for Epicurus brings the issue to this point, that if one sense has told a lie once in a man's life, no sense must ever be believed.

80. Hoc est verum esse, confidere suis testibus(=感覚) et importune(無作法に) insistere! Itaque Timagoras Epicureus negat sibi umquam, cum oculum torsisset(ひねる), duas ex lucerna(灯火) flammulas(炎) esse visas; opinionis enim esse mendacium, non oculorum. Quasi quaeratur(問われ) quid sit, non quid videatur! Sed hic quidem majorum similis; tu vero, qui visa sensibus alia vera dicas esse, alia falsa, qui ea distinguis? Desine, quaeso, communibus locis; domi(=at homeである) nobis ista nascuntur. Si, inquis, deus te interroget sanis modo et integris sensibus num(かどうか) amplius quid(何か) desideras,quid respondeas? Utinam quidem(主deus) roget! Audiret quam nobiscum male ageret. Ut enim vera videamus, quam longe videmus? Ego Catuli Cumanum ex hoc loco video, Pompeianum non cerno, neque quicquam interjectum est quod obstet, sed intendi(伸ばす) acies(視力) longius non potest. O praeclarum prospectum(眺め)! Puteolos(ナポリの西、プテオリ) videmus, at familiarem nostrum C. Avianium fortasse in porticu Neptuni ambulantem non videmus;

80 確かに、自分が呼んだ証人(=感覚のこと)をひたすら信じて自分の立場をあくまで変えないのは立派なことだ。同様に、エピクロス派のティマゴラスは、目の下をあちこち指で押しても、ランプの火が二つに見えたことはない(=錯覚の否定)、間違うのは目ではなく憶断の方なのだと言っている。しかし、問題は何があるかではなく何が見えるかなのだ。ところが、彼は自分の師に忠実だった。しかし、あなたは感覚の表象のうちの、ある物は真実で、ある物は虚偽であると言っている。では、それをあなたはどうやって区別するのか? ここでいつもの議論を持ち出すのはやめてほしい。そういう例はこちらも沢山持っている。もし完璧で誤りのない感覚よりももっと何か良いものが欲しいかと神様に尋ねられたら、あなたはこれ以上の物は必要ないと答えると、あなたは言った。僕も神様に聞いてもらえたら、神様は僕達をうまく造ってはいないと答えるだろう。例えば、我々の目が仮に真実を見るとしても、それほど遠くの物を見ることはできない。ここからクマエにあるカトゥルス君の屋敷が僕には見えるが、ポンペイにある屋敷は見えない。間に邪魔になるものは何もないのに視力が届かないのである。まったく素晴らしい視力だ。僕はプテオリ(=ポッツオーリ)の人たちは見えるけれど、僕達の友達のガイウス・アヴィアニウス・フラックス(=書簡集にも出てくる友人)がネプチューンの神殿で散歩しているところは見えないのだ。

80 This is true candour - to trust in one's own witnesses and persist in perversity ! Accordingly, Timagoras the Epicurean denies that he has ever really seen two little flames coming from the lamp when he has screwed up an eye, since it is a lie of the opinion, not of the eyes. As though the question were what exists, not what seems to exist ! However, Timagoras may be allowed to be true to his intellectual ancestry ; but as for you. who say that some sense-presentations are true and some false, how do you distinguish them apart ? And do pray desist from mere stock arguments : those are products we have a home supply of ! If a god, you say, were to inquire of you whether, given healthy and sound senses, you want anything more, what would you reply ? Indeed I wish he would make the inquiry ! he would be told how badly he was dealing with us ! For even granting that our sight is accurate, how wide is its range ? I can make out Catulus's place at Cumae from where we are, and can see it straight in front of me, but I can't make out his villa at Pompei, although there is nothing in between to block the view, but my sight is not able to carry any further. O what a glorious view ! We can see Puteoli, but we can't see our friend Gaius Avianius, who is very likely taking a stroll in the Colonnade of Neptune (a) ;

81. At ille nescio qui,qui in scholis nominari solet,mille et octingenta(1800) stadia quod abesset videbat: quaedam volucres longius. Responderem igitur audacter isti vestro deo me plane his oculis non esse contentum. Dicet me acrius videre quam illos pisces fortasse qui neque videntur a nobis et nunc quidem sub oculis sunt neque ipsi nos suspicere(見上げる) possunt. Ergo ut illis aqua, sic nobis aer crassus(厚い) offunditur(覆う). At amplius non desideramus! Quid? talpam(もぐら) num desiderare lumen putas? Neque tam(→quam) quererer cum deo(神に不平を言う) quod parum longe quam quod falsum viderem. Videsne navem illam? Stare nobis videtur, at iis qui in nave sunt moveri haec villa. Quaere rationem cur ita videatur; quam(←rationem) ut maxime inveneris, quod haud scio an(多分) non possis, non tu verum te testem habere, sed eum non sine causa falsum testimonium(証言) dicere ostenderis.

81 よく話に出てくる何とか言う人は1800スタディア離れたものが見えたという。鳥はもっと遠くまで見える。だから、僕ならあなたの神様に対して偉そうに答えてやる。この目では不満だと。しかし、その神様は言うだろう、お前は魚よりはいい目をしていると。しかし、我々は魚が真下にいても見えないし、魚も我々が見えない。魚が水に覆われているように、我々は分厚い空気に覆われているのである。それなのに、これ以上は求めないとあなたは言う。どうしてなんだ。モグラは光を求めないとあなたは言うのか。僕が神様に不満があるのは、僕達が遠くまで見えないことよりも、虚偽を見てしまうことである。あなたにはあの船が見えるだろうか? あの船は我々には止まって見える。ところが、あの船に乗っている人にはこの家は動いていると見えるのである。どうしてそのように見えるのか、その理由を探求してみたまえ。多分あなたには無理だと思うが、仮にその理由を見つけたとしても、どうせあなたの連れてくる証人は本当のことを言う人ではなく、わざと嘘の証言をする人だろう。

81 whereas that somebody or other who is regularly quoted in lectures used to see an object two hundred and twenty-five miles off,(b) and certain birds can see further. Therefore I should boldly answer that deity of your friends that I am by no means satisfied with the eyes that I have got. He will say that my sight is keener than that of the fishes down there, very likely, which we cannot see though they are under our eyes at the very moment, and which also themselves cannot see us above them ; it follows that we are shut in by an opaque envelope of air as they are by one of water. But, you say, we don't wish for more ! What, do you think a mole doesn't wish for light ? And I should not quarrel with the deity so much about the limited range of my sight as about its inaccuracy. Do you see yonder ship ? To us she appears to be at anchor, whereas to those on board her this house appears in motion. Seek for a reason for this appearance, and however much you succeed in finding one - though I doubt if you can - you will not have made out that you have got a true witness but that your witness is for reasons of his own giving false evidence.

XXVI.

82. Quid ego de nave? Vidi enim a te remum contemni. Maiora fortasse quaeris(探求する). Quid potest esse sole maius? quem mathematici amplius duodeviginti(18) partibus confirmant majorem esse quam terram. Quantulus(何と小さい) nobis videtur! Mihi quidem quasi pedalis(足の). Epicurus autem posse putat etiam minorem esse eum quam videatur, sed non multo: ne majorem quidem multo putat esse vel tantum esse, quantus videatur, ut oculi aut nihil mentiantur aut non multum. Ubi igitur illud est semel? Sed ab hoc credulo(信じやすい), qui numquam sensus mentiri putat, discedamus: qui(=エピクロス) ne nunc quidem, cum ille sol, qui tanta incitatione(激しい動き) fertur, ut celeritas ejus quanta sit ne cogitari quidem possit, tamen nobis stare videatur.

XXVI 82 僕がなぜ船のことを言うのか? あなたはオールの問題を大したことはないと言っているね。あなたはもっと大きな物で説明して欲しいんだろう。では、太陽より大きな物があるだろうか? 太陽は地球の18倍(あるいは19倍)の大きさだと数学者は言っている。その太陽がなんと小さく見えることか? 僕にはスリッパの大きさにしか見えない。ところがエピクロスに言わせれば、太陽は見かけよりすこし小さいかもしれないが、けっして見かけより大きいことはなく、多分見かけどおりの大きさであって、目はそんな嘘つきじゃないということになる。それなら、さっき言った「一度」というのはどこへ行ったんだ。しかし、感覚は嘘をつかないとと思っているこの信仰深い人からは別れよう。あれほど大きな勢いで動いていて、それがどれほどの速度かを知ることはできないのに、止まっているように見えるというのに、それでも彼は感覚は嘘をつかないというのだから。

82  Why do I talk about a ship ? for I saw (a) that you think the illustration of the oar contemptible ; perhaps you want bigger examples. What can be bigger than the sun, which the mathematicians declare to be nineteen times the size of the earth (b) ? How tiny it looks to us ! to me it seems about a foot in diameter. Epicurus on the other hand thinks that it may possibly be even smaller than it looks, though not much ; he thinks that it is not much larger either, or else exactly the size that it appears to be, so that the eyes either do not lie at all or else not much. What becomes then of that ' once ' (c) of which we spoke ? But let us quit this gullible person, who thinks that the senses never lie, - not even now, when the sun up there, that is travelling with such rapidity that the magnitude of its velocity cannot even be conceived, nevertheless appears to us to be standing still.


83. Sed ut minuam controversiam, videte quaeso quam in parvo lis(論点) sit. Quattuor sunt capita quae concludant nihil esse quod nosci percipi comprehendi possit, de quo haec tota quaestio est. E quibus primum est esse aliquod visum falsum, secundum non posse id percipi, tertium inter quae visa nihil intersit fieri non posse ut eorum alia percipi possint, alia non possint, quartum nullum esse visum verum a sensu profectum(生ずる) cui non appositum sit visum aliud quod ab eo nihil intersit quodque percipi non possit. Horum quattuor capitum secundum et tertium omnes concedunt. Primum Epicurus non dat; vos, quibuscum res est, id quoque conceditis. Omnis pugna de quarto est.


83 しかし、議論の要点を絞るために、問題の範囲は限定することを考えてほしい。これまでずっと議論してきた問題は、認識し知覚し把握できることは何もないということで、それを証明する命題は四つである。その第一は、何か虚偽の表象が存在するということ、第二は、そのような表象は知覚出来ないこと、第三は、何も違いのない複数の表象の間で、ある物は知覚できてある物は知覚できないということはあり得ないということ、第四は、感覚から得られた真実の表象で、それと何の違いもなく知覚することも出来ない別の表象が並存しないものはない、ということ。この四つのうち第二と第三はみんなが認めている。第一はエピクロスは認めないが、議論しているあなた達は認めている。だから問題は第四に絞られる。 

83 But to narrow down the controversy, pray see how small a point it is on which the issue turns. There are four heads of argument intended to prove that there is nothing that can be known, perceived or comprehended, which is the subject of all this debate : the first of these arguments is that there is such a thing as a false presentation ; the second, that a false prescntation cannot be perceivcd : the third, that of presentations between which there is no difference it is impossible for some to be able to be perceived and others not ; the fourth, that there is no true presentation originating from sensation with which there is not ranged another presentation that precisely corresponds to it and that cannot be perceived.(a) The second and third of these four arguments are admitted by everybody ; the first is not granted by Epicurus, but you with whom we are dealing admit that one too ; the entire battle is about the fourth.

84. Qui igitur P. Servilium Geminum videbat, si Quintum se videre putabat, incidebat in ejus modi visum quod percipi non posset, quia nulla nota verum distinguebatur a falso; qua distinctione sublata quam(=how) haberet in C. Cotta, qui bis cum Gemino consul fuit, agnoscendo ejus modi notam quae falsa esse non posset? Negas tantam similitudinem in rerum natura esse. Pugnas omnino, sed cum adversario facili; ne sit sane: videri certe potest. Fallet igitur sensum, et si una fefellerit similitudo, dubia omnia reddiderit. Sublato enim judicio illo quo oportet agnosci, etiamsi ipse erit quem videris qui tibi videbitur, tamen non ea nota judicabis, qua dicis oportere, ut non possit esse ejusdem modi falsa.

84 だから、もし双子の片方であるプブリウス・セルウィリウス・ゲミヌス(=56節)を見た人が、もしクイントゥスの方を見ていると思ったのなら、それは真実と虚偽を区別するための目印がないために知覚できない表象に出会ったのである。この区別を失った人は、ゲミヌスと一緒に二度執政官(=252,248年BC)になったガイウス・コッタを見分けようとしても、虚偽でありえない目印をどうやって手に入れられると言うのだろうか? あなたはこの世の中にそんなに似ている物はないと言う。あなたが全面的に争うなら敵はすぐ降参するだろう。確かにそんなに似ている物はない。しかし似ているように見える物ならあるはずだ。そして、そのために感覚は騙される。そして一つでも似ているものに騙されると、全てが疑わしくなってしまう(=コッタを見ても疑わしく思えてくる)。というのは、見分けるのに必要な基準がなければ、たとえあなたが見ている人があなたが思っている当人だとしても、あなたが必然だという、よく似た虚偽ではありえない目印によって、そう判断していることにならないからである。

84 If therefore a person looking at Publius ServiUus Geminus (b) used to think he saw Quintus, he was encountering a presentation of a sort that could not be perceived, because there was no mark to distinguish a true presentation from a false one ; and if that mode of distinguishing were removed, what mark would he have, of such a sort that it could not be false, to help him to recognize Gaius Cotta, who was twice consul with Geminus ? You say that so great a degree of resemblance does not exist in the world. You show fight, no doubt, but you have an easy-going opponent ; let us grant by all means that it does not exist, but undoubtedly it can appear to exist, and therefore it will cheat the sense, and if a single case of resemblance has done that, it will have made everything doubtful ; for when that proper canon of recognition has been removed, even if the man himself whom you see is the man he appears to you to be, nevertheless you will not make that judgement, as you say it ought to be made, by means of a mark of such a sort that a false likeness could not have the same character.

85. Quando igitur potest tibi P. Geminus Quintus videri, quid habes explorati(<exploratum 確かさ) cur non possit tibi Cotta videri qui non sit, quoniam aliquid videtur esse quod non est? Omnia dicis sui generis esse, nihil esse idem quod sit aliud. Stoicum est quidem nec admodum credibile 'nullum esse pilum(毛髪) omnibus rebus talem, qualis sit pilus alius, nullum granum(穀粒).' Haec refelli possunt, sed pugnare nolo; ad id enim quod agitur nihil interest omnibusne partibus visa res nihil differat an internosci non possit etiam si differat. Sed si hominum similitudo tanta esse non potest, ne signorum quidem? Dic mihi, Lysippus eodem aere, eadem temperatione(配合), eodem caelo(彫刻刀) atque ceteris omnibus, centum Alexandros ejusdem modi facere non posset? Qua igitur notione(=nota) discerneres?


85 だから、プブリウス・セルウィリウス・ゲミヌスがあなたの目にクイントゥスに見えるのなら、事実と異なる物が見えるのだから、コッタでない人がコッタに見える可能性がないとどうして確実に言えるだろうか? あなたは全てのものはそれぞれ独自性をもっていると言い、別の物でありながら同じである物はないと言う。ストア派の主張は「髪の毛一本も砂粒一つでさえ全ての点で別の物と同じ物はない」という信じがたいものである。この考えを否定するのは可能だが、私は論争するつもりはない。なぜなら、目で見た物自身にあらゆる点で同じ物があるのか、それとも同じではないが区別できないのか、という今の問題とは関係がないからである。しかし、もし人間はそれほど似ていないとしても、人間を描いた像もまた似ていないだろうか。どうだろう、リュシッポスは同じ銅を使い、同じ配合、同じ彫刻刀など同じ条件を揃えたら、百体のよく似たアレキサンダー像を作れないだろうか? その場合に、あなたはどんな概念によって見分けるんだ?

85 Therefore seeing that it is possible for Publius Geminus <as> Quintus to appear to you, what reason have you for being satisfied that a person who is not Cotta cannot appear to you to be Cotta, inasmuch as something that is not real appears to be real ? You say that everything is in a class of its own,(a) and that nothing is the same as what some other thing is. That is, it is true, a Stoic argument, and it is not a very convincing one - that no hair or grain of sand is in all respects the same as another hair or grain. These assertions can be refuted, but I don't want to fight ; for it makes no difference to the point at issue whether an object completely within sight does not differ at all from another or cannot be distinguished from it even if it does differ. But if so great a resemblance between human beings is impossible, is it also impossible between statues ? Tell me, could not Lysippus,(b) by means of the same bronze, the same blend of metals, the same graver and all the other requisites, make a hundred Alexanders of the same shape ? then by what mode of recognition would you tell them apart ?

86. Quid? si in ejusdem modi cera(ろう) centum sigilla(印章) hoc anulo impressero, ecquae poterit in agnoscendo esse distinctio? an tibi erit quaerendus anularius(指輪職人、印章付き) aliqui, quoniam gallinarium(鶏屋) invenisti Deliacum(デロス島の) illum, qui ova cognosceret?

XXVII.

Sed adhibes artem advocatam etiam sensibus. Pictor videt quae nos non videmus et, simul inflavit tibicen(笛吹き), a perito(熟練した) carmen agnoscitur. Quid? hoc nonne videtur contra te valere, si sine magnis artificiis(巧妙な技術), ad quae pauci accedunt, nostri quidem generis admodum(特に), nec videre nec audire possimus? Jam illa praeclara, quanto artificio esset sensus nostros mentemque et totam constructionem hominis fabricata natura!

86 どうだろう。このろう板に僕がこの印鑑を100回そっくりに押したら、それらを見分けるためにどんな区別をつけたらいいだろう? それとも、あなたは卵を見分けられるデロス島の鶏商人を見つけてきたように、印鑑作りの名人を探してくるかい? 

XXVII. しかし、あなたは技術を感覚の助けに呼んでいる。画家は我々には見えないものを見ているし、笛を一声吹けば何の曲か専門家には見分けられる。しかしどうだろう? 我々人類の少数しか近づけないような高度な技術がなければ見分けたり聞き分けたりできないのなら、これはあなたの理論には不都合なのではないだろうか(=感覚自身の認識力のなさを証明しているから)。しかもあなたは、自然が我々の感覚と心と肉体の全てを創り上げた技術がいかに高度なものかについて素晴らしい演説をしたのだ。

86 Well, if I imprint a hundred seals with this ring on lumps of wax of the same sort, will there possibly be any mode of distinction to aid in recognizing them ? Or will you have to seek out some jeweller, as you found that poultry-keeper (c) at Delos who recognized eggs ? XXVII. But you call in the aid of art (d) to plead in defence even of the senses. A painter sees things that we do not, and a musical expert recognizes a tune as soon as a flute-player has blown a note. Well, does not this seem to tell against you, if without great artistic acquirements, to which few people, of our race indeed very few, attain, we are unable either to see or to hear ? Again those were remarkable points (e) about the high artistic skill shown in Nature's fabrication of our senses and mind and the whole structure of a human being.

87. Cur non extimescam opinandi temeritatem? Etiamne hoc affirmare potes, Luculle, esse aliquam vim, cum prudentia et consilio scilicet, quae finxerit vel, ut tuo verbo utar, quae fabricata sit hominem? Qualis ista fabrica est? ubi adhibita? quando? cur? quo modo? Tractantur ista ingeniose: disputantur etiam eleganter. Denique videantur sane, ne affirmentur modo. Sed de physicis mox (et quidem ob eam causam, ne tu, qui idem me facturum paulo ante dixeris, videare mentitus). Sed ut ad ea quae clariora sunt veniam, res iam universas profundam(浴びせる), de quibus volumina impleta sunt non a nostris(我々の仲間) solum, sed etiam a Chrysippo; de quo queri solent Stoici, dum studiose omnia conquisierit(集める) contra sensus et perspicuitatem contraque omnem consuetudinem contraque rationem, ipsum sibi respondentem inferiorem fuisse, itaque ab eo armatum esse Carneadem.―

87 それを聞いた僕はどうして憶断の大胆さを恐れずにいられるだろうか? ルクルスさん、あなたはそのうえ、先見の明と計画性をもって人間を形作る、あるいはあなたの言葉を使うと、人間を制作する何かの力が存在すると断言できるのだろうか? その技術はどんなものだろうか? どこでそれを使うのか? いつ、どうして、どのように? あなたはこうしたことを上手に扱っているし、上手に表現もしている。あなたが自分の考えを持つのは自由だ。ただ断言するのだけはやめてもらいたい。しかし、僕はすぐに自然哲学者の話に移ろう(そして僕がすぐにそうするとさっきあなたが言ったとおりにするのだ)。ここは分かりやすくするために、問題の全体をにわたって詳しく語りたいところだが、そうすると何冊も本が出来るほどになるし、しかも我々だけでなくストア派のクリュシッポスの議論も含まれてくる。もっともクリュシッポスはストア派の学者たちの評判が悪い。彼は感覚とその明白性と常識と理性を否定する証拠を熱心にすべて集めたが、議論には負けてしまい、カルネアデス(=懐疑派)に攻撃材料を提供しただけだからである。

87 Why should I not be extremely afraid of rashness in forming opinion ? Can you even assert this, Lucullus, that there is some force, united I suppose with providence (a) and design, that has moulded or, to use your word,(b) fabricated a human being ? What sort of workmanship is that ? where was it applied ? when ? why ? how ? You handle these matters cleverly, and expound them in a style that is even elegant ; well then, let us grant that they appear, only provided that they are not affirmed. But with the natural philosophers we will deal soon (and that with the object of saving you, who said just now (c) that I should go to them, from appearing to have told a falsehood) ; whereas, to come to matters less obscure, I will now pour forth the facts of the universe, about which volumes have been filled not only by our school but also by Chrysippus ; of whom the Stoics are in the habit of complaining that, while he carefully sought out all the facts that told against the senses and their clarity and against the whole of common experience and against reason, when answering himself he got the worst of it, and thus it was he that furnished weapons to Carneades.


88. Ea sunt ejus modi quae a te diligentissime tractata sunt. Dormientium et vinolentorum et furiosorum visa imbecilliora(弱い) esse dicebas quam vigilantium siccorum sanorum. Quo modo? quia, cum experrectus(目を覚ましている) esset Ennius, non diceret se vidisse Homerum, sed visum esse,' Alcmaeo autem:

 'Sed mihi ne utiquam cor consentit ...'

 Similia de vinolentis. Quasi quisquam neget et qui experrectus sit eum somniasse se et cujus furor consederit putare non fuisse ea vera quae essent sibi visa in furore! Sed non id agitur: tum cum videbantur quo modo viderentur, id quaeritur. Nisi vero(ただし~なら別だが、そんなことは言えないのである) Ennium non putamus ita totum illud audivisse,

 'O pietas animi ...',

 si modo id somniavit, ut si vigilans audiret; experrectus enim potuit illa visa putare, ut erant, somnia: dormienti vero aeque ac vigilanti probabantur. Quid? Iliona somno illo:

 'Mater, te appello ...'

 nonne ita credit filium locutum, ut experrecta etiam crederet? Unde enim illa:

 'Age asta(側に立つ): mane, audi: iterandum(繰り返す) eadem istaec mihi!' num videtur minorem habere visis quam vigilantes fidem?

88 あなたが熱心に議論していた事は次のようなことだった。眠っている人、酔っている人、心が狂っている人の見る像は、覚醒している人、しらふの人、正気の人の見る像より劣っているとあなたは言っていた。どうしてかというと、エンニウスは目覚めている時には「自分はホメロスを見た」ではなく「見たと思った」と言ったからであり、一方アルクマイオンはエンニウスの作品の中で

「私の心は自分の目に見えているものを受け入れることはない」と言っているからだとあなたは言う。

これは酔っ払いの場合も同じだとあなたは言う。目が覚めた人は自分は夢を見ていたと思い、狂気が治まった人が狂気の時に見た像を真実だと思わないということは誰も否定できないと。しかし、今の問題はこれではない。問題は何かを見ている時にどのように見えているのかなのだ。というのは、エンニウスは次の言葉、

「我が心に宿りし親愛の情は・・・」

をたとえ夢の中で聞いたとしても、彼はまるで目覚めている時と同じように聞いたのであって、我々はそれを否定出来ないからである。

というのは、目が覚めた時にエンニウスは自分の見たものが夢だと思うことができたが、寝ているときは起きている時と同じようにそれを真実だと思ったからである。さらに、イリオナは夢の中で、

「母よ、あなたに私は呼びかける・・・」

と自分の息子に話しかけられたのを真実だと思ったので、目覚めてからもそれを真実だと思い続けたのではなかろうか? というのは、彼女はなぜ次のように言ったのだろうか?

「おいで、傍においで、ここにいて私の話を聞いておくれ、その話をもう一度しておくれ」。

彼女は起きている時に見たものと同じくらいに夢で見たものを信じたのではあるまいか?

88 My points are of the sort that have been handled very industriously by you.(d) Your assertion was that presentations seen by people asleep and tipsy and mad are feebler than those of persons awake and sober and sane. How ? Because, you said, when Ennius (e) had woken up he did not say that he had seen Homer but that he had seemed to see him. while his Alcmaeon says

But my mind agrees in no wise . . ?

There are similar passages about men tipsy. As if anybody would deny that a man that has woken up thinks that he has been dreaming, or that one whose madness has subsided thinks that the things that he saw during his madness were not true ! But that is not the point at issue ; what we are asking is what these things looked like at the time when they were seen. Unless indeed we think that, if Ennius merely dreamt that passage

O piety of spirit ...(a)

he did not hear the whole of it in the same way as if he had been listening to it when awake ; for when he had woken up he was able to think those appearances dreams, as they were, but he accepted them as real while he was asleep just as much as he would have done if awake. Again, in that dream of Iliona,


Mother, on thee I call . . .,(b)

did she not so firmly believe that her son had spoken, that she believed it even after waking up ? For what is the cause of her saying

Come, stand by me, stay and hear me ; say those words
to me again - ?

does she seem to have less faith in her visual presentations than people have when they are awake ?

XXVIII.

89. Quid loquar de insanis? qualis tandem fuit affinis(姻戚) tuus, Catule, Tuditanus? quisquam sanissimus tam certa putat quae videt quam is putabat quae videbantur? Quid ille, qui:

  Video, video te. Vive, Ulixes, dum licet ?

 nonne etiam bis exclamavit se videre, cum omnino non videret? Quid? apud Euripidem Hercules cum ut Eurysthei filios ita suos configebat(刺し通す) sagittis(矢), cum uxorem interemebat(殺す), cum conabatur etiam patrem, non perinde(同様に) movebatur falsis ut veris moveretur? Quid? ipse Alcmaeo tuus, qui negat 'cor sibi cum oculis consentire,' nonne ibidem incitato(激しい) furore:

 'unde haec flamma oritur?'

 et illa deinceps:

 'Incedunt(襲う), incedunt: assunt, assunt, me expetunt:'

 Quid? cum virginis fidem implorat:

 'Fer mi auxilium, pestem abige a me, flammiferam(燃える) hanc vim, quae me excruciat(悩ます)! Caerulea(青い) incinctae(身にまとう) angui(ヘビ) incedunt, circumstant cum ardentibus taedis(松明).'

 Num dubitas quin sibi haec videre videatur? Itemque cetera:

  Intendit crinitus(長髪の) Apollo
 arcum auratum laeva(左手) innixus,
 Diana facem jacit a luna.

XXVIII 89 気が狂った人はどうだろうか? カトゥルス君よ、我々はあなたの親戚のトゥディタヌスについてどう考えたらいいだろう? 正気の人でトゥディタヌス(=狂人)ほど自分の見たものを強く信じる人がいるだろうか? また、

「私には見えるぞ、お前が見えるぞ。生きていろ、オデュッセウスよ、出来る限り」

と言った人(=アイアス)はどうだろうか? 彼は本当は見えていないにも関わらず、「見えるぞ」と二度叫んだのではなかろうか。あるいは、エウリピデスのヘラクレスは、エウリュステウスの子供を殺すつもりで自分の子供を射殺し、妻を殺し、父親をさえ殺そうとした時、彼はまるで真実の表象に動かれたかのように、虚偽の表象に動かされたのではなかろうか? さらに、あなたの言うアルクマイオンは「私の心は自分の目に見えているものを受け入れることはない」と言っているが、同じ箇所で彼は狂気が激しくなって叫ぶ。

「この炎はどこから来たのか?」と。

次に、こんな事をいう。

「奴らが来る。奴らが来る。私の方に向かってくる。私を探している」

彼が娘に助けを求めるときはどうだろう。

「私を助けてくれ、私を苦しめるこの災難を、燃え上がる炎を遠ざけてくれ。
恐ろしい蛇を体に巻いて奴らが来る、奴らが燃え上がる松明をもって私を取り巻いている」


彼はこうしたものを本当に見ていると思っているのを、あなたは疑わないだろう。次の言葉について同様である。

流れる御髪のアポロンが
黄金の弓を私の方に向ける
左手に力を込めて。
一方、ダイアナが松明を月から投げるてくる。

89 " What shall I say about those who are out of their mind ? What pray are we to think of your relative Tuditanus, Catulus ? does anybody perfectly sane think that the objects that he sees are as real as Tuditanus thought that his visions were ? What was the condition of the character who says

     I see, I see thee. Live, Ulysses, whilst thou mayest - ? (c)

did he not actually shout out twice over that he saw, although he was not seeing at all ? Or Hercules in Euripides, when he was transfixing his own sons with his arrows as if they were those of Eurystheus,when he was making away with his wife, when he was attempting to make away with his father too, - was he not being affected by things false in the same manner as if the things by which he was affected had been true ? Again, Alcmaeon himself whom you quote,(a) who says that ' his mind agrees not with his eyes,' - does he not in the same passage spur on his frenzy and cry


Whence does this flame arise ?

and then the words

They come, they come ! Now, now they are upon me !
'Tis me they seek !

What when he appeals to the maiden's loyalty for aid -

Help me, drive the venom off, the flaming violence that
    torments me !
Girt with steely snake they come, they ring me round with
    burning torches ?

surely you do not doubt that he seems to himself to
see these things ? And similarly the rest :

Apollo of the flowing locks
Against me bends his gilded bow
With all the force of his left arm (b) ;
Dian her torch flings from the moon -


90. Qui magis haec crederet si essent quam credebat quia videbantur? Apparet enim iam 'cor cum oculis consentire.' Omnia autem haec proferuntur, ut illud efficiatur, quo certius nihil potest esse, inter visa vera et falsa ad animi assensum nihil interesse. Vos autem nihil agitis(そんなことをしても無意味だ), cum illa falsa vel furiosorum vel somniantium recordatione ipsorum refellitis(反駁する). Non enim id quaeritur, qualis recordatio fieri soleat eorum qui experrecti sint, aut eorum qui furere destiterint(やめる), sed qualis visio fuerit aut furentium aut somniantium tum cum movebantur. Sed abeo a sensibus.

90 彼はこの幻覚をまるで現実であるかのように信じたのである。つまり、彼の「心は自分の目に見えているもの受け入れ」ていたのは明らかである。私がこられの話をしたのは、我々の心が何かを受け入れるためには真実と虚偽の違いは関係がないということを証明するためである。実際、これほど確かなことはないのだ。一方、あなたの学派は狂人や夢見る人が見る虚偽の表象を、後からの思い出として扱うことで、価値の低いものとして扱おうとしたがそれは失敗だ。というのは、目が覚めたり狂気から覚めた人の思い出が問題なのではなく、狂気の人や夢見る人が実際に体験している幻覚が問題なのである。しかし、この辺で感覚のことは終わろう。

90 how would he have believed these things more if they had really been true than he actually did believe them because they seemed to be ? for as it was it seemed that ' mind with eyes agreeth.' But all these things are brought forward in order to prove what is the most certain fact possible, that in respect of the mind's assent there is no difference between true presentations and false ones. But your school achieve nothing when you refute those false presentations by appealing to the recollection of madmen or dreamers ; for the question is not what sort of recollection is usually experienced by those who have woken up or have ceased to be mad, but what was the nature of the visual perception of men mad or dreaming at the moment when their experience was taking place.But I am getting away from the senses.

91. Quid est quod ratione percipi possit? Dialecticam inventam esse dicitis, veri et falsi quasi disceptatricem et judicem. Cuius veri et falsi? et in qua re? In geometriane quid sit verum aut falsum dialecticus judicabit an in litteris an in musicis? At ea non novit. In philosophia igitur? Sol quantus sit quid ad illum(=dialecticum)? Quod sit summum bonum(最高善であるところのもの) quid habet(彼は何を持っている) ut queat judicare? Quid igitur judicabit? quae conjunctio, quae disjunctio vera sit, quid ambigue dictum sit, quid sequatur quamque rem, quid repugnet? Si haec et horum similia judicat, de se ipsa judicat; plus autem pollicebatur, nam haec quidem judicare ad ceteras res quae sunt in philosophia multae atque magnae, non est satis.

91 次に、理性によって知覚できることは何であろうか? 問答法はいわば真偽の裁判官、判定者として生みだされたとあなた達は言う。問答法はどのような真偽を判定し、どのようなことについて判定するのだろうか? また問答者が判断する真偽とは幾何学のことなのか、文学なのか、それとも音楽なのか? しかし、問答法はこれらのことを知らないのではないか? だから哲学なのか? とすると、太陽の大きさは問答法は扱わないことになる。 また、問答法は最高善を判断する材料など持っていない。 では問答法は何を判断するのか? どのような仮言命題と選言命題が真で、何が多義的な言葉遣いで、どんな前提からどんな結論がされるのか、何がそれと矛盾しているのかを判断するのか? しかし、問答法がこのようなことを判断するのなら、それは問答自身についての判断である。しかし、問答法はもっと多くのことができると言っていた。というのは、このようなことを判断するだけでは哲学に含まれる他の多くの重大な問題には不充分だからである。 

91 " What is it that the reason is capable of perceiving ? Your school says that dialectic was invented (a) to serve as a ' distinguisher ' (b) or judge between truth and falsehood. What truth and falsehood, and on what subject ?  Will the dialectician judge what is true or false in geometry, or in literature, or in music ? But those are not the subjects with which he is acquainted. In philosophy therefore? What has the question of the size of the sun to do with him ? what means has he to enable him to judge what is the supreme good ? What then will he judge ? what form of hypothetical judgement or of inference from alternative hypotheses is valid, what proposition is ambiguous, what conclusion follows from any given premiss and what is inconsistent with it ? If the reason judges these and similar matters, it judges about itself ; but the promise that it held out went further,as to judge merely these matters is not enough for all the other numerous and important problems contained in philosophy.

92. Sed quoniam tantum in ea arte ponitis(評価する), videte ne contra vos tota(=ea ars) nata sit: quae primo progressu(出だし) festive(見事に) tradit(語る) elementa(初歩) loquendi(論理学) et ambiguorum intellegentiam concludendique rationem, tum paucis additis venit ad soritas, lubricum sane et periculosum locum, quod tu modo dicebas esse vitiosum interrogandi genus.

XXIX.

Quid ergo? istius vitii num nostra culpa est? Rerum natura nullam nobis dedit cognitionem finium, ut ulla in re statuere possimus quatenus. Nec hoc in acervo(堆積) tritici(小麦) solum, unde nomen est, sed nulla omnino in re minutatim interrogati, dives pauper, clarus obscurus sit, multa pauca, magna parva, longa brevia, lata angusta, quanto aut addito aut dempto certum respondeamus non habemus(分からない、出来ない).


92 それなのにあなたの学派はこの問答法を重視しているので言うが、問答法はあなた達に害をなしていないか注意した方がいい。それは最初の段階では対話の初歩と多義的な命題の理解の仕方と推論の方法について詳しく教えてくれるが、それから少し進むとソリテスに行きつくのだ。これは面倒でやっかいなテーマで、あなたが間違った議論の仕方だと言っていたものである。

XXIX. ではどうだろう? この間違いは我々のせいだろうか? 何かについてどこを境界とするかの知識を我々は生まれつき与えられていない。名前の元となった小麦の山の場合だけでなく何についても、段階的に質問していくなら、金持ちと貧乏、明確と不明確、多いと少ない、大きいと小さい、長いと短い、広いと狭いについて、どれだけ足したり引いたりすれば確かな答えが得られるか、我々は分からないのである。

92 But since your school sets so much store by that science,(c) see that it is not essentially entireiy against you, when at the first stage it gaily imparts the elements of discourse, the solution of ambiguous propositions and the theory of the syllogism, but then by a process of small additions comes to the sorites,(a) certainly a slippery and dangerous position, and a class of syllogism that you lately declared to be erroneous. XXIX.
What then ? is that an error for which we are to blame ? No faculty of knowing absolute limits has been bestowed upon us by the nature of things to enable us to fix exactly how far to go in any matter ; and this is so not only in the case of a heap of wheat from which the name is derived, but in no matter whatsoever - if we are asked by gradual stages, is such and such a person a rich man or a poor man, famous or undistinguished, are yonder objects many or few, great or small, long or short, broad or narrow, we do not know at what point in the addition or subtraction to give a definite answer.

93. At vitiosi sunt soritae(男性複数形).Frangite(粉砕する) igitur eos, si potestis, ne molesti sint. Erunt enim, nisi cavetis. 'Cautum est,' inquit: 'Placet enim Chrysippo, cum gradatim interrogetur (verbi causa) tria pauca sint anne multa, aliquanto prius quam ad multa perveniat quiescere, id est, quod ab his dicitur, ησυχαιζειν[Greek: hesychazein].' 'Per me vel stertas(いびきをかく) licet,' inquit Carneades, 'non modo quiescas. Sed quid proficit(役に立つ)? Sequitur enim qui(不定) te ex somno excitet et eodem modo interroget; "Quo in numero conticuisti(黙る), si ad eum numerum unum addidero, multane erunt?" ―progrediere rursus quoad videbitur.' Quid plura? hoc enim fateris(認める), neque ultimum te paucorum neque primum multorum respondere posse; cujus generis error ita manat ut non videam quo non possit accedere(起こる).

93 それなのに、ソリテスは間違っているという。それなら、もし出来るならソリテスをやっつけて、あなた達が困らないようにすればいい。用心しないとソリテスは厄介なシロモノだからである。「いや用心はした」と言うかもしれない。「クリュシッポス(=ストア派)も、(例えば)三は少ないか多いかを段階的に質問されたら、多いところに来る手前で休めば(ギリシア語でヘースカゼイン)いいと言っている」と。それに対してカルネアデスは言う、「私に言わせれば、休むどころか居眠りしてもいいくらいだ。でも、そんな事をしても何の役にも立たない。また誰かが君を眠りから起こして質問を続けるだけだから。『君が止まったところの数字に一を足すと、それは多いことになるのか?』と。君はまた好きなところまで続けたらいい」と。もうこの辺でいいだろう。要するに、あなた達はどこで「少ない」が終わってどこで「多い」が始まるのか答えられないと告白しているのだ。この種のはっきりしない事は至る所に存在するからである。

93  But you say that the sorites is erroneous. Smash the sorites then, if you can, so that it may not get you into trouble, for it will if you don't take precautions. ' Precautions have been taken,' says he, ' for the policy of Chrysippus is, when questioned step by step whether (for example) 3 is few or many, a little before he gets to " many," to come to rest, or, as they term it, hesychazein.' ' So far as I am concerned,' says Carneades, ' you may not only rest but even snore ; but what's the good of that ? for next comes somebody bent on rousing you from slumber and carrying on the cross-examination : " If I add 1 to the number at which you became silent, will that make many ? " - you will go forward again as far as you think fit.' Why say more ? for you admit my point, that you cannot specify in your answers either the place where ' a few ' stops or that where ' many ' begins ; and this class of error spreads so widely that I don't see where it may not get to.

94. 'Nihil me laedit,' inquit, 'ego enim, ut agitator(御者) callidus, prius quam ad finem veniam, equos sustinebo, eoque magis, si locus is quo ferentur(走る) equi praeceps erit. Sic me,' inquit, 'ante sustineo nec diutius captiose(揚げ足を取るように) interroganti respondeo.' Si habes quod liqueat(明白である) neque respondes, superbus es; si non habes, ne tu quidem percipis. Si quia obscura, concedo. Sed negas te usque ad obscura progredi. Illustribus(明白) igitur rebus insistis(立ち止まる). Si id tantum modo, ut taceas, nihil assequeris(達成). Quid enim ad illum qui te captare(誘惑する) volt utrum tacentem irretiat(罠にかける) te an loquentem? Sin autem usque ad novem, verbi gratia, sine dubitatione respondes pauca esse, in decimo insistis, etiam a certis et illustrioribus cohibes(抑制する) assensum. Hoc idem me in obscuris facere non sinis. Nihil igitur te contra soritas ars ista adjuvat quae nec augentis nec minuentis quid aut primum sit aut postremum docet.

94 すると今度は次のように言うかもしれない。「そんなことは平気だ。なぜなら、私は上手い騎手のように、目標の直前で馬を引き止めるから。馬の向かっているのが断崖だったらなおさらだ。それと同じように、僕もその前で立ち止まって、やっかいな質問にはそれ以上は答えないことにする」と。でも、もしあなたがはっきりとした答えを持っていて答えないのなら傲慢だし、そんな答えを持っていないのなら、あなたはやはり知覚できないことになる。もう暗闇の中なら仕方がない。しかし、あなたは暗闇の前まで進むことを拒否しているのだ。そしてはっきりしている所で立ち止まっている。でも答えないでいるためにそんなことをしても、うまくいかない。あなたを罠にかけようとする人にとっては、あなたが答えようが答えまいが何も違わないからだ。一方、もしあなたが例えば九まで躊躇なく「少ない」と答えて十で立ち止まるなら、あなたは明確なものに対しても同意を控える(=判断停止)ことになる。ところが、不明確なものに対して僕が同じ事をするとあなたは批判する。というわけで、あなたの問答法では少ない方の最後が何かも多い方の最初が何かも分からないから、ソリテスをやっつけるのには役に立たないのである。

94 ' It doesn't touch me at all,' says he, ' for like a clever charioteer, before I get to the end, I shall pull up my horses, and all the more so if the place they are coming to is precipitous : I pull up in time as he does,' says he, ' and when captious questions are put I don't reply any more.' If you have a solution of the problem and won't reply, that is an arrogant way of acting, but if you haven't, you too don't perceive the matter ; if because of its obscurity, I give in, but you say that you don't go forward till you get to a point that is obscure. If so, you come to a stop at things that are clear. If you do so merely in order to be silent, you don't score anything, for what does it matter to the adversary who wants to trap you whether you are silent or speaking when he catches you in his net ? but if on the contrary you keep on answering ' few ' as far as 9, let us say, without hesitating, but stop at 10, you are withholding assent even from propositions that are certain, nay, clear as daylight ; but you don't allow me to do exactly the same in the case of things that are obscure. Consequently that science of yours gives you no assistance against a sorites, as it does not teach you either the first point or the last in the process of increasing or diminishing.


95. Quid quod eadem illa ars, quasi Penelope telam(織物) retexens, tollit ad extremum superiora? Utrum ea vestra an nostra culpa est? Nempe fundamentum dialecticae est, quidquid enuntietur(言明する) (id autem appellant αξιωμα[Greek: axioma], quod est quasi effatum(命題)) aut verum esse aut falsum. Quid igitur? haec vera an falsa sunt? Si te mentiri dicis idque verum dicis, mentiris an verum dicis? Haec scilicet inexplicabilia esse dicitis, quod est odiosius quam illa quae nos non comprehensa et non percepta dicimus.

XXX.

Sed hoc omitto, illud quaero: si ista explicari non possunt nec eorum ullum judicium invenitur ut respondere possitis verane an falsa sint, ubi est illa definitio, effatum esse id quod aut verum aut falsum sit ? Rebus sumptis adjungam ex his sequendas(支持する) esse alias, alias improbandas(否認する), quae sint in genere contrario.

95 しかし、ペネロペが織物をほどいたように、問答法は最後になってそれまでの全てを否定してしまうのはどういうことだろう? この責任は僕達にあるのか、あなた達にあるのか? 問答法の基本は、何であれ言われた事が(これを彼らはアクシオーマと呼んでおり、「命題」にあたる)真実か虚偽かのいずれかであるということだ。それではこれはどうだ? 次のことは真実なのか虚偽なのか? 「もしあなたが自分は嘘をついていると本心から言ったら、あなたは嘘をついているのかどうなのか?」あなた達は「その問題は回答不能だ」と言う。それはあなた達にとって、僕達のいう「把握されないこと」「知覚されないこと」よりも悩ましいことだ。

XXX しかし、これはいいとして、次のことはどうなんだ。つまり、もしこの問題が回答不能で、それが真実か虚偽か答える基準が見つからないのなら「ある命題は真実か虚偽かどちらかである」とするあなた達の定義はどうなるのか。さらに、複数の前提があるとするなら、互いに相反する二つの命題のうちの片方を取って片方を捨てるべきだ、とあなた達は言っている。

95  What of the fact that this same science destroys at the end the steps that came before, like Penelope unweaving her web ? is your school to blame for that or is ours ? Clearly it is a fundamental principle of dialectic that every statement (termed by them axioma, that is, a ' proposition ') is either true or false ; what then ? is this a true proposition or a false one - ' If you say that you are lying and say it truly, you lie ' ? Your school of course says that these problems are ' insoluble,' (a) which is more vexatious than the things termed by us ' not grasped ' and ' not perccived.' XXX.
" But I drop this point and ask the following question : if the problems in question are insoluble and no criterion of them is forthcoming to enable you to answer whether they are true or false, what becomes of the definition of a ' proposition ' as ' that which is either true or false ' ? Taking certain premisses I will draw the conclusion that, of two sets of propositions, to be classed as contradictory, one set is to be adopted and the other set to be rejected.(b)

96. Quo modo igitur hoc conclusum esse judicas: 'Si dicis nunc lucere et verum dicis, lucet; dicis autem nunc lucere et verum dicis; lucet igitur'? Probatis certe genus et rectissime conclusum dicitis, itaque in docendo(証明する) eum primum concludendi modum traditis. Aut quidquid igitur eodem modo concluditur probabitis aut ars ista nulla est. Vide ergo hanc conclusionem probaturusne sis: 'Si dicis te mentiri verumque dicis, mentiris; dicis autem te mentiri verumque dicis, mentiris igitur.' Qui potes hanc non probare, cum probaveris ejusdem generis superiorem? Haec Chrysippea sunt, ne ab ipso quidem dissoluta. Quid enim faceret huic conclusioni? 'Si lucet, lucet; lucet autem: lucet igitur.' Cederet scilicet. Ipsa enim ratio conexi(<conexum), cum concesseris superius, cogit inferius concedere. Quid ergo haec ab illa conclusione differt? 'Si mentiris, mentiris: mentiris autem: mentiris igitur.' Hoc negas te posse nec approbare nec improbare. Qui igitur magis illud? Si ars, si ratio, si via, si vis denique conclusionis valet, eadem est in utroque.

96 それなら次の推論をあなたはどう判断するのか、「もしあなたが明るいと本心から言えば明るい。ところで、あなたは明るくなったと本心から言っている。したがって、明るい」? あなた達はこの種の推論を確かに認めているし、完全に有効だと言っている。だから、これをあなた達は第一の推論法だと講義で教えている。だから、もしあなた達の問答法が無意味でなければ、この方法で推論されたものをあなた達は何でも認めるはずだ。すると、次の推論をあなた達は認めるかどうか考えてほしい。「もしあなたが自分は嘘をついてると本心から言っているなら、あなたは嘘を付いている。ところで、あなたは自分は嘘をついてると本心から言っている。したがって、あなたは嘘をついている」。さっきの推論を認めたのに、あなたはどうしてこの推論を認められないのか? この誤謬はクリュシッポスの考えたもので、彼自身も解決していない。彼のやり方を見てみよう。「もし明るければ明るい。ところで、明るい。したがって、明るい」。もちろん彼はこれを認める。この推論の方法でいくなら、もし前提を認めるなら、結論も認めざるを得ない。これと次の推論はどう違うだろうか? 「もしあなたが嘘をついたら、嘘をついている。ところで、あなたは嘘をついている、したがって、あなたは嘘をついている」。ところがあなたはこれには賛成も反対も出来ないというのだ。それなら、あなた達は前の推論をどうして認められるのか? しかし、推論のやり方も方式も手段も手続きも全部有効なら、どちらの場合にもそれらは有効であるはずだ。

96 What judgement do you pass on the procedure of the following syllogism - ' If you say that it is light now and speak the truth, it is light ; but you do say that it is light now and speak the truth ; therefore it is light ' ? Your school undoubtedly approve this class of syllogism and say that it is completely valid, and accordingly it is the first mode of proof that you give in your lectures. Either therefore you will approve of every syllogism in the same mode, or that science of yours is no good. Consider therefore whether you will approve the following syllogism : ' If you say that you are lying and speak the truth, you are lying ; but you do say that you are lying and speak the truth ; therefore you are lying ' ; how can you not approve this syllogism when you approved the previous one of the same class ? These fallacies are the inventions of Chrysippus, and even he himself could not solve them ; for what could he make of this syllogism - ' If it is light, it is light ; but it is light ; therefore it is light ' ? Of course he would agree ; for the very nature of hypothetical inference compels you to grant the conclusion if you have granted the premiss. What then is the difference between this syllogism and the former one - ' If you are lying, you are lying ; but you are lying ; therefore you are lying ' ? You say that you are unable either to agree to this or to disprove it ;how then are you more able to deal with the other ? if science, reason, method, in fact if the syllogistic proof is valid, it is the same in either case.

97. Sed hoc extremum(最後) eorum est: postulant ut excipiantur(除外する) haec inexplicabilia. Tribunum aliquem censeo adeant: a me istam exceptionem numquam impetrabunt. Etenim cum ab Epicuro, qui totam dialecticam et contemnit et irridet, non impetrent ut verum esse concedat quod ita effabimur, 'Aut vivet cras Hermarchus aut non vivet' cum dialectici sic statuant, omne quod ita(→quasi) disjunctum(選言的な) sit quasi 'aut etiam aut non' non modo verum esse sed etiam necessarium: vide quam sit cautus is quem isti tardum putant; 'Si enim', inquit, 'alterutrum(いずれか一つ) concessero necessarium esse, necesse erit cras Hermarchum aut vivere aut non vivere; nulla autem est in natura rerum talis necessitas.' Cum hoc igitur dialectici pugnent, id est, Antiochus et Stoici; totam enim evertit dialecticam. Nam si e contrariis disjunctio―contraria autem ea dico, cum alterum aiat, alterum neget―si talis disjunctio falsa potest esse, nulla vera est.

97 ところが、彼らは挙句の果てに、この問題を説明出来ないものとして例外扱いしてくれと言ったのである。そんなに例外扱いをして欲しければ護民官にでも頼むがいい。だが、僕は例外扱いするつもりは全くない。実際、僕達が「あしたヘルマルコスは生きているか生きていないか、どちらかである」なとど言ったりしたら、問答法全体を軽視して嘲笑するエピクロスはそれを真実だとは認めてくれない。ところが、問答者たちは「~であるか~でないかのどちらかである」という選言は真実であるのみか必然的であると考えている。実際、頭が悪いとあなた達が言うエピクロスがどれほど慎重であることか。彼は言っている、「もし私がどちらか一方は必然的であると認めるなら、あしたヘルマルコスは生きているか生きていないかどちらかであるのは必然的である。ところが、この世の中にそのような必然性は存在しない」と。というわけで、問答者たち即ちアンティオコスとストア派の学者たちはエピクロスと論争をするべきだ。エピクロスは問答法の全体を排除しているのだから。というのは、逆のものからなる選言命題―逆というのは一方を肯定するときには他方を否定することである―このような選言命題が虚偽の場合があるとすれば、真実であるものは何もないからというのである。

97   But the farthest length they go is to demand that these insoluble problems should be deemded an exception. My advice to them is to apply to some tribune (a) : they will never get that ' saving clause ' from me. For as they will not get Epicurus, who despises and laughs at the whole of dialectic, to admit the validity of a proposition of the form ' Hermarchus will either be alive to-morrow or not alive,' whereas dialecticians lay it down that every disjunctive proposition of the form ' either x or not-x- ' is not only valid but even necessary, see how on his guard the man is whom your friends think slow ; for ' If,' he says, ' I admit either of the two to be necessary, it will follow that Hermarchus must either be alive to-morrow or not alive ; but as a matter of fact in the nature of things no such necessity exists.' Therefore let the dialecticians, that is, Antiochus and the Stoics, do battle with this philosopher, for he overthrows the whole of dialectic, if a disjunctive proposition consisting of two contrary statements - ' contrary ' meaning one of them affirmative, the other negative - if a disjunctive proposition of this sort can be false, none is true ;

98. Mecum vero quid habent litium(争い), qui ipsorum disciplinam sequor? Cum aliquid huius modi inciderat, sic ludere Carneades solebat: 'Si recte conclusi, teneo: sin vitiose, minam(1ミナ) Diogenes reddet.' (Ab eo enim Stoico dialecticam didicerat: haec autem merces(対価) erat dialecticorum). Sequor igitur eas vias quas didici ab Antiocho, nec reperio quo modo judicem(動接1単) 'si lucet, lucet,' verum esse (ob eam causam quod ita didici, omne quod ipsum ex se conexum sit verum esse), non judicem 'si mentiris, mentiris,' eodem modo esse conexum. Aut igitur et hoc et illud aut nisi hoc, ne illud quidem judicabo.

XXXI.

Sed, ut omnes istos aculeos(皮肉) et totum tortuosum(曲がりくねった) genus disputandi relinquamus(放棄する) ostendamusque qui simus, iam explicata tota Carneadis sententia Antiochea ista corruent universa. Nec vero quicquam ita dicam ut quisquam id fingi suspicetur: a Clitomacho sumam, qui usque ad senectutem cum Carneade fuit, homo et acutus, ut Poenus(カルタゴ人), et valde studiosus ac diligens. Et quattuor ejus libri sunt de sustinendis assensionibus. Haec autem quae iam dicam sunt sumpta de primo.


98 けれども、彼らは僕と争う必要はない。僕は問答者たちの教えに従っているのだから。問答法が行き詰まったとき、カルネアデスは次ような冗談を言ったものだ。「もし私の推論が正しければ、それは私の手柄だ。もし間違っているなら、ディオゲネスに一ミナ返してもらうさ」と。(カルネアデスは授業料の一ミナを出してストア派のディオゲネスから問答法を学んだからである)。ただ僕はアンティオコスに学んだやり方に従って、「もし明るければ明るい」は真実であると言いながら(なぜなら自分自身からの推論はすべて真であると僕は学んだからである)、同じ自分自身からの推論である「もしあなたが嘘をついているならあなたは嘘をついている」も真実であると、なぜ言うべきでないか分からないのだ。だから、僕は両方とも真実だと言うか、片方を真実でないならもう片方も真実でないというか、そのどちらかである。

XXXI しかし、ひねくれたずる賢い詭弁の話はやめて僕達のやり方を見せるために、今からカルネアデスの考えの全体像を明らかにしよう。そうすればアンティオコスの考えは悉く否定されてしまうはずだ。しかし、僕が何か言ってもそれが僕自身の考えだと思われてはいけないのでクレイトマコスの本から引用しよう。クレイトマコスは高齢になるまでカルネアデスと一緒にいた人で、頭がよく本当に勤勉なカルタゴ人だ。同意を控えるべきことに関する4冊の本がある。僕が今から言うことはその第一巻に書いてある。


98 but what quarrel have they with me, who am a disciple of their own school ? When any situation of this nature occurred, Carneades used to play with the matter thus : ' If my conclusion is correct, I keep to it ; if it is faulty, Diogenes will pay me back a mina(a) ' (for Diogenes as a Stoic had taught him dialectic, and that was the fee of professors of that subject). I therefore am following the methods of procedure that I learnt from Antiochus, and I cannot make out how I am to form the judgement that the proposition ' If it is light, it is light ' is a true one (because I was taught that every hypothetical inference is true), but not form the judgement that ' If you are lying, you are lying ' is an inference on the same lines. Either therefore I shall make both the former judgement and the latter one, or, if not the former, not the latter either.

XXXI. " But to leave all those stinging repartees and the whole of the tortuous class of argument (b) and to display our real position, as soon as the whole system of Carneades has been unfolded the doctrines of your Antiochus will come to the ground in complete collapse. However, I will not assert anything in such a manner that anybody may suspect me of inventing ; I shall take it from Clitomachus, who was a companion of Carneades quite until old age, a clever fellow as being a Carthaginian, and also extremely studious and industrious. There are four volumes of his that deal with the withholding of assent, but what I am now going to say has been taken from Volume One.

99. Duo placet esse Carneadi genera visorum, in uno hanc divisionem, alia visa esse quae percipi possint, alia quae non possint, in altero autem alia visa esse probabilia, alia non probabilia; itaque quae contra sensus contraque perspicuitatem dicantur ea pertinere ad superiorem divisionem, contra posteriorem nihil dici oportere; quare ita placere, tale visum nullum esse ut perceptio consequeretur, ut autem probatio(同意), multa. Etenim contra naturam est probabile nihil esse, et sequitur omnis vitae ea,quam tu, Luculle, commemorabas,eversio; itaque et sensibus probanda multa sunt, teneatur modo(さえすれば) illud, non inesse in iis quicquam tale quale non(=二重否定) etiam falsum nihil ab eo differens esse possit. Sic quidquid acciderit specie probabile, si nihil se offeret quod sit probabilitati illi contrarium, utetur eo sapiens, ac sic omnis ratio vitae gubernabitur. Etenim is quoque qui a vobis sapiens inducitur(紹介する) multa sequitur probabilia, non comprehensa neque percepta neque assensa sed similia veri; quae nisi probet, omnis vita tollatur.

99 カルネアデスによると表象は二つに分類される。第一の分類はさらに知覚できる表象と知覚できない表象に分かれる。その第二の分類はさらに真実らしい表象と真実らしくない表象に分かれる。したがって、感覚に対する批判と知覚に対する批判は第一の分類に入るが、第二の分類に対する批判はすべきでないと、彼はいう。つまり、彼の意見では、知覚できるような表象は存在しないが、受け入れられるような表象は沢山ある。真実らしい物が何もないのは不自然なことであり、ルクルスさん、あなたが言ったように、全人生がひっくりかえってしまう。だから、もし「感覚に捉えられた物はそれと少しも違いわないのに虚偽でありうるものばかりである」と言えるのなら、感覚による多くの表象を受け入れるべきである。見たところ真実らしい物は何であっても、もしその真実らしさに反する物が何もないなら、賢者はそれを利用して自分の人生の行路は決めるのである。さらにあなた達が言っている賢者も、沢山の真実らしい物に従っているのである。彼は把握し知覚し同意したものではなく、真実に似ているものに従っているのである。もし彼がこのことを認めないなら、あらゆる人生は覆ってしまうだろう。

99 Carneades holds that there are two classifications of presentations, which under one are divided into those that can be perceived and those that cannot, and under the other into those that are probable and those that are not probable (c) ; and that accordingly those presentations that are styled by the Academy contrary to the senses and contrary to perspicuity belong to the former division, whereas the latter division must not be impugned ; and that consequently his view is that there is no presentation of such a sort as to result in perception, but many that result in a judgement of probability. For it is contrary to nature for nothing to be probable, and entails that entire subversion of life of which you, Lucullus, were speaking(a); accordingly even many sense-percepts must be deemed probable, if only it be held in mind that no sense-presentation has such a character as a false presentation could not also have without differing from it at all. Thus the wise man will make use of whatever apparently probable presentation he encounters, if nothing presents itself that is contrary to that probability, and his whole plan of life will be charted out in this manner. In fact even the person whom your school brings on the stage as the wise man follows many things probable. that he has not grasped nor perceived nor assented to but that possess verisimihtude ; and if he were not to approve them, all life would be done away with.

100. Quid enim? conscendens(乗る) navem sapiens num comprehensum animo habet atque perceptum se ex sententia(満足して、思い通りに) navigaturum? Qui potest? Sed si iam ex hoc loco proficiscatur Puteolos(プテオリへ) stadia triginta, probo(頑丈な) navigio(船), bono gubernatore, hac tranquillitate(好天), probabile videatur se illuc venturum esse salvum(無事に). Huius modi igitur visis consilia capiet et agendi et non agendi, faciliorque erit, ut albam esse nivem probet, quam erat Anaxagoras (qui id non modo ita esse negabat sed sibi, quia sciret aquam nigram esse unde illa concreta esset, albam ipsam esse ne videri quidem).

100 だってそうだろう。 船に乗った賢者は自分が望みどおりに航海するということを心で把握して知覚しているだろうか。誰にそんなことが出来るというのか? しかし、もし賢者がここからポッツオーリ(=ナポリ近郊の港)まで30スタディアムの旅をするとして、いい船でいい船長でこの穏やかな天気なら、自分がそこに無事到着することは真実らしいと思われる。つまり、賢者はこのような表象によって何かをするとかしないとかの計画を立てるし、雪が白いことを受け入れるのもアナクサゴラスよりは容易になる。(アナクサゴラスは、雪は白くないと言うだけではなく、雪の元になる水は黒いことを知っているので、雪は白くは見えないと言う)。

100 Another point : when a wise man is going on board a ship surely he has not got the knowledge already grasped in his mind and perceived that he will make the voyage as he intends ? how can he have it ? But if for instance he were setting out from here to Puteoli, a distance of four miles, with a reliable crew and a good helmsman and in the present calm weather, it would appear probable that he would get there safe. He will therefore be guided by presentations of this sort to adopt plans of action and of inaction, and will be readier at proving that snow is white than Anaxagoras was (who not only denied that this was so, but asserted that to him snow did not even appear white, because he knew that it was made of water solidified and that water was black) ;


101. Et quaecumque res eum(=sapientem) sic attinget, ut sit visum illud probabile neque ulla re impeditum, movebitur. Non enim est e saxo sculptus aut e robore dolatus(彫刻); habet corpus, habet animum, movetur mente, movetur sensibus, ut esse ei multa vera videantur, neque tamen habere insignem(明白な) illam et propriam percipiendi notam, eoque sapientem non assentiri, quia possit ejusdem modi exsistere falsum aliquod cujus modi hoc verum. Neque nos contra sensus aliter dicimus ac Stoici, qui multa falsa esse dicunt longeque aliter se habere ac sensibus videantur.

XXXII.

Hoc autem si ita sit, ut unum modo sensibus falsum videatur, praesto est qui neget(→79) rem ullam percipi posse sensibus. Ita nobis tacentibus ex uno Epicuri capite(要点), altero vestro perceptio et comprehensio tollitur. Quod est caput Epicuri? 'Si ullum sensus visum falsum est, nihil percipi potest.' Quod vestrum? 'Sunt falsa sensus visa.' Quid sequitur? Ut taceam, conclusio ipsa loquitur nihil posse percipi.'Non concedo,' inquit,'Epicuro.' Certa(命令法) igitur cum illo, qui a te totus diversus est, noli mecum, qui hoc quidem certe, falsi esse aliquid in sensibus, tibi assentior.

101 だから、賢者は、自分の身に起こることが何であれ、それが真実らしく思えて、その真実らしさに欠点がないのなら、それによって影響される。賢者も木や石で作られたわけではなく、肉体と精神を備えた身であるから、精神と感覚によって影響されるので、多くの表象が真実に思える。しかし、それらの物は知覚のための明確な目印、独特の目印はもっていない。だから、賢者は同意しない。なぜなら真実の表象とよく似た虚偽の表象が存在する可能性があるからである。また僕達が感覚を批判するやり方はストア派と同じである。ストア派は、多くの表象は虚偽であり、感覚に現れたものとは大きく異なっていると言っているからである。

XXXII そして、感覚に現れた表象が一つでも虚偽であったりすると、感覚による知覚の可能性を全否定する人がすぐに登場する。かくして、僕達が何もしなくても、エピクロスの理論とあなた達の理論によって、知覚と把握は否定されたのである。このエピクロスの理論とは「もし感覚の表象が一つでも虚偽なら、何も知覚することはできない」というものである。あなた達の理論は「感覚の表象は虚偽である」というものである。それに続く結論は、僕が何も言わなくても、「何も知覚することは不可能である」となる。「エピクロスとは違う」と言うかもしれない。それならエピクロスと論争すればいい。感覚を認めるエピクロスはあなたとは全然異なるからだ。だが、僕とはやめてくれ。僕は感覚には虚偽なものがあるという点であなたと意見が一致するのだから。

101 and whatever object comes in contact with him in such a way that the presentation is probable, and unhindered by anything, he will be set in motion. For he is not a statue carved out of stone or hewn out of timber ; he has a body and a mind, a mobile intellect and mobile senses, so that many things seem to him to be true, although nevertheless they do not seem to him to possess that distinct and peculiar mark leading to perception, and hence the doctrine that the wise man does not assent, for the reason that it is possible for a false presentation to occur that has the same character as a given true one. Nor does our pronouncement against the senses differ from that of the Stoics, who say that many things are false and widely different from what they appear to the senses.

XXXII. " If however this be the case, let the senses receive but a single false presentation, and he (a) stands ready to deny that the senses can perceive anything ! Thus a single first principle of Epicurus combined with another belonging to your school results in the abolition of perception and comprehension, without our uttering a word. What is the principle of Epicurus ? ' If any sense-presentation is false, nothing can be perceived.' What is yours ? ' There are false sense-presentations.' What follows ? Without any word of mine, logical inference of itself declares that nothing can be perceived. ' I do not admit Epicurus's point,' says he. Well then, fight it out with Epicurus - he differs from you entirely ; don't join issue with me, who at all events agree with you so far as to hold that there is an element of falsehood in the senses.

102. Quamquam nihil mihi tam mirum videtur quam ista dici, ab Antiocho quidem maxime, cui erant ea quae paulo ante dixi notissima. Licet enim haec quivis arbitratu suo reprehendat quod negemus rem ullam percipi posse, certe levior reprehensio est; quod tamen dicimus esse quaedam probabilia, non videtur hoc satis esse vobis. Ne sit; illa certe debemus effugere quae a te vel maxime agitata sunt: 'Nihil igitur cernis? nihil audis? nihil tibi est perspicuum?' Explicavi paulo ante Clitomacho auctore quo modo ista Carneades diceret. Accipe quem ad modum eadem dicantur a Clitomacho in eo libro quem ad C. Lucilium scripsit poetam, cum scripsisset isdem de rebus ad L. Censorinum eum qui consul cum M. Manilio fuit. Scripsit igitur his fere verbis ―sunt enim mihi nota, propterea quod earum ipsarum rerum de quibus agimus prima institutio et quasi disciplina illo libro continetur― sed scriptum est ita:

102 しかし、僕がいま言った考え方に精通しているアンティオコスがそんな学説を主張するのだから、こんなに驚くことはない。何も知覚できないという僕達の意見を誰が勝手に批判しても、それはたいしたことではない。しかし、真実らしいものが存在するという僕達の考えに、あなた達は満足していない。それはそうかもしれない。確かに「すると君は何も見えないのか、何も聞こえないのか? 何も明確なものはないのか?」と言って、あなた達が最も批判する点については、僕達も何とかすべきである。それで僕はカルネアデスがその事についてどう言っているかをさっきクレイトマコスの本から引用した(=99)。さらにクレイトマコスが同じ事を詩人のC.ルキリウスに捧げた本の中で書いていることをお話しよう。その事はM.マニリウスと共に執政官だったL.ケンソリウスにも書いている。クレイトマコスは次のように書いている。ーーこれを僕が知ったのは、まさにいま論じているこの問題に関する第一の理論いわば学説がその本の中にあるからである。ーーそれは次のように書いてある。

102 Although nothing seems to me so surprising as that those dootrines should be asserted, especially indeed by Antiochus, who was perfectly well acquainted with the arguments that I stated a little before. For even though anybody at his own discretion may criticize our statement that nothing can be perceived, that is a less serious criticism ; but it is our assertion that there are some things that are probable that seems to your school to be inadequate. It may be ; anyhow it is certainly up to us to get round the difficulties that you raised with the greatest insistency : ' Do you then see nothing ? do you hear nothing ? is nothing clear to you ? ' I quoted from Clitomachus a little earher an explanation of the way in which Carneades treated the difficulties you refer to ; let me give you the way in which the same points are dealt with by Clitomachus in the volume that he wrote to the poet Gaius Lucilius, although he had written on the same subjects to the Lucius Censorinus who was Manius Manilius's colleague in the consulship.(a) He wrote then in almost these words - for I am familiar with them, because the primary 'system' or doctrine (b) which we are dealing with is contained in that book - but it runs as follows :

103. Academicis placere esse rerum ejus modi dissimilitudines, ut aliae probabiles videantur, aliae contra: id autem non esse satis cur alia posse percipi dicas, alia non posse, propterea quod multa falsa probabilia sint, nihil autem falsi perceptum et cognitum possit esse. Itaque ait vehementer errare eos qui dicant ab Academia sensus eripi, a quibus numquam dictum sit aut colorem aut saporem aut sonum nullum esse, illud sit disputatum, non inesse in his propriam quae nusquam alibi esset veri et certi notam.

103 「アカデメイア派(=懐疑派)の考えでは、物事には二種類あって、それは真実らしいものとそうでないものである。しかし、それだけではある物が知覚できてある物が知覚できない理由としては不充分である。というのは、虚偽なものは知覚も認識もできないが、多くの虚偽なものは真実らしいからである。したがって、『アカデメイア派は感覚を奪った』という人たちは著しく間違っている。なぜなら、アカデメイア派は色や味や音というものがないと言っているのではなく、そのような表象の中には真実や確実性を表す独自の目印はどこにもないと言っているからである」とクレイトマコスは言っている。

103  ' The Academic school holds that there are dissimilarities between things of such a nature that some of them seem probable and others the contrary ; but this is not an adequate ground for saying that some things can be perceived and others cannot, because many false objects are probable but nothing false can be perceived and known.' And accordingly he asserts that those who say that the Academy robs us of our senses are violently mistaken, as that school never said that colour, taste or sound was non-existent, but their contention was that these presentatiuns do not contain a mark of truth and certainty peculiar to themselves and found nowhere else.


104. Quae cum exposuisset, adjungit dupliciter dici assensus sustinere sapientem: uno modo, cum hoc intelligatur, omnino eum rei nulli assentiri: altero, cum se a respondendo, ut aut approbet quid aut improbet, sustineat, ut neque neget aliquid neque aiat. Id cum ita sit, alterum placere, ut numquam assentiatur, alterum tenere, ut sequens probabilitatem ubicumque haec(=probabilitas) aut occurrat aut deficiat aut 'etiam(=yes)' aut 'non' respondere possit. Etenim cum placeat eum qui de omnibus rebus contineat se ab assentiendo moveri tamen et agere aliquid, relinqui(受不) ejus modi visa quibus ad actionem excitemur, item ea quae interrogati in utramque partem respondere possimus, sequentes tantum modo quod ita visum sit, dum sine assensu; neque tamen omnia ejus modi visa approbari, sed ea quae nulla re impedirentur.

104 クレイトマコスはこう言った後で、次のように付け加えた。「賢者が同意を控えるのは二通りあると言われている。一つは、賢者はどんな表象にも同意しないという意味であり、もう一つは、賛成するかしないかの答えを控えて、何かを否定したり肯定したりしないという意味である。したがって、一方の賢者は決して同意しないと考えているが、もう一方の賢者は、真実らしさに従って、真実らしさがある場合とない場合で肯定したり否定したりできると考えている。つまり、全ての場合について同意を控えるけれども、刺激を受けて行動する気持ちになる時には、表象によって行動に駆り立てられる余地は残されているし、問われたら同意はしないまでも、表象のあり方に応じて肯定も否定もできるのである。もちろん、全ての表象を受け入れるわけではなく、何物にも邪魔されない表象だけを受け入れるのである。

104  After setting out these points, he adds that the formula ' the wise man withholds assent ' is used in two ways, one when the meaning is that he gives absolute assent to no presentation at all, the other when he restrains himself from replying so as to convey approval or disapproval of something, with the consequence that he neither makes a negation nor an affirmation ; and that this being so, he holds the one plan in theory, so that he never assents, but the other in practice, so that he is guided by probability, and wherever this confronts him or is wanting he can answer ' yes ' or ' no ' accordingly. In fact as we hold that he who restrains himself from assent about all things nevertheless does move and does act, the view is that there remain presentations of a sort that arouse us to action, and also answers that we can give in the affirmative or the negative in reply to questions, merely following a corresponding presentation, provided that we answer without actual assent ; but that nevertheless not all presentations of this character were actually approved, but those that nothing hindered.

105. Haec si vobis non probamus(認めさせる), sint falsa sane, invidiosa certe non sunt. Non enim lucem eripimus, sed ea quae vos (=dicitis)percipi comprehendique, eadem nos, si modo probabilia sint, videri dicimus.

XXXIII.

Sic igitur inducto et constituto probabili(中性従格), et eo quidem expedito, soluto, libero, nulla re implicato, vides profecto, Luculle, jacere(行き詰まる) iam illud tuum perspicuitatis patrocinium(弁護). Iisdem enim hic sapiens de quo loquor oculis quibus iste vester caelum, terram, mare intuebitur, iisdem sensibus reliqua quae sub quemque sensum cadunt sentiet. Mare illud quod nunc Favonio(西風) nascente purpureum videtur, idem huic nostro videbitur, nec tamen assentietur, quia nobismet ipsis modo caeruleum videbatur, mane(朝) ravum(灰色の), quodque nunc, qua a sole collucet(輝いている) albescit et vibrat dissimileque est proximo et continenti(次に続く), ut etiamsi possis rationem reddere(説明する) cur id eveniat, tamen non possis id verum esse quod videbatur oculis defendere.

105 もしこの考え方があなた達にとって説得力がないとすれば、間違っていると言われてもいいが、けっして嫌な考え方ではないはずだ。というのは、僕達は光を奪っているのではなく、あなた達が知覚するとか把握すると言っているものを、僕達は、それが真実らしい限りにおいて、それはそうらしく見えると言ってるのである。

XXXIII こうして、真実らしさが導入され確立されて、そこから障害を取り除かれ、解放され自由になり、何物にも煩わされなった今では、ルクルスさん、あなたの明白性に対する弁護は最早成り立たなくなったことが分かるだろう。我々のいう賢者も、あなた達の賢者と同じ目で空と大地と海を見るだろうし、それ以外の物もあなた達の賢者と同じ感覚によってそれぞれの感覚の対象を感じるだろう。いま西風が吹き始めて紫色に見えている海は、我々の賢者にも同じように見えるだろうが、彼はけっして同意することはない。なぜなら我々の目にも、ついさっきまで同じ海が空色に見えたし、朝は灰色に見えたし、太陽が光る所は白くきらめいて見えるし、その周りとは違って見えるからである。したがって、あなた達は何故こんな事が起きるのかを説明出来るとしても、目に見える物が真実であると主張することは出来ないだろう。


105 If we do not win your approval for these doctrines, they may no doubt be false, but certainly they are not detestable. For we don't rob you of dayliglit, but, whereas you speak of things as being ' perceived ' and ' grasped,' we describe the same things (provided they are probable) as ' appearing.'

XXXIII. " Now therefore that we have thus brought in and established 'probability,' and a probability rid of difficulties, untrammelled, free, unentangled with anything, you doubtless see, Lucullus, that all your former advocacy of ' perspicuity ' now  collapses. For this wise man of whom I am speaking will behold the sky and earth and sea with the same eyes as the wise man of your school, and will perceive with the same senses the rest of the objects that fall under each of them. Yonder sea that now with the west wind rising looks purple, will look the same to our wise man, though at the same time he will not ' assent ' to the sensation, because even to ourselves it looked blue just now and tomorrow it will look grey, and because now where the sun lights it up it whitens and shimmers and is unlike the part immediately adjoining, so that even if you are able to explain why this occurs, you nevertheless cannot maintain that the appearance that was presented to your eyes was true !

106. Unde memoria, si nihil percipimus? Sic enim quaerebas. Quid? meminisse visa nisi comprehensa non possumus? Quid? Polyaenus, qui magnus mathematicus fuisse dicitur, is postea quam(=after that) Epicuro assentiens totam geometriam falsam esse credidit, num illa etiam quae sciebat oblitus est? Atqui falsum quod est id percipi non potest, ut vobismet ipsis placet; si igitur memoria perceptarum comprehensarumque rerum est, omnia quae quisque meminit,(=quisque) habet ea comprehensa atque percepta; falsi autem comprehendi nihil potest, et omnia meminit Siron Epicuri dogmata; vera igitur illa sunt nunc omnia. Hoc per me(=私に関する限り) licet(それでいい); sed tibi aut concedendum est ita esse, quod minime vis, aut memoriam mihi remittas(容認する) oportet et fateare(認める) esse ei(=memoriae) locum, etiam si comprehensio perceptioque nulla sit.

106 もし我々が何も知覚しないなら、どうして記憶というものがあるのかと、あなたは問うていたね。では、例えば、僕達は把握されていない表象は記憶できないだろうか? 例えば、偉大な数学者だったと言われるポリュアエヌスは、エピクロスに従って幾何学は全て虚偽であると考えるようになったが、そのあとではそれまで知っていた幾何学はすべて忘れてしまったのだろうか? もし人が記憶していることは知覚され把握されたことだけなら、人は自分が記憶していることを全て把握し知覚していることになる。ところで、あなた達の考えでは、虚偽なものは知覚できない。さらに、虚偽なものは把握できない。ところが、エピクロスの弟子のシロンはエピクロスの学説を全て記憶している。すると、エピクロスの学説は全て真実であることになる。僕はそれでも構わないが、あなた達は嫌だろう。つまり、あなた達はエピクロスの学説を真実だと認めたくなければ、記憶のことは僕に譲って、把握も知覚もしていなことでも、記憶は出来ることを認めねばならないのである。

106  If we perceive nothing, what is the cause of memory ? - that was a question you were asking.(a)  What ? are we unable to remember sense-presentations unless we have comprehended them ? What ? Polyaenus is said to have been a great mathematician : after he had accepted the view of Epicurus and come to believe that all geometry is false, surely he did not forget even the knowledge that he possessed ? Yet what is false cannot be perceived, as you yourselves hold ; if therefore the objects of memory are things perceived and comprehended, all the things a man remembers he holds grasped and perceived ; but nothing false can be grasped, and Siro remembers all the doctrines of Epicurus ; therefore in the present state of things those doctrines are all true. This may be so as far as I am concerned ; but you are either bound to allow that it is so, which is the last thing you are willing to do, or you must grant me memory and admit that it has a place, even if grasp and perception are non-existent.

107. Quid fiet artibus? Quibus? Iisne quae ipsae fatentur conjectura se plus uti quam scientia, an iis quae tantum id quod videtur sequuntur nec habent istam artem vestram qua vera et falsa dijudicent(見分ける)?

    Sed illa sunt lumina duo quae maxime causam istam continent. Primum enim negatis fieri posse ut quisquam nulli rei assentiatur. At id quidem perspicuum est. Cum Panaetius, princeps prope meo quidem judicio Stoicorum, ea de re dubitare se dicat, quam omnes praeter eum Stoici certissimam putant, vera esse haruspicum(占い師) responsa, auspicia, oracula, somnia, vaticinationes(神託), seque ab assensu sustineat: quod is potest facere vel de iis rebus quas illi a quibus ipse didicit(学ぶ) certas habuerint, cur id sapiens de reliquis rebus facere non possit? An(それとも) est aliquid quod positum(命題) vel improbare vel approbare possit,dubitare non possit? an tu in soritis poteris hoc,cum voles, ille in reliquis rebus non poterit eodem modo insistere(疑う), praesertim cum possit sine assensione ipsam veri similitudinem non impeditam(妨げられた) sequi?

107 「もしそうなら学問はどうなるんだ」とあなた達は聞くだろう。しかし、それはどんな学問のことだろうか? 知識より推論を多用することを自ら認めている学問は大丈夫だし、表象のみに従い、あなた達の言う真実と虚偽を判断する技術を持たない学問なら大丈夫だ。

    ところで、あなたの主張を支持する目玉となる論点は次の二つである。つまり、その第一の論点は、あなた達は「何物にも同意しない人がいる」ということをあり得ないと否定していることだ。しかし、何物にも同意しないということは明らかなことである。ストア派の第一人者と言っていいパナイティオスは、自分以外のストア派がみんな確かであると見なしていることについて、自分は疑っていると言った。すなわち、占い、鳥占い、神託、夢、予言などが真実であるということに対して、彼は同意を控えたのだ。このようにパナイティオスは自分の教師たちが確かであると見なしている事について出来た同意を控えることを、どうして賢者がそのほかの事について出来ないだろうか? それとも、賛成や反対は出来るけれども疑うことの出来ないような命題が何かあるだろうか? それとも、あなたにはその気になればソリテスに同意を控えることが出来るのに、賢者にはそのほかのことについて同じことが出来ないというのだろうか? 賢者は障碍なく真実に似たものに対して同意することなく従うことが出来るというのに。

107 What will happen to the sciences ? What sciences ? the ones that themselves confess that they make more use of conjecture than knowledge, or those that are only guided by appearance, and are not possessed of that method belonging to your school to enable them to distinguish what is true from what is false ?
    " But the two outstanding things that hold your case together are the following. The first is your statement that it is impossible for anybody to assent to nothing, and that this at all events is ' perspicuous.' Seeing that Panaetius, who in my judgement at all events is almost the chief of the Stoics, says that he is in doubt as to the matter which all the Stoics beside him think most certain, the truth of the pronouncements of diviners, of auspices and oracles, of dreams and soothsaying, and that he restrains himself from assent, which he can do even about things that his own teachers held to be certain, why should not the wise man be able to do so about everything else ? Is there any proposition that he can either reject or approve, but is not able to doubt ? will you be able to do so with sorites arguments when you wish, but he not be able to call a similar halt in everything else, especially as he is able to follow mere resemblance to truth when unhampered,(a) without the act of assent ?
 
108. Alterum est, quod negatis actionem ullius rei posse in eo esse, qui nullam rem assensu suo comprobet. Primum enim videri(検討する) oportet in quo sit etiam assensus. Dicunt enim Stoici sensus ipsos assensus esse, quos quoniam(であるから) appetitio consequatur, actionem sequi, tolli autem omnia, si visa tollantur.

XXXIV.

Hac de re in utramque partem et dicta sunt et scripta multa, sed brevi res potest tota confici(書く). Ego enim etsi(→tamen) maximam actionem puto repugnare visis, obsistere opinionibus, assensus lubricos(すべりやすい) sustinere, credoque(信頼する) Clitomacho ita scribenti, Herculi quendam laborem exanclatum(=exantlatum 耐える) a Carneade, quod, ut feram et immanem beluam, sic ex animis nostris assensionem, id est, opinationem et temeritatem extraxisset(引きずり出す), tamen (ut ea pars defensionis relinquatur) quid impediet actionem ejus qui probabilia sequitur nulla re impediente?

108 もうあなた達の一つの論点は、何事にも同意しない人はどんな行動も不可能になるということだ。まず第一に、同意とはどういうことかを見てみよう。ストア派が言うには、感覚自身が同意であり、感覚に欲求が伴うから、行動は感覚に従うのである。それに対して、もし表象が取り去られるなら、この全てが取り去られると言うのである。

XXXIV このことについては賛否両論多くのことが語られまた書かれている。しかし、問題の全体を短く要約することは可能だ。僕としては、表象に反対し、憶断に抵抗し、危なっかしい同意を控えることこそ、最も重要な行動だと考えている。僕はクレイトマコスと同じく、カルネアデスによってヘラクレスの功業が達成されと考えている。つまり、カルネアデスは巨大な野獣を追い出すようにして、我々の精神から同意すなわち憶断と軽率さを追い出してくれたのである。しかし(この立場に対する弁護は省略する)、もし真実らしさに対する疑念が何もないとすれば、真実らしさに従う人の行動を何が妨げるというのだろうか。

108 The second point is the assertion of your school that no action as regards anything is possible in the case of a man who gives the approval of his assent to nothing ; for in the first place the thing must be seen, and that includes assent, for the Stoics say that the sensations are themselves acts of assent, and that it is because these are followed by an impulse of appetition that action follows, whereas if sense-presentations are done away with, everything is done away with.

XXXIV. On this matter a great deal has been said and written both for and against, but the whole subject can be dealt with briefly. For even although my own opinion is that the highest form of activity (a) wars(戦う) against sense-presentations, withstands opinions, holds back acts of assent on their slippery slope, and although I agree with Clitomachus when he writes that Carneades really did accomplish an almost Herculean labour in ridding(除去する) our minds of that fierce wild beast, the act of assent, that is of mere opinion and hasty thinking, nevertheless (to abandon that section of the defence) what will hamper the activity of the man that follows probabilities when nothing hampers ?

109. 'Hoc,' inquit, 'ipsum impediet, quod statuet ne id quidem quod probet posse percipi(受け入れていることが知覚できないと言っていること).' Jam istuc te quoque impediet in navigando, in conserendo, in uxore ducenda, in liberis procreandis, plurimisque in rebus in quibus nihil sequere praeter probabile.

    Et tamen illud usitatum(普通の) et saepe repudiatum(退けられた) refers(繰り返す), non ut Antipater sed, ut ais 'pressius.' Nam Antipatrum reprehensum, quod diceret consentaneum(相応しい) esse ei qui affirmaret nihil posse comprehendi, id(=何も把握できないこと) ipsum saltem(=at least) dicere posse comprehendi, quod ipsi Antiocho pingue(へたな、だめな) videbatur et sibi ipsum contrarium. Non enim potest convenienter(整合性がある) dici nihil comprehendi posse, si quicquam comprehendi posse dicatur. Illo modo potius putat urguendum(非難する) fuisse Carneadem: cum sapientis nullum decretum esse posset nisi comprehensum perceptum cognitum, ut hoc ipsum decretum, quod sapientis esset, nihil posse percipi, fateretur esse perceptum. Proinde quasi nullum sapiens aliud decretum habeat et sine decretis vitam agere possit!

109 それに対して「自分が受け入れた事を知覚できないと考えること自体が行動の妨げとなる」と言うかもしれない。そんなこと言っていたら、航海や、種蒔き、結婚、子供作りなど、真実らしさに従う以外にはない多くの場合に、あなた達は何もできなくなる。

それに対して、あなた達はアンティパトロスと違って、何度も繰り返され退けられてきたことを言って、ルクルスさんの言葉を借りれば「もっと辛辣に攻撃する」(=29)。アンティパトロスは、「何も把握できない」と言う人がこの「何も把握できない」という事だけは把握できると言うことは矛盾ではない」と言ったとき、それをカルネアデスが批判したそうだが(=28)、ところが、この批判はアンティオコスには矛盾した愚かなことだと思われたのだ。確かにもし「把握できるものがある」と言うなら、何も把握できないと言うのはおかしい。しかし、むしろカルネアデスこそ次のように批判されるべきだとアンティオコスは考える。つまり、把握され知覚され認識されない限り賢者はどんな教義も持ち得ないのだから、「何も知覚できない」という賢者の教義自体は知覚されていることを彼は認めるべきであると。これではまるで、賢者はそれ以外には何の教義も持たず何の教義もなしに生きていけるようだが、そうではない。 

109 ' The very fact,' says he, ' that he will decide that not even what he approves can be perceived, will hamper him.' Well then, that same fact will hamper you also in going a voyage, in sowing a crop, in marrying a wife, in begetting a family, in ever so many things in which you will be following nothing but probability.

" And putting that aside, you repeat the old, familiar and oft-rejected argument, not in Antipater's manner, but as you say ' coming more to grips with it ' (b) ; for Antipater, you tell us, was censured for saying that it was consistent for one who asserted that nothing could be grasped to say that that assertion itself could be grasped. This seemed stupid and self-contradictory even to Antiochus ; for it cannot consistently be said that nothing can be grasped if anything is said to be able to be grasped. The way in which Antiochus thinks Carneades should preferably have been attacked was this - to make him admit that, since the wise man can have no ' decision ' (a) that is not grasped and perceived and known, therefore this particular decision itself, that it is the decision of the wise man that nothing can be perceived, is perceived. Just as if the wise man held no other decision and could conduct his life without decisions !

110. Sed ut illa habet probabilia non percepta, sic hoc ipsum, nihil posse percipi. Nam si in hoc haberet cognitionis notam, eadem uteretur in ceteris; quam quoniam non habet, utitur probabilibus. Itaque non metuit ne confundere omnia videatur et incerta reddere. Non enim, quem ad modum si quaesitum ex eo(賢者に) sit stellarum numerus par an impar sit, item si de officio multisque aliis de rebus in quibus versatus exercitatusque sit, nescire se dicat; in incertis enim nihil est probabile, in quibus autem (=probalile)est, in iis non deerit sapienti nec quid faciat nec quid respondeat.

110 賢者は知覚されないが真実らしい教義を色々持っていて、「何も知覚できない」という教義も同様なのである。というのは、もしこの教義について認識の目印を持っているなら、ほかの教義にもこの目印を使うはずであるが、そんなものは持っていないので、真実らしい教義に従うのである。だから、彼は全てを混乱させて不確かなものにしてしまうと見えるのを恐れたりしないのである。実際、自分が関わっていてよく知っている自分の仕事について尋ねられた場合に、彼は星の数が奇数か偶数か尋ねられた場合とはちがって、自分は知らないと答えることはないのである。不確な事の場合には真実らしいことは何もないが、それに対して、真実らしいことが存在する物事については、賢者は何をすべきか何を答えるべきかに困りはしないのである。

110 On the contrary, he holds this particular opinion, that nothing can be perceived, in just the same way as he holds the 'probable ' but not 'perceived ' views that have been mentioned ; for if he had a mark of knowledge in this case, he would employ the same mark in all other cases, but since he has not got it, he employs probabilities. Thus he is not afraid lest he may appear to throw everything into confusion and make everything uncertain. For if a question be put to him about duty or about a number of other matters in which practice has made him an expert, he would not reply in the same way as he would if questioned as to whether the number of the stars is even or odd, and say that he did not know ; for in things uncertain there is nothing probable, but in things where there is probability the wise man will not be at a loss either what to do or what to answer.

111. Ne illam quidem praetermisisti(省略), Luculle, reprehensionem Antiochi-nec mirum, in primis enim est nobilis(有名)-, qua solebat dicere Antiochus Philonem maxime perturbatum(動揺した): cum enim sumeretur unum, esse quaedam falsa visa, alterum, nihil ea differre a veris, non attendere(気づく) superius(→unum) illud ea re(そのために→quod) a se esse concessum(認める) quod videretur esse quaedam in visis differentia, eam(=differentia) tolli altero(→alterum) quo(by which) neget visa a falsis vera differre; nihil tam repugnare. Id ita esset, si nos verum omnino tolleremus. Non facimus(=tollimus). Nam tam vera quam falsa cernimus. Sed probandi species(表象) est, percipiendi signum nullum habemus.

111 ルクルスさん、あなたはアンティオコスのもう一つの批判にも言及していた(=44)。あれは特に有名だから当然だ。アンティオコスによれば、フィロンはこの批判に一番困ったそうである。つまり、一方で「虚偽の表象が存在する」と言い、他方で「虚偽の表象と真実の表象には違いがない」と言っているが、前者が認められるのは表象の中に何らかの違いのあることが分かっているという事実からなのに、後で真実の表象と虚偽の表象には違いがないと言うのは、この事実を否定してしまっている。フィロンはそれに気づいていないが、これほど矛盾したことはない、と言うのだ。しかし、アンティオコスのこの批判が成り立つためには僕達は真実の存在を完全に否定してしまわねばならない。しかし僕達は真実を否定はしない。僕たちは嘘と真(まこと)の見分けはつくからだ。しかし僕たちは表象によって真実を受け入れるだけで、確かな目印によって知覚してるわけではない。

111 Nor yet, Lucullus, did you pass over the criticism made by Antiochus (b) ? and no wonder, as it is one of the most famous ? which Antiochus used to say Philo had found most upsetting : it was that when the assumption was made, first, that there were some false presentations, and secondly, that they differed in no respect from true ones, Philo failed to notice that whereas he had admitted the former proposition on the strength of the apparent existence of a certain difference among presentations, this fact was refuted by the latter proposition, his denial that true presentations differ from false ones ; and that no procedure could be more inconsistent. This would hold good if we abolished truth altogether ; but we do not, for we observe some things that are true just as we observe some that are false. But there is 'appearance ' (a) as a basis of approval, whereas we have no mark as a basis of perception.

XXXV.

112. Ac mihi videor nimis etiam nunc agere jejune(無味乾燥な). Cum sit enim campus in quo exsultare(飛び跳ねる) possit oratio, cur eam tantas in angustias(狭い場所) et in Stoicorum dumeta(イバラの藪) compellimus? si enim mihi cum Peripatetico(逍遥学派の) res esset(扱う), qui id percipi posse diceret, 'quod impressum esset e vero,' neque adhiberet(あてがう) illam magnam accessionem(追加), 'quo modo imprimi non posset a falso,' cum simplici homine simpliciter agerem nec magnopere(全力で) contenderem atque etiam, si, cum ego nihil dicerem posse comprehendi, diceret ille sapientem interdum opinari, non repugnarem(反対する), praesertim ne Carneade quidem huic loco valde(強力に) repugnante: nunc quid facere possum?

112 僕の議論は少々窮屈になりすぎたかもしれない。というのは、雄弁が活躍できるような広い領域があるなら、話をストア派の茂みの中の狭い領域にとどるまることはなかったのだ。例えばもしこれがペリパトス派(=アリストテレス派=独断派)が相手なら、彼らは「真実なものによって刻印された表象」は知覚できると言うだけで、「虚偽なものによって刻印され得ないような姿をしている表象」(=真実の目印があること)というややこしい但し書きを付け加えないので、率直な人に率直な議論をするだけでよく、ひどく論争することはない。また、僕が何も把握できるものはないと言った時に、ペリパトス派が賢者もときには憶断すると言っても、僕は反論しない。特にカルネアデスはこの点では強く反論しないのである。でも、ストア派が相手では僕に何が出来るだろう。

XXXV 112. " And even now I feel that my procedure is too cramped. For when there is a wide field in which eloquence might expatiate, why do we drive it into such confined spaces and into the briary thickets of the Stoics ? If I were dealing with a Peripatetic, who would say that we can perceive 'an impression formed from a true object,' without adding the important qualification ' in a manner in which it could not be formed from a false one,' I would meet his frankness with frankness and would not labour to join issue(議論を戦わす) with him, and if, when I said that nothing can be grasped, he said that the wise man sometimes forms an opinion, I would even refrain from combating him, especially as even Carneades does not vehemently combat this position ; but as it is what can I do ?


113. Quaero enim quid sit quod comprehendi possit. Respondet mihi non Aristoteles aut Theophrastus, ne Xenocrates quidem aut Polemo, sed qui his minor est: 'tale verum quale falsum esse non possit.' Nihil ejus modi invenio; itaque incognito nimirum(もちろん) assentiar, id est opinabor. Hoc mihi et Peripatetici et vetus Academia concedit, vos negatis(許さない), Antiochus in primis, qui me valde movet, vel quod amavi hominem sicut ille me, vel quod ita judico, politissimum(洗練された) et acutissimum omnium nostrae memoriae philosophorum. A quo primum quaero quo tandem modo sit ejus Academiae cujus esse se profiteatur(自称する)? Ut omittam alia, haec duo de quibus agitur, quis umquam dixit aut veteris Academiae aut Peripateticorum, vel id solum percipi posse quod esset verum tale quale falsum esse non posset, vel sapientem nihil opinari? Certe nemo. Horum(←duo) neutrum ante Zenonem magnopere defensum est. Ego tamen utrumque verum puto, nec dico temporis causa, sed ita plane probo.

113 というのは、僕が「把握できるものは何か」と聞いても、僕に答えてくれるのはアリストテレスでもテオフラストス(=ペリパトス派)でもなく、クセノクラテスでもポレモン(=アカデメイア派)でもない。それは彼らより劣った誰かであり、しかもその答えは「虚偽ではありえないほどに真実なもの」なのだ。しかしそんな姿をしたものに僕は出会うことはない。だから僕は認識していない事にきっと同意するだろうし、憶断することだろう。これはペリパトス派と古アカデメイア派(=どちらも独断派)はこの僕を認めてくれている。ところが、アンティオコスを初めとするあなた達は認めてくれないのだ。アンティオコスは僕が大きく影響を受けた人である。それは僕と彼は互いに親密だったからだし、現代の哲学者の中では一番洗練されて聡明だと思うからである。僕がアンティオコスにまず尋ねたいことは、彼はアカデメイア派(=懐疑派)だと言うが、一体どうしてそんなことが言えるのかということである。というのは、ほかの事は別にして、いま僕達が扱っている二つのこと、つまり「虚偽ではありえないほどに真実であるものだけが知覚できる」とか、「賢者は決して憶断しない」と、古アカデメイア派やペリパトス派の誰がいつ言ったのか。そんなことは誰も言っていないのは明らかである。こんなことはどちらもゼノン(=ストア派)以前には熱心に主張されたことはない。それにも関わらず、僕はどちらも正しいと思っている。これはその方が好都合だからではなく、僕は明確に受け入れているのである。
  
113 For I put the question what there is that can be grasped ; I receive the answer, not from Aristotle or Theophrastus, not even from Xenocrates or Polemo, but from a smaller person,(b) ' A true presentation of such a sort that there cannot be a false one of the same sort.' I do not encounter any such presentation ; and accordingly I shall no doubt assent to something not really known, that is, I shall hold an opinion. This both the Peripatetics and the Old Academy grant me, but your school denies it, and Antiochus does so first and foremost, who influences me strongly, either because I loved the man as he did me, or because I judge him as the most polished and the most acute of all the philosophers of our time. The first question that I put to him is, how pray can he belong to that Academy to which he professes to belong ? To omit other points, what member of the Old Academy or of the Peripatetic school ever made these two statements that we are dealing with - either that the only thing that can be perceived is a true presentation of such a sort that there could not be a false one of the same sort, or that a wise man never holds an opinion ? No one, without a doubt ; neither of these propositions was much upheld before Zeno. I nevertheless think both of them true, and I do not say so just to suit the occasion, but it is my deliberate judgement.

XXXVI.

114. Illud ferre non possum. Tu cum me incognito assentiri vetes idque turpissimum esse dicas et plenissimum temeritatis, tantum tibi arroges(偽称する), ut exponas disciplinam sapientiae(知恵=哲学), naturam rerum omnium evolvas, mores fingas, finis bonorum malorumque constituas, officia describas, quam vitam ingrediar(始める) definias, idemque(同時に) etiam disputandi(弁証法) et intellegendi(論理学) judicium dicas te et artificium(理論) traditurum, perficies(未、証明する) ut ego ista innumerabilia complectens nusquam labar, nihil opiner? Quae tandem ea est disciplina, ad quam me deducas(誘う), si ab hac abstraxeris? Vereor ne subarroganter(やや傲慢) facias, si dixeris tuam. Atqui ita dicas necesse est. Neque vero tu solus, sed ad suam quisque rapiet(ひったてる).

XXXVI 114 ただ次のことだけは僕は耐えられない。あなたは僕が認識していないことに同意することを禁止して、それは最も恥ずかしいことであり最も軽率なことだと言うが、その一方で、あなたが、知恵の教えを提示して、世界の本質を展開して、習慣を形成して、善悪の究極を定めて、義務について語り、どのような人生を送るべきかを規定して、議論と理解の基準と理論を自ら伝えようと厚かましくも言うが、あなたたちの理論を全部頭に入れておけば、あなたは僕が二度と失敗せず臆断しないようにしてくれるというのかね? あなたはもし僕を今の学派から引き離すことができたとして、あなたが僕を誘い入れたい学派は一体どの学派だ? もしそれはあなたの学説だというなら、それは思い上がりというものではないか。それでもあなたはきっとそうするだろう。あなただけではなく、誰もが自分の学派に誘いたがるものだから。

XXXVI.114 " One thing I cannot put up with : when you forbid me to assent to something that I do not know and say that this is most disgraceful and reeks with rashness, but take so much upon yourself as (厚かましく~する)to set out a system of philosophy, to unfold a complete natural science, to mould our ethics and establish a theory of the chief good and evil and map out our duties and prescribe the career that I am to embark upon, and also actually profess to be ready to impart a criterion and scientific system of dialectic and logic, will you secure that I on my side when embracing all your countless doctrines shall never make a slip, never hold a mere opinion ? What system pray is there for you to convert me to if you can withdraw me from this one ? I am afraid you may be doing rather a presumptuous thing if you say your own system, yet all the same you are bound to say so. Nor indeed will you be alone, but everybody will hurry me into his own system.

115. Age, restitero(未完、抵抗する) Peripateticis, qui sibi cum oratoribus cognationem(密接な関係) esse, qui claros viros a se instructos dicant rem publicam saepe rexisse(導く), sustinuero(支える) Epicureos, tot meos familiaris, tam bonos, tam inter se amantis viros, Diodoto(ストア派) quid faciam Stoico, quem a puero audivi? qui mecum vivit tot annos? qui habitat apud me? quem et admiror et diligo? qui ista Antiochea(アンティオコスの哲学) contemnit? 'Nostra,' inquies,' sola vera sunt.' Certe sola, si vera, plura enim vera discrepantia(不一致) esse non possunt. Utrum igitur nos impudentes(あつかましい) qui labi nolumus, an illi arrogantes qui sibi persuaserint scire se solos omnia? 'Non me quidem,' inquit, 'sed sapientem dico scire.' Optime!  nempe ista scire quae sunt in tua disciplina. Hoc primum quale est, a non sapiente explicari sapientiam? Sed discedamus a nobismet ipsis, de sapiente loquamur, de quo ut saepe iam dixi omnis haec quaestio est.

115 でも、僕はペリパトス派には入らない。彼らは弁論家に知り合いが多く、教え子に著名人をたくさんいて国家の要職に付いていると言って誘うのにだ。また僕はエピクロス派には入らない。彼らにはとても仲の良い友人が沢山いるし、良い人達ばかりだが。それなのに、あなたの学派に入ったりしたら、僕はストア派のディオドトスの学派にどう説明したらいいのだ。彼は僕の子供の頃からの先生で、長年僕と一緒に暮らしてきた僕の尊敬する人で、あなたの言うアンティオコスの学説を軽蔑している人なのだ。それに対して、あなたは「自分たちの理論だけが真実だ」と言う。もし真実なら、定めしそれは確かだろう。多くの異なる真実が存在することなどあり得ないからだ。失敗するのを嫌う僕達が生意気でないとするなら、自分だけが全てを知っているという思い込んでいる人たちが思い上がりなのである。それに対して「全てを知っているのは私ではなく、賢者のことだ」と言うかもしれない。それはそうだろうが、その知識というのはあなたの学説のことだろう。そもそも知恵のない人が説明する知恵とは何なのだ。僕達の話はやめて、賢者のことを話そうじゃないか。これまでの議論はすべて賢者についてのことだから。

115  Come, suppose I stand out against the Peripatetics, who say that they are akin to the orators and that famous men equipped with their teaching have often governed the state. and suppose I resist the Epicureans, that crowd of friends of my own, so worthy and so affectionate a set of men : what shall I do with Diodotus the Stoic, whose pupil I have been from a boy, who has been my associate for so many years, who lives in my house, whom I both admire and love, and who despises the doctrines of Antiochus that you are putting forward ? ' Our doctrines,' you will say, ' are the only true ones.' If they are true, certainly they are the only true ones, for there cannot be several true systems disagreeing with one another. Then is it we that are shameless, who do not wish to make a slip, or they presumptuous, who have persuaded themselves that they alone know everything ? ' I don't say that I myself know,' says he, ' but that the wise man knows.' Excellent! no doubt you mean 'knows the doctrines that are in your system.' To begin with, what are we to think of this - wisdom being unfolded by a man that is not wise ? But let us leave ourselves and speak about the wise man, on whom all this inquiry turns, as I have often said already.


116. In tres igitur partis et a plerisque et a vobismet ipsis distributa sapientia est. Primum ergo, si placet, quae de natura rerum sint quaesita, videamus: at illud ante. Estne quisquam tanto inflatus errore, ut sibi se illa scire persuaserit? Non quaero rationes eas quae ex conjectura pendent, quae disputationibus huc et illuc trahuntur, nullam adhibent persuadendi necessitatem. Geometrae(<geometres 複主) provideant(配慮する), qui se profitentur non persuadere, sed cogere, et qui omnia vobis quae describunt probant. Non quaero ex his illa initia mathematicorum quibus non concessis(過分奪、認める) digitum(指の幅) progredi non possunt, punctum esse quod magnitudinem nullam habeat, extremitatem et quasi libramentum(水平面) in quo nulla omnino crassitudo(厚み) sit, liniamentum(線) sine ulla latitudine(幅). Haec cum vera esse concessero, si adigam ius jurandum(誓わせる) sapientem, nec prius quam Archimedes eo inspectante rationes(計算) omnis descripserit(記述) eas quibus efficitur(証明される) multis partibus solem majorem esse quam terram, juraturum putas? Si fecerit, solem ipsum quem deum censet esse contempserit.

116 あなた達の学派も大多数の哲学者たちも同じ様に、知恵は三つの部門に分かれている。では、まず自然科学についてどんな研究が行われてきたか見てみよう。しかし、その前に言うことがある(=128)。自然科学のことを知っていると思い込んでいる人ほど過ちに満ちた人はいない。僕は、推論に依存して、議論の中であちこちへ引きずり回され、なんら必然的な説得力を具えていない理論のことを言っているのではない。それは幾何学者たちにまかせておけばいい。彼らは説得するのではなく確信させるのだと公言して、全てをあなた達に証明してくれるだろう。私は「点とは如何なる大きさも持たないものである」とか「面つまり平面は全く厚さのないものである」とか「線には広がりがない」など、幾何学者に認めてやらなければ彼らが一歩も進むことの出来ない数学の公理について言っているのでもない。僕がこれらの公理が真実だと認めるとき、もし賢者にこの公理の真実を誓うことを求めたら、アルキメデスが賢者の目の前で、太陽は地球の何倍も大きい(=82)ということを理論的に証明した後でも、賢者は誓うとあなたは言うのだろうか。もし誓うなら、彼は自分が神であると考えている太陽に不敬を働くことになってしまう。

116 " Wisdom then is divided by your own school, as it is also by most philosophers, into three parts. First therefore, if you agree, let us see what investigations  have been made about natural science. But one thing first : is there anybody so puffed up with error as to have persuaded himself that he knows this subject? I am not asking about the theories that depend upon conjecture, that are dragged to and fro in debate, employing no convincing cogency ; let the geometricians see to that, whose claim is that they do not persuade but convince, and who prove all their propositions by their diagrams to the satisfacticn of your school. I am not asking these people about those first principles of mathematics which must be granted before they are able to advance an inch - that a point is a thing without magnitude, that a 'boundary ' or surface (a) is a thing entirely devoid of thickness, a line a thing without any breadth. When I have admitted the correctness of these definitions, if I put the wise man on his oath, and not until Archimedes has first, with him looking on, drawn all the diagrams proving that the sun is many times as large as the earth, do you think that he will take the oath ? If he does, he will have shown contempt for the sun itself which he deems is a god.

117. Quodsi geometricis rationibus non est crediturus, quae vim afferunt in docendo(証明する), vos ipsi ut dicitis, ne(= asseverative) ille longe aberit ut argumentis credat philosophorum; aut si est crediturus, quorum potissimum? Omnia enim physicorum licet explicare, sed longum est; quaero tamen quem sequatur. Finge aliquem nunc fieri sapientem, nondum esse, quam potissimum sententiam eliget et disciplinam? Etsi quamcumque eliget, insipiens eliget. Sed sit ingenio divino, quem unum e physicis potissimum probabit? Nec plus uno poterit. Non persequor quaestiones infinitas: tantum de principiis(原理) rerum e quibus omnia constant videamus quem probet, est enim inter magnos homines summa dissensio.

117 もちろん賢者があなたの学派が必須要件であると認める幾何学の方法を信じないなら、賢者は自然哲学者たちの証明など信じるはずがない。だが、もし信じるとしても、どの学派の証明を信じるだろうか。ここで自然哲学者達全員の証明を説明してもいいが、それでは長くなる。しかし、僕は賢者がどれに従うかを知りたいのだ。まだ賢者ではないが賢者にになろうとしている人ならどうだろう。どの学説のどの理論を選ぶだろうか。しかし、彼がどれを選ぶにしろ、まだ彼は賢者ではない。しかし、もし彼に超人的な能力があるとすれば、どの自然哲学者を一人だけ彼は選ぶだろうか。しかも彼が選ぶのは一人だけなのだ。僕は終わりのない質問をしているのではない。ただ万物を構成している元素について、彼が認める人を知りたいのだ。なぜなら、偉大な自然哲学者たちの間で大きく意見が別れる問題だからである。

117 But if he is going to refuse credence to the methods of geometry, which in their teaching exercise a compelling force, as your school itself asserts, surely he for his part will be far from believing the proofs of the philosophers ; or else, if he does believe them, which school's proofs will he choose ? for one might set out all the systems of the natural philosophers, but it would be a long story : all the same, I want to know which philosopher he follows. Imagine that somebody is becoming a wise man now, but is not one yet ; what doctrine or system will he select to adopt ? although whichever one he does select, the selection will be made by a man not wise ; but suppose he be an inspired genius, which single one among the natural philosophers will he choose to approve ? more than one he will not be able to. I am not asking about problems of unlimited vagueness : let us merely consider what authority he will approve in respect of the elements of which the universe (a) consists, for it is a subject extremely debated among the great.

XXXVII.

118. Princeps Thales, unus e septem, cui sex reliquos concessisse primas(中、第一位) ferunt, ex aqua dixit constare omnia. At hoc Anaximandro, populari(同郷の) et sodali(仲間) suo, non persuasit: is enim infinitatem naturae dixit esse, e qua omnia gignerentur. Post ejus auditor Anaximenes infinitum aera(空気), sed ea quae ex eo orirentur definita: gigni autem terram, aquam, ignem, tum ex his omnia. Anaxagoras materiam infinitam, sed ex ea particulas(分子), similis inter se, minutas, eas primum confusas, postea in ordinem adductas(導く) a mente divina. Xenophanes, paulo etiam antiquior, unum esse omnia neque id esse mutabile(変化する) et id esse deum neque natum umquam et sempiternum(永久), conglobata figura: Parmenides ignem, qui moveat terram, quae ab eo formetur(形作る): Leucippus, plenum et inane: Democritus huic in hoc similis, uberior in ceteris: Empedocles haec pervulgata(よく知られている) et nota(既知の) quattuor: Heraclitus ignem: Melissus hoc quod esset infinitum et immutabile et fuisse semper et fore. Plato ex materia in se omnia recipiente mundum factum esse censet a deo sempiternum. Pythagorei(ピュタゴラス派、主複) ex numeris et mathematicorum initiis proficisci volunt omnia. Ex his eliget(未、選ぶ) vester sapiens unum aliquem, credo, quem sequatur: ceteri tot viri et tanti repudiati(拒否されて) ab eo condemnatique discedent.

118 まず最初に来るのは7人の賢者の一人であるタレースである。残りの6人の賢者も第一番の地位を彼に譲るという話である。その彼は「万物は水からできて」いると言った。しかし、彼の友人で同じ町のアナクシマンドロスはこの考えには納得しなかった。アナクシマンドロスは万物は無限の物質から生まれてくるとと言った。その後、アナクシマンドロスの弟子のアナクシメネスは無限のエーテルが存在し、そこから有限のものが生成すると言った。つまり、土と水と火とが生まれ、そこから全てのものが生まれてくるのだと。アナクサゴラスは無限の物質が存在して、そこから小さくて互いによく似た形の分子が生まれ、それらは初めは混乱しているが、後に神の意志によって整頓されてくると言った。時代が少し遡るクセノファネスは万物は一つであり、それは不変の神で、永遠に存在するので生まれてくることのない球形のものであると言っている。パルメニデスは火が地球を生み出して動かしていると言う。レウキッポスは固体と空間だという。デモクリトスもレウキッポスと似ているが、もっと広範に論じている。エンペドクレスは4つの元素があると言っている。ヘラクレイトスも火だという。メリッソスは無限で不変の存在があって永遠に存在するという。プラトンは世界はすべてを包含する物質から神が創成したものであり永遠に続くという。ピュタゴラス派の人たちは万物は数と数学の原理から生まれているという。この中からあなたの賢者はどれか一人を選んでその人に従うのだろう。そして残りの人達はこれだけの偉人であるにもかかわらず、見捨てられて軽蔑されて去っていくのだ。

118 XXXVII. " At the head of the list Thales, the one of the Seven to whom the remaining six are stated to  have unanimously yielded the first place, said that all things are made of water. But in this he did not carry conviction with his fellow-citizen and associate Anaximander ; Anaximander said that there exists an infinity of substance (b) from which the universe was engendered. Afterwards his pupil Anaximenes held that air is infinite, but the things that spring from it finite, and that earth, water and fire are engendered, and then the universe of things out of these. Anaxagoras held that matter is infinite, but that out of it have come minute particles entirely alike, which were at first in a state of medley but were afterwards reduced to order by a divine mind. Xenophanes at a somewhat earlier date said that the universe is one, and that this is unchanging, and is god, and that it never came into being but has existed for ever, of a spherical shape ; Parmenides said that the primary element is fire, which imparts motion to the earth that receives from it its conformation ; Leucippus's elements were solid matter and empty space ; Democritus resembled him in this but was more expansive in the rest of his doctrines ; Empedocles taught the four ordinary elements that we know ; Heraclitus, fire ; Melissus, that the present infinite and unchangeable universe has existed and will exist always. Plato holds the view that the world was made by god out of the all-containing substance, to last for ever. The Pythagoreans hold that the universe originates out of numbers and the first principles of the mathematicians. From these teachers your wise man will doubtless select some single master to follow, while the numerous residue of men of such distinction will depart rejected and condemned by him.

119. Quamcumque vero sententiam probaverit, eam sic animo comprehensam habebit ut ea quae sensibus, nec magis approbabit nunc lucere(明らかである) quam, quoniam Stoicus est, hunc mundum esse sapientem, habere mentem quae et se et ipsum fabricata sit et omnia moderetur moveat regat. Erit ei persuasum etiam solem lunam stellas omnis terram mare deos esse, quod quaedam animalis intellegentia per omnia ea permanet et transeat, fore tamen aliquando ut omnis hic mundus ardore deflagret.
XXXVIII.
Sint ista vera (vides enim iam me fateri aliquid esse veri), comprehendi ea tamen et percipi nego. Cum enim tuus iste Stoicus sapiens syllabatim(一語ずつ) tibi ista dixerit, veniet flumen(能弁) orationis aureum fundens Aristoteles, qui illum desipere(愚かである) dicat: neque enim ortum esse umquam mundum quod nulla fuerit novo consilio inito(始める) tam praeclari operis(仕事) inceptio(開始), et ita(→ut) esse eum undique(あらゆる方向で) aptum(秩序だった) ut nulla vis tantos(→ut) queat motus mutationemque(変化) moliri(動かす), nulla senectus diuturnitate temporum exsistere,ut hic ornatus(みごとな=mundus) umquam dilapsus(崩れる) occidat. Tibi hoc repudiare,illud autem superius sicut caput(命) et famam tuam defendere necesse erit, cum mihi ne ut dubitem quidem relinquatur(~する可能性がない).

119 そして彼が受け入れた学説がなんであれ、彼はそれを感覚で把握した表象と同じように心で把握する。そして、彼はストア派なので、この世界は賢者であり、自らを形成して制御して動かして支配する心をもっていることは、火を見るよりも明らかなのである。彼は太陽も月も星も地球も海も神々であると信じている。なぜなら、命のある知性がその全ての中に浸透しているからである。しかし、宇宙の全てが燃え尽きる日がやってくると信じている。
XXXVIII これらのことが真実だとしても(僕が真実の存在を認めていることはあなたもわかると思う)、僕はそれを把握したり知覚したりすることは出来ないと思っている。あなたのストア派の賢者はあなたにこうしたことを少しずつ教えている間に、アリストテレスがやってきて、大量の輝かしい言葉を注いで、ストア派の賢者は愚か者だと言ったのである。というのは、宇宙の始まりなどはないからである。なぜなら、新しい考えが必要な、こんな素晴らしい仕事が始まることはないからである。宇宙はどの方向も均衡がとれていているので、どんな力によってもこんな大きな動きを作ることは出来ないし、時間がいくら経っても老いが訪れることはないので、秩序ある宇宙が崩壊することはない。あなたはこの説を拒否しなければならない。そして、さっきの説を僕が疑うことを許さないだけでなく、命がけで擁護しなければいけないのだ。

119 But whatever opinion he approves, he will hold it in as firm a mental grasp as he holds the presentations that he grasps by the senses, and he will not be more firmly convinced that it is now daylight than he is convinced, being a Stoic, that this world is wise and is possessed of an intelligence that constructed both itself and the world, and that controls, moves and rules the universe. He will also be convinced that the sun and moon and all the stars and the earth and sea are gods, because a 'vital intelligence ' (a) permeates and passes through them all ; but that nevertheless a time will come when all this world will be burnt out with heat.
 XXXVIII.
Suppose these facts of yours are true (for you see now that I do admit the existence of some truth), nevertheless I deny that they are ' grasped ' and perceived. For when your Stoic wise man aforesaid has told you those facts one syllable at a time, in will come Aristotle, pouring forth a golden stream of eloquence, to declare that he is doting, since the world never had a beginning, because there never can have been a commencement, on new and original lines, of so glorious a structure, and since it is so compactly framed on every side that no force could bring about such mighty movements of mutation,(b) no old age arise from the long lapse of years to cause this ordered cosmos ever to perish in dissolution. For you it will be obligatory to spurn this view, and to defend the former one as you would your life and honour, while to me it is not even left to doubt.

120. Ut omittam levitatem temere assentientium, quanti libertas ipsa aestimanda est non mihi necesse esse quod tibi est? Quaero cur deus, omnia nostra causa cum faceret (sic enim voltis), tantam vim natricum viperarumque fecerit? cur mortifera tam multa ac perniciosa terra marique disperserit? Negatis haec tam polite tamque subtiliter effici potuisse sine divina aliqua sollertia. (cujus quidem vos maiestatem deducitis usque ad apium formicarumque perfectionem, ut etiam inter deos Myrmecides aliquis minutorum opusculorum fabricator fuisse videatur.): negas sine deo posse quicquam.

120 軽々しく同意することは論外として、僕たちは同意を君達ほど強制されないという、この自由の価値は測り難いものがある。神が僕達のために万物を作った時(あなた達の意見ではそうなっている)にどうして大量の蛇を作ったのかを聞きたい。なぜ大地や海にこんなに多くの有毒物質をばらまいたのか。神の叡慮なしにこのような素晴らしい正確なことが行われたはずはないとあなた達は言う。(あなた達は神々の偉大さを蜂や蟻の完璧さにまで引き下げて、神々の間にミュメキデスのような細工師がいると思うほどなのだ)。あなたは神々なしに何も出来ないと言う。

120 Not to speak of the frivolity of those who assent without consideration, how valuable is the mere freedom of my not being faced by the same obligation as you are ! I ask for what reason did the deity, when making the universe for our sakes (for that is the view of your school), create so vast a supply of water-snakes and vipers, and why did he scatter so many death-bringing and destructive creatures over land and sea ? Your school asserts that this highly finished and accurately constructed world of ours could not have been made without some skill of a divine nature (indeed it brings down that majestic deity to minutely fabricating the bees and the ants, so that we must even suppose that the list of gods included some Myrmecides,(a) an artist whose works were on a minutely small scale) : you assert that nothing can be created without a god.

121.Ecce tibi e transverso Lampsacenus Strato, qui det isti deo immunitatem magni quidem muneris (et cum sacerdotes deorum vacationem habeant, quanto est aequius habere ipsos deos!); negat opera deorum se uti ad fabricandum mundum. Quaecumque sint, docet omnia effecta esse natura, nec ut ille qui ex asperis et levibus et hamatis uncinatisque corporibus concreta haec esse dicat interjecto inani- somnia censet haec esse Democriti non docentis sed optantis-ipse autem singulas mundi partis persequens, quidquid aut sit aut fiat, naturalibus fieri aut factum esse docet ponderibus et motibus. Ne ille et deum opere magno liberat et me timore. Quis enim potest, cum existimet curari se a deo, non et dies et noctes divinum numen horrere et, si quid adversi acciderit (quod cui non accidit?) extimescere ne id jure evenerit? Nec Stratoni tamen assentior, nec vero tibi. Modo hoc, modo illud probabilius videtur.

121 そこへ、あなたの神々に大変な労力を免除してくれるあのランプサコスのストラトン(=ペリパトス派)がやってきたのだ。(神々の神官に休暇があるのなら、神々に休暇があってもよいではないか)。彼は宇宙を作るのに神の仕事は不要だと言ったのである。彼の教えでは万物は自然の力によって作られるというのである。しかし彼はこの世界が刺のあるなめらかででこぼこの様々な物質から作られていてその間に空虚な部分があるという人とは違う。この考えはデモクリトスの夢想であって教えと言うよりは希望だと彼は言う。彼は大地の要素を一つづつ点検して、存在する個々の物は自然の重さと動きによって作られていると 言う。実に彼は神から労力を省いただけではなく、僕たちから神に対する恐怖を取り除いた。神による配慮を受けていると思っている間は、昼も夜も神の意志を 誰が恐れずにいられようか? またもし不幸な事態になったら(それは誰にも起こりうる)、これは天罰ではないかと恐れずにいられようか。しかし、僕はあなたの意見にもストラトンの意見にも従わない。ある時はこちらの意見が真実らしく思えるし、ある時はあちらの意見が真実らしく思えるだけだ。

121 Lo, here you have Strato of Lampsacus cutting in, bent on bestowing upon your deity exemption from exertion on any extensive scale (and seeing that the priests of the gods have holidays, how much fairer it is that the gods themselves should have them !) ; he declares that he does not make use of divine activity for constructing the world. His doctrine is that all existing things of whatever sort have been produced by natural causes, although he does not follow the master who says that this world of ours was welded out of rough and smooth, hook-shaped or crooked atoms interspersed with void - he judges these doctrines to be dreams on the part of Democritus, the talk of a visionary, not of a teacher, - but he himself, reviewing the various departments of the universe one by one, teaches that whatever either is or comes into being is or has been caused by natural forces of gravitation and motion. Assuredly he frees the deity from a great task, and also me from alarm ! for who holding the view that a god pays heed to him can avoid shivering with dread of the divine power all day and all night long, and if any disaster happens to him (and to whom does it not ?) being thoroughly frightened lest it be a judgement upon him ? All the same I do not accept the view of Strato, nor yet yours either ; at one moment one seems the more probable, and at another moment the other. holding the view that a god pays heed to him can avoid shivering with dread of the divine power all day and all night long, and if any disaster happens to him (and to whom does it not ?) being thoroughly frightened lest it be a judgement upon him ? All the same I do not accept the view of Strato, nor yet yours either ; at one moment one seems the more probable, and at another moment the other.

XXXIX.

122. Latent ista omnia, Luculle, crassis occultata et circumfusa tenebris, ut nulla acies humani ingeni tanta sit quae penetrare in caelum, terram intrare possit. Corpora nostra non novimus, qui sint situs partium, quam vim quaeque pars habeat ignoramus. Itaque medici ipsi, quorum intererat ea nosse, aperuerunt, ut viderentur; nec eo tamen aiunt empirici notiora esse illa, quia possit fieri ut patefacta et detecta mutentur. Sed ecquid nos eodem modo rerum naturas persecare aperire dividere possumus, ut videamus terra penitusne defixa sit et quasi radicibus suis haereat an media pendeat?

122 ルクルスさん、あなたの言うようなことは全部厚い暗闇に覆われているので、人間のどんな英知の力でもってしても大地と天空を貫くことは出来ない。僕たちは自分の肉体すらよくは知らない。体の部分の場所もよく知らないし、それぞれがどんな役割をしているかも知らない。だから、それを知っておくべき医者はそれを見るために体を開けてみる。それでも経験派の医者はそんなことでは何もわからないという。なぜなら、外に出してしまった臓器は性質が変わってしまうからと。それなのに、同じようにして宇宙を切り裂いて開いて分解したら、地球が底に固定されているのか根が生えて捉まっているか、中間に浮いているのか分かるだろうか。

122 XXXIX. "All those things you talk about are hidden, Lucullus, closely concealed and enfolded in thick clouds of darkness, so that no human intellect has a sufficiently powerful sight to be able to penetrate the heaven and get inside the earth. We do not know our own bodies, we are ignorant of the positions of their parts and their several functions ; and accordingly the doctors themselves, being concerned to know the structure of the body, have cut it open to bring its organs into view, yet nevertheless the empiric school assert that this has not increased our knowledge of them, because it is possibly the case that when exposed and uncovered they change their character. But is it at all within our power similarly to dissect and open up and separate the constituents of the universe, in order to see whether the earth is firmly fixed deep down and holds so to speak by its own roots, or hangs suspended at the centre ?

123. Habitari ait Xenophanes in luna,eamque esse terram multarum urbium et montium: portenta videntur, sed tamen neque ille qui dixit jurare posset ita se rem habere neque ego non ita. Vos etiam dicitis esse e regione nobis, e contraria parte terrae, qui adversis vestigiis stent contra nostra vestigia, quos αντιποδασ[Greek: antipodas] vocatis: cur mihi magis suscensetis qui ista non aspernor quam eis qui cum audiunt desipere vos arbitrantur? Hicetas Syracusius, ut ait Theophrastus, caelum solem lunam stellas supera denique omnia stare censet neque praeter terram rem ullam in mundo moveri, quae cum circum axem se summa celeritate convertat et torqueat, eadem effici omnia quae si stante terra caelum moveretur; atque hoc etiam Platonem in Timaeo dicere quidam arbitrantur, sed paulo obscurius. Quid tu, Epicure? loquere, putas solem esse tantulum?  Ego ne bis quidem tantum! Et vos ab illo irridemini et ipsi illum vicissim eluditis. Liber igitur a tali irrisione Socrates, liber Aristo Chius, qui nihil istorum sciri putant posse.

123 クセノファネスは月には人が住んでいるといい、沢山の町も山もあるという。この話は面白いけれど、この話をする彼もそれが事実だと誓うことは出来ないし、僕がそれを嘘だと誓うことも出来ない。あなた達の説では、我々のちょうど反対の大地の裏側には足の裏をこちらの反対向きにして立っている人がいると言う。それをあなた達はギリシア語でアンティポデスな人たちという。どうしたあなた達はその考え方を馬鹿にしない僕に腹を立てて、その話を聞いた時にあなた達を愚か者だと言う人達に腹を立てないのか。テオフラストスの話では、シラクサのヒケタスは空も太陽も月も星も要するに全ての天体はじっとしていて宇宙では地球以外は何も動いていない、地球だけが軸の周りを高速で回転していて、仮に地球がじっとしていて天が動いているのと同じ結果をもたらしていると。地球の自転についてはプラトンも『ティマイオス』の中で言及していると言われているが、少々曖昧である。エピクロスよ、あなたはどういう意見なのか? 言ってくれ、太陽はあんなに小さいと思うかね。あの二倍の大きさだとも僕は思わない。あなた達は彼に笑われているし、彼も逆にあなた達に笑われている。ソクラテスはそんな嘲笑からは自由だった。キオスのアリストンも自由だった。彼らはあなたのいう様なこと(=ストア派の神による宇宙観)は知ることは出来ないと考えているからだ。

123 Xenophanes says that the moon is inhabited, and is a land of many cities and mountains : these seem marvellous doctrines, but nevertheless I am no more able to swear that they do not agree with the facts than their author could swear that they do. Your school even says that there are people opposite to us on the contrary side of the earth, standing with the soles of their feet turned in the opposite direction to ours, whom you call 'antipodes ': why are you more irritated with me who do not scoff at these doctrines of yours than with those who when they hear them think you are out of your minds ? The Syracusan Hicetas, as Theophrastus asserts, holds the view that the heaven, sun, moon, stars, and in short all of the things on high are stationary, and that nothing in the world is in motion except the earth, which by revolving and twisting round its axis with extreme velocity produces all the same results as would be produced if the earth were stationary and the heaven in motion ; and this is also in some people's opinion the doctrine stated by Plato in Timaeus,(a) but a little more obscurely. What is your view, Epicurus ? say, do you really think that the sun is as small as it appears ? for my own part I don't think it is twice as big either ! (b) Your school are laughed at by Epicurus, and you yourselves also in your turn mock at him. Mockery of that sort therefore does not touch Socrates and does not touch Aristo of Chios, who think that none of the things that you treat of can be known.

124. Sed redeo ad animum et corpus. Satisne tandem ea nota sunt nobis, quae nervorum natura sit, quae venarum? tenemusne quid sit animus, ubi sit? denique sitne an, ut Dicaearcho visum est, ne sit quidem ullus? Si est, tresne partis habeat, ut Platoni placuit, rationis, irae, cupiditatis, an simplex unusque sit? si simplex, utrum sit ignis an anima an sanguis an, ut Xenocrates, numerus nullo corpore (quod intellegi quale sit vix potest)? et quidquid est, mortale sit an aeternum? nam utramque in partem multa dicuntur. Horum aliquid vestro sapienti certum videtur, nostro ne quid maxime quidem probabile sit occurrit: ita sunt in plerisque contrariarum rationum paria momenta.

124 肉体と魂の話に戻ろう。あなた達は神経の本質、血管の本質については充分に知っているのだろうか? 魂とは何であると僕たちは思うべきなのだろうか。それはどこにあるのだろうか。ディカイアルコスの言うように、そんなものはないのだろうか。もし魂が存在するなら、それはプラトンの言うように、三つの部分(理性、怒り、欲望)から成っているのだろうか、それとも一つなのだろうか。もし一つなら、それは火なのか息なのか血なのか、クセノクラテスの言うように、形のない数なのか(ほとんど理解不可能だが)? 魂はいつか死ぬものなのか永遠に続くものなのか。こうしたことは両論多々言われている。この中のいくつかの考えはあなたの賢者にとっては確かな事だが、僕達の賢者にはどれが真実らしいかもわからない。それほどにも、これらの事の多くは正反対の学説にとっても有効な理由となるからである。

124 But I return to the mind and the body.(c) Pray are we sufficiently acquainted with the nature of the sinews and the veins ? do we grasp what mind is, where it is, and in fine whether it exists, or, as Dicaearchus held, does not even exist at all ? If it does, do we know if it has three parts, as Plato (d) held, reason, passion and appetite, or is a simple unity ? if simple, whether it is fire or breath (e) or blood,(f) or, as Xenocrates said, an incorporeal numerical formula (a thing the very nature of which is almost unintelligible) ? and whatever it is, whether it is mortal or everlasting ? for many arguments are put forward on both sides. Some part of these matters seems to your wise man to be certain, but ours has not a notion even what part is most probable, to such an extent do most of these matters contain equal reasons for contrary theories.

XL.

125. Sin agis verecundius et me accusas, non quod tuis rationibus non assentiar, sed quod nullis, vincam animum cuique assentiar deligam-quem potissimum? quem? Democritum: semper enim, ut scitis, studiosus nobilitatis fui. Urguebor iam omnium vestrum convicio. 'Tune aut inane quicquam putes esse, cum ita completa et conferta sint omnia ut et quidquid movebitur corporeum cedat et qua quidque cesserit aliud ilico subsequatur? aut atomos ullas e quibus quidquid efficiatur illarum sit dissimillimum? aut sine aliqua mente rem ullam effici posse praeclaram? et cum in uno mundo ornatus hic tam sit mirabilis, innumerabilis supra infra, dextra sinistra, ante post, alios dissimilis, alios ejusdem modi mundos esse? et ut nos nunc simus ad Baulos Puteolosque videamus, sic innumerabilis paribus in locis isdem esse nominibus honoribus rebus gestis ingeniis formis aetatibus, eisdem de rebus disputantis? et si nunc aut si etiam dormientes aliquid animo videre videamur, imagines extrinsecus in animos nostros per corpus irrumpere? Tu vero ista ne asciveris neve fueris commenticiis rebus assensus: nihil sentire est melius quam tam prava sentire.'

125 もしあなたがもっと謙虚になって、僕があなたの理論に同意しないからではなくて、どの理論にも同意しないことを批判するのなら、僕は頑張って同意できる人を選ぼう。それは誰あろう、デモクリトスである。僕はご存知のように高貴な物が好きだからである。僕はあなた達全員の非難にさらされるだろう。「全ての物が緻密に詰まっているのに、君は空虚なものが存在すると思うのか。物体が動く時は場所を開けて別の物体がその場所に入ってくるはず。原子によって作られた物体が原子に似ていないのに原子の存在を受け入れるのか。精神の動きなしに何か素晴らしいものが作られるという考えでいいのか。我々が見ているこの素晴らしい世界が一つ存在するのが、その前後左右に、それと似た世界や似ていない世界が無数に存在すると思うのか。我々がバウリに居てプテオリの光景を見ているのと同じように、同じ名前・同じ地位・記録・心・外見・年齢をしている別の無数の人達がいて同じような場所で同じ事を論じていると君は思うのか。起きている時でも寝ている時でも心のなかに映像を見るのは映像が体の外部から内部へ侵入してくるからだと君は思うのか。君はこうした考え(=デモクリトスの考え方)を受け入れるべきではない。こんなものは全部出鱈目だ。こんな考えを持つくらいなら何も考えないほうがましだ。」

125 XL. " If on the other hand you behave with greater modesty and charge me not with not agreeing with your arguments but with not agreeing with any, I will overcome my inclination, and will choose, in order to agree with him - whom for preference ? whom ? Democritus : for, as you know I have always been a devotee of rank (a) ! Now I shall be assailed with upbraiding by all of you : ' Can you really suppose that any such thing as empty void exists, when the universe is so completely filled and packed that whenever a bodily object is set in motion it gives place and another object at once moves into the place that it has left ? or that any atoms exist out of which are made things that are all entirely unlike them ? or that anything splendid can be produced without the action of some mind ? and that when one world contains the marvellously ordered beauty that we see, there exist above it and below, on the right and on the left, in front and behind, countless other worlds, some unlike it and others of the same sort ? and that just as we are now at Bauli and have a view of Puteoli, so there are innumerable other groups of people with the same names and distinctions and records, minds, appearances and ages, discussing the same subjects in similar places ? and that, if now or if even when asleep we seem to see something with the mind, it means that images are forcing a way through the body into our minds from outside ? You must not accept such notions, or give your assent to mere fictions : it is better to have no opinions than to have such wrong ones !'

126. Non ergo id agitur, ut aliquid assensu meo comprobem, quod tu vide ne impudenter etiam postules, non solum arroganter, praesertim cum ista tua mihi ne probabilia quidem videantur; nec enim divinationem quam probatis ullam esse arbitror, fatumque illud esse quo omnia contineri dicitis, contemno-ne exaedificatum quidem hunc mundum divino consilio existimo; atque haud scio an ita sit.
XLI.
Sed cur rapior in invidiam? licetne per vos nescire quod nescio? an Stoicis ipsis inter se disceptare, cum his non licebit? Zenoni et reliquis fere Stoicis aether videtur summus deus, mente praeditus, qua omnia regantur. Cleanthes, qui quasi majorum est gentium Stoicus, Zenonis auditor, solem dominari et rerum potiri putat. Ita cogimur dissensione sapientium dominum nostrum ignorare, quippe qui nesciamus soli an aetheri serviamus. Solis autem magnitudinem―ipse enim hic radiatus me intueri videtur ac monet ut crebro faciam mentionem sui―vos ergo huius magnitudinem quasi decempeda permensi refertis: huic me quasi malis architectis mensurae vestrae nego credere. Ergo dubium est uter nostrum sit, leniter ut dicam, verecundior?

126 それならあなたの目的は私に何かを同意によって認めさせることではないということだ。そんな要求をあなたがするのは傲慢なだけでなく厚かましいことだ。なんといってもあなたの教義はまったく真実らしくないからである。あなたの学派が主張するような神が存在するとは僕は思わない。運命についても僕は重視しない。あなたの学派は運命によって全てのことが決定されると考えている。僕はこの世界が神の計画によって作られたとも思わない。もちろんそうかもしれないがね。

XLI だが、僕はどうして嫌われることになるのだ。僕は自分の知らないことは知らないままにしてもらえないのか。ストア派の人たちは自分たちの間では議論するのは許されているのに、部外者は彼らに反論することが許されないのか。ゼノンやその他ストア派の大多数はエーテルが最高の神であり、それを魂をもって、それによって世界を支配していると考えている。ゼノンの弟子だったクレアンテスはストア派のなかでは古株だが、太陽を神と崇めて世界の支配者だと考えている。賢者の間でもこんなに意見が違うのだから、僕たちは世界の主については無知でいるしかないではないか。僕たちは太陽の召使なのかエーテルのしもべなのか分からないのだから。では、太陽の大きさについてはどうだろう。輝く太陽はずっと僕を見つめているので、太陽のことを何度も言わずにはいられないんだ。あなたの学派は太陽を竿で測ったみたいなことを言っているが、ヘボな測量士じゃあるまいし、僕はそんな寸法は信じることはできない。穏やかな言い方をすれば、僕達のどちらが謙虚であるかは明らかじゃないか。
 
126 Oh, then, the object is not to get me to give the approval of my assent to something-a demand which it is surely actually impudent and not merely arrogant for you to make, especially as these dogmas of yours don't seem to me even probable ; for I don't as a matter of fact think that there is any such thing as the divination which your school accepts, and I make light of the existence of that destiny which your school declares to be the bond that holds the universe together-I do not even deem that this world was built on a divine plan ; and yet it may be so.

 XLI But why am I dragged into disfavour ? may I have your leave not to know what I do not know ? Are the Stoics to be allowed to dispute among themselves but nobody allowed to dispute with the Stoics ? Zeno and almost all the other Stoics think the aether a supreme deity, endowed with a mind whereby the universe is ruled, Cleanthes, the Stoic of the older famillies as it were, who was a disciple of Zeno, holds that the sun is lord and master of the world ; thus the disagreement of the wise compels us to be ignorant of our own lord, inasmuch as we do not know whether we are the servants of the sun or of the aether. Then the size of the sun ? for this radiant sun himself seems to be gazing at me, reminding me to keep mentioning him - your school then report his size as if you had measured it with a tenfoot rule, while I declare that I mistrust this measurement of yours as I distrust incompetent architects : then is it doubtful which of us is - to speak frivolously - the more modest ?

127. Neque tamen istas quaestiones physicorum exterminandas puto. Est enim animorum ingeniorumque naturale quoddam quasi pabulum consideratio contemplatioque naturae. Erigimur, elatiores fieri videmur, humana despicimus, cogitantesque supera atque caelestia haec nostra ut exigua et minima contemnimus. Indagatio ipsa rerum cum maximarum tum etiam occultissimarum habet oblectationem. Si vero aliquid occurrit, quod veri simile videatur, humanissima completur animus voluptate.

127 それにもかかわらず、あなた達の自然哲学の探求を僕は排除するつもりはない。自然の研究と観察は精神と知能にとってよい栄養を与えてくれる。僕たちは高みに立つことが出来る。高揚した気分になれる。人間の世界を見下ろせるのだ。物事を上から見たり天上の世界のことを考えたりすることで、自分たちの日常を小さいものとして見下ろせるのだ。巨大なもの曖昧なものを探求するのは楽しいことだ。真実に似ていると思われる考え方が手に入るなら、心は最も人間的な喜びで満たされるのだ。

127 And all the same I do not think that these physical investigations of yours should be put out of bounds. For the study and observation of nature affords a sort of natural pasturage for the spirit and intellect ; we are uplifted, we seem to become more exalted, we look down on what is human, and while reflecting upon things above and in the heavens we despise this world of our own as small and even tiny. There is delight in the mere investigation of matters at once of supreme magnitude and also of extreme obscurity ; while if a notion comes to us that appears to bear a likeness to the truth, the mind is filled with the most humanizing kind of pleasure.

128. Quaeret igitur haec et vester sapiens et hic noster, sed vester, ut assentiatur, credat, affirmet, noster, ut vereatur temere opinari praeclareque(=very good) agi secum putet, si in ejus modi rebus veri simile quod sit invenerit. Veniamus nunc ad bonorum malorumque notionem: at paulum ante dicendum est. Non mihi videntur considerare, cum physica ista valde affirmant, earum etiam rerum(次のquaeの先行詞) auctoritatem, si quae illustriores videantur, amittere. Non enim magis assentiuntur neque approbant lucere nunc, quam, cum cornix cecinerit, tum aliquid eam aut iubere aut vetare, nec magis affirmabunt signum illud, si erunt mensi, sex pedum esse quam solem, quem metiri non possunt, plus quam duodeviginti partibus majorem esse quam terram. Ex quo illa conclusio nascitur: si sol quantus sit percipi non potest, qui ceteras res eodem modo quo magnitudinem solis approbat, is eas res non percipit. Magnitudo autem solis percipi non potest. Qui igitur id approbat, quasi percipiat, nullam rem percipit. Responderint posse percipi quantus sol sit. Non repugnabo, dum modo eodem pacto cetera percipi comprehendique dicant. Nec enim possunt dicere aliud alio magis minusve comprehendi, quoniam omnium rerum una est definitio comprehendendi.

128 これらの問題は君達の賢者も僕達の賢者も同じく探求している。しかし、君達の賢者は同意し信じ肯定するためだが、僕達の賢者は臆断を恐れ、このようなことの中に真実らしさを発見した場合に明確な議論ができると思うためである。次に善と悪の概念に移ろう。しかしその前に一言いっておくべきだ。彼らは自然について理論をあまりに肯定的に主張するために、もっと明白だと思える事実の真実さを損なっていることを忘れているように僕には思えるのだ。なぜなら、彼らが日が輝くという事実に対して同意して受け入れる度合いは、カラスが鳴いた時にそれが命令か禁止であるという想像に同意するよりも強くないからである。また、彼らがあそこの像の大きさを測るとき、それが六フィートであるということに同意する度合いは、彼らには測れない太陽の大きさが地球の十八倍以上であることに同意する度合いよりも強くないのである。ここから次の推論が生まれる。もし太陽の大きさが知覚できないのなら、太陽と同じように他の物を受け入れている人間はこれらの物も知覚していない。ところが、太陽の大きさは知覚できない。したがって、太陽を知覚して受け入れているという人は、何も知覚していないことになる。もし彼らが太陽の大きさを知覚できると答えるなら、他のあらゆるものも同じように知覚して把握できると言う限りにおいて、僕はこの答えを批判しないだろう。というのは、彼らがあるものが他の物よりよりより良く知覚できたり出来なかったりすることは不可能だからである。なぜなら、心の把握の仕方は全ての物について一様だからである。

128 These researches therefore will be pursued both by your wise man and by this sage of ours, but by yours with the intention of assenting, believing and affirming, by ours with the resolve to be afraid of forming rash opinions and to deem that it goes well with him if in matters of this kind he has discovered that which bears a likeness to truth. Now let us come to the concept of good and evil : but a few words must be said first. When they assert those doctrines so positively they seem to me to forget that they also lose the guarantee for facts that appear to be more clear. For their assent to or acceptance of the fact that daylight is now shining is no more positive than their assent to the belief that when a crow croaks it is conveying some command or prohibition, and if they measure yonder statue, they will not affirm that it is six feet high with greater positiveness than they will affirm that the sun, which they cannot measure, is more than nineteen times as large as the earth. From this springs the followlng train of argument : if it cannot be perceived how large the sun is, he that accepts all other things in the same way as he accepts the sun does not perceive those things ; but the size of the sun cannot be perceived ; therefore he that accepts it as if he perceived it, perceives nothing. Suppose their answer is that it can be perceived how large the sun is : I will not combat this provided that they say that everything else can be perceived and grasped in the same manner ; for in fact it is impossible for them to say that one thing is grasped more, or less, than another, since there is one definition of mental grasp in relation to all objects.

XLII.

129. Sed quod coeperam: Quid habemus in rebus bonis et malis explorati? nempe fines constituendi sunt ad quos et bonorum et malorum summa referatur; qua de re est igitur inter summos viros major dissensio? Omitto illa quae relicta iam videntur,-ut Erillum, qui in cognitione et scientia summum bonum ponit; qui cum Zenonis auditor esset, vides quantum ab eo dissenserit et quam non multum a Platone. Megaricorum fuit nobilis disciplina, cujus, ut scriptum video, princeps Xenophanes, quem modo nominavi, deinde eum secuti Parmenides et Zeno, itaque ab his Eleatici philosophi nominabantur. Post Euclides, Socratis discipulus, Megareus, a quo iidem illi Megarici dicti, qui id bonum solum esse dicebant, quod esset unum et simile et idem semper. Hic quoque multa a Platone. A Menedemo autem, quod is Eretria fuit, Eretriaci appellati, quorum omne bonum in mente positum et mentis acie qua verum cerneretur, Elii similia sed opinor explicata uberius et ornatius.

129 はじめに戻って、善悪の問題について僕たちはどんな知識を持っているだろうか? 最善と最悪の基準を僕たちは決めなければいけない。どの問題が主な研究者の間で最も意見が異なるだろうか。いまやめたほうがいいものはここでは扱わない。例えば、エリッルス(=ストア派)は学問を最善だと言っている。彼はゼノンの弟子だったが、ゼノンよりはプラトンの意見に近い。また、メガラ派は有名だが、書かれたものを見ると創始者はクセノファネスである。この名前はすでに述べた。彼の後を継いだのがパルメニデスとゼノンだ。だから彼らはエレア派と名付けられた。その後、ソクラテスの弟子のエウクレイデス(数学者ユークリッドとは別人)がメガラの人だったので、メガラ派という名前がついたのである。彼らは善は唯一無二のものだという。彼らはプラトンからも多くを受け継いでいる。ところが、メネデーモスがエレトリア人だったので、今度はエレトリア派という名前になった。彼らは善は心のなかにあって、真実を見分ける洞察力にあるとした。エリス派の学説もこれに似ているが、もっと詳細でもっと修辞的である。

129 XLII. " But to resume : in the matter of good and evil what certain knowledge have we got ? Clearly the task is to determine the Ends which are the standards of both the supreme good and the supreme evil(a) ; if so, what question is the subject of greater disagreement among the leading thinkers ? I leave out the systems that appear to be now abandoned - for example Erillus, who places the chief good in learning and in knowledge ; although he was a pupil of Zeno, you see how much he disagreed with him and how little with Plato. A famous school was that of the Megarians, whose founder, as I see it recorded, was Xenophanes whom I mentioned just now ; next he was followed by Parmenides and Zeno (and so the school of thought derived from them the name of Eleatic) and afterwards by Euclides, the pupil of Socrates, a Megarian (from whom the same school obtained the title of Megarian) ; their doctrine was that the sole good is that which is always one and alike and the same. These thinkers also took much from Plato. But from Menedemus, who was an Eretrian, they received the designation of the Eretrian school ; they placed their good wholly in the mind and in keenness of mental vision whereby the truth is discerned. The school of Elis taught a similar doctrine, but I believe they expounded it in a more copious and ornate style.

130. Hos si contemnimus et iam abjectos putamus, illos certe minus despicere debemus, Aristonem, qui cum Zenonis fuisset auditor, re probavit ea quae ille verbis, nihil esse bonum nisi virtutem, nec malum nisi quod virtuti esset contrarium: in mediis ea momenta quae Zeno voluit nulla esse censuit. Huic(=Aristoni) summum bonum est in his rebus neutram in partem moveri, quae αδιαφορια[Greek: adiaphoria] ab ipso dicitur. Pyrrho autem ea ne sentire quidem sapientem, quae απαθεια[Greek: apatheia] nominatur. Has igitur tot sententias ut omittamus, haec nunc videamus, quae diu multumque defensa sunt.

130 これらの哲学者を軽く見て時代遅れだと見るならば、以下に紹介する哲学者たちにはそれほど軽蔑を感じなくてすむはずだ。ゼノンの弟子だったアリストンは師が理論的に確立した「美徳以外に善はなく、美徳に反すること以外に悪はない」ということを行動の実践してみせた。一方、ゼノンが重視した善悪の中間的な物をアリストンはそんなものはないと考えた。アリストンの最高善は、その中間的な物の中でもどちらにも動かされないことだとして、ギリシア語でアディアフォラと呼んだ。それに対して、ピュロンは賢者はその中間的な物を感覚によって知覚することはないという。それをギリシア語でアパテアと呼んだ。これらの数多くの学説を脇において、次の説を見てみよう。この学説は長年しきりに擁護されてきたから。

130 If we look down on these philosophers and think them out of date, we are undoubtedly bound to feel less contempt for the following : Aristo, who, having been a disciple of Zeno, proved in practice what his master established in theory, that nothing is good except virtue, and nothing evil unless it is contrary to virtue ; those motives of action which Zeno held to exist in things intermediate he deemed to be non-existent. Aristo's chief good is in these things to be moved in neither direction - he himself calls it adiaphoria "(a) ; Pyrrho on the other hand held that the wise man does not even perceive these things with his senses - the name for this unconsciousness is apatheia. Leaving on one side therefore all these numerous opinions, let us now look at the following which have long been strongly championed.

131. Alii voluptatem finem esse voluerunt: quorum princeps Aristippus, qui Socratem audierat, unde Cyrenaici. Post Epicurus, cujus est disciplina nunc notior, neque tamen cum Cyrenaicis de ipsa voluptate consentiens. Voluptatem autem et honestatem finem esse Callipho censuit: vacare omni molestia Hieronymus: hoc idem cum honestate Diodorus: ambo hi Peripatetici. Honeste autem vivere fruentem rebus iis, quas primas homini natura conciliet, et vetus Academia censuit, ut indicant scripta Polemonis, quem Antiochus probat maxime, et Aristoteles ejusque amici nunc proxime videntur accedere. Introducebat etiam Carneades, non quo probaret, sed ut opponeret Stoicis, summum bonum esse frui rebus iis, quas primas natura conciliavisset. Honeste autem vivere, quod ducatur a conciliatione naturae, Zeno statuit finem esse bonorum, qui inventor et princeps Stoicorum fuit.

131 ある人々は快楽こそ最高の善だと主張する。その学説の創始者はソクラテスの弟子のアリスティッポスである。彼の出身地からキレネ派と呼ばれるようになった。彼の後継者がエピクロスで、その学説は有名だが、彼の快楽説はキレネ派のものとは異なっている。例えばカッリフォンは快楽と道徳的な善が最高善だといい、ヒエロニュモスはあらゆる苦痛からの解放を最高善だという、ディオドロスは苦痛からの解放に道徳的善を組み合わせる。最後の二人はペリパトス派である。古アカデメイア派は自然が勧める主な快楽を享受しながら道徳的生活をおくることが最高善だと言っている。これはアンティオコスが高く評価しているポレモンの書いた物によって証明されている。アリストテレスと彼の信奉者たちもこの立場に近いように思われる。カルネエアデスもこの考え方を表明している。彼自身がそう考えているのではなく、ストア派と戦うためである。つまり、最高善とは自然が推奨する重要な要素を享受することである。それに対して、ストア派の創始者で最初の学頭であるゼノンは、究極の善は道徳的に名誉ある生活であり、それは自然の勧めに従うことであるという説を確立した。

131 Others have held that the end is pleasure ; their founder was Aristippus, who had been a pupil of Socrates, and from whom they get the name of the Cyrenaic school ; after him came Epicurus, whose doctrine is now more famous, although on the actual subject of pleasure it does not agree with the Cyrenaics. But Callipho defined the end as being pleasure and moral goodness, Hieronymus as freedom from all annoyance, Diodorus the same combined with moral goodness - both the two latter were Peripatetics ; but the Old Academy defined the end as living the moral life while enjoying those primary things which nature recommends to man - this is proved by the writings of Polemo, who is very highly approved by Antiochus ; and also Aristotle and his adherents seem to come very near to this position. Also Carneades used to put forward the view - not that he held it himself but in order to combat the Stoics with it - that the chief good was to enjoy those things that nature had recommended as primary. Zeno however, who was the originator and first head of the Stoics, set it up that the end of goods is the morally honourable life, and that this is derived from nature's recommendation.

XLIII.

132. Jam illud perspicuum est, omnibus iis finibus bonorum, quos exposui, malorum finis esse contrarios. Ad vos nunc refero quem sequar: modo ne quis illud tam ineruditum absurdumque respondeat: 'Quemlibet, modo aliquem.' Nihil potest dici inconsideratius. Cupio sequi Stoicos. Licetne―omitto per Aristotelem, meo judicio in philosophia prope singularem―per ipsum Antiochum? qui appellabatur Academicus, erat quidem, si perpauca mutavisset, germanissimus Stoicus. Erit igitur res iam in discrimine. Nam aut Stoicus constituatur sapiens aut veteris Academiae. Utrumque non potest. Est enim inter eos non de terminis, sed de tota possessione contentio. Nam omnis ratio vitae definitione summi boni continetur, de qua qui dissident, de omni vitae ratione dissident. Non potest igitur uterque sapiens esse, quoniam tanto opere dissentiunt, sed alter. Si Polemoneus, peccat Stoicus, rei falsae assentiens―nam vos quidem nihil esse dicitis a sapiente tam alienum―: sin vera sunt Zenonis, eadem in veteres Academicos et Peripateticos dicenda. Hic igitur neutri assentietur? Sin, inquam, uter est prudentior?

132 次に究極の悪についてはこれまでの説の反対であるの明らかである。僕がここで誰を師と仰ぐべきかはあなたの好きに任せよう。「誰でもいいから誰かに師事しなさい」という風ないい加減な答えはやめてほしい。こんないい加減な忠告はない。僕はストア派に従う気だと言えば、哲学の世界の最高権威であるアリストテレス(=ペリパトス派)とは言わないまでも、アンティオコスは許してくれるだろうか。彼はアカデメイア派だと言われているが、実際は少し修正しさえすれば完全なストア派である。すると、問題はまたしても同じ所に逢着する。僕達が選ぶべきはストア派の賢者か古アカデメイア派の賢者かどちらなのだろう。両方選ぶことは不可能だ。この両学派は境界を争っているだけではなく、領土全体を争っているからである。なぜなら、最高善の定義は人生全体の方針と深く結びついているからであり、この点で一致できない両者は人生全体の方針で一致できないからである。だから、どちらか一方を選ぶしかない。だから、もしアカデメイア派のポレモンの賢者が正しいのなら、ストア派の賢者は間違っていることになる。ところが、賢者にそんなことが起きるわけがないとあなた達は言うだろう。しかし、ゼノンが正しいのなら、古アカデメイア派とペリパトス派の賢者についても同じ事を言わねばならなくなる。ではアンティオコスはどちらも受け入れることは出来ないのではないか。もしどちらかを受け入れるとしたら、どちらがより賢明だというのだろうか?

132 XLIII. " There follows the obvious point that corresponding to all the ends of goods that I have set out there are opposite ends of evils. Whom I am to follow now I leave to you, only do not let anyone make that very uneducated and ridiculous answer 'Any body you like, only follow somebody' ; no remark could be more ill-considered. I am eager to follow the Stoics : have I permission - I don't say from Aristotle, in my judgement almost the outstanding figure in philosophy, but from Antiochus himself ? he was called an Academic, and was in fact, had he made very few modifications, a perfectly genuine Stoic. Well then, the matter will now come to an issue : we must settle on either the Stoic wise man or the wise man of the Old Academy. To take both is impossible, for the dispute between them is not about boundaries but about the whole ownership of the ground, since the entire scheme of life is bound up with the definition of the supreme good, and those who disagree about that disagree about the whole scheme of life. They cannot therefore each of them be the wise man, since they disagree so widely ; it must be one or the other. If Polemo's is, the Stoic wise man sins in assenting to a falsehood - for you certainly say that nothing is so alien from the wise man ; if on the other hand Zeno's doctrine is true, the same verdict has to be passed against the Old Academics and the Peripatetics. Will Antiochus therefore agree with neither ? or if not, which of the two, say I, is the wiser ?

133. Quid? cum ipse Antiochus dissentit quibusdam in rebus ab his quos amat Stoicis, nonne indicat non posse illa probanda esse sapienti? Placet Stoicis omnia peccata esse paria. At hoc Antiocho vehementissime displicet. Liceat tandem mihi considerare utram sententiam sequar. Praecide, inquit: statue aliquando quidlibet. Quid, quod quae dicuntur et acuta mihi videntur in utramque partem et paria? nonne caveam ne scelus faciam? Scelus enim dicebas esse, Luculle, dogma prodere. Contineo igitur me, ne incognito assentiar-quod mihi tecum est dogma commune.

133 ではこれはどうだろう。アンティオコスは自分が傾倒するストア派の理論の幾つかには同意していないが、それらについては賢者も受け入れるべきではないと彼は考えているのではないか。例えば、ストア派は罪はどれも同じだという意見だが、アンティオコスはこの意見には強く反対している。僕がどの学説を選ぶかを慎重に検討させてほしい。「さっさとやれ。すぐどれかに決めろ」と言うかもしれない。だが、両者の議論が示す事実はどちらも正しく有効なように見えるのに。だって僕は罪を犯さないように気をつけるべきではないのか? ルクルスさん、あなたは言った。教義を捨てるということは罪だと。だから、僕はよく知らない学説に同意しないように気をつけているのだ。そしてこれは僕とあなたの共通の教義なのだ。

133 What then ? when Antiochus himself disagrees in some things from these Stoic friends of his, does he not show that it is impossible for these views to be what the wise man must approve ? The Stoics hold that all sins are equal, but with this Antiochus most violently disagrees ; do please give me leave to deliberate which opinion to follow. 'Cut it short,' says he ; ' do for once decide on something ! 'What of the fact that the arguments advanced seem to me both acute on either side and equally valid ? am I not to be careful not to commit a crime ? for you, Lucullus, said that it is a crime to abandon a dogma (a) ; therefore I hold myself in so as not to assent to a thing unknown - that is a dogma that I share with you.

134. Ecce multo major etiam dissensio. Zeno in una virtute positam beatam vitam putat. Quid Antiochus? 'Etiam,' inquit, 'beatam, sed non beatissimam.' Deus ille qui nihil censuit deesse virtuti, homuncio hic qui multa putat praeter virtutem homini partim cara esse, partim etiam necessaria. Sed ille vereor ne virtuti plus tribuat quam natura patiatur, praesertim Theophrasto multa diserte copioseque <contra> dicente. Et hic metuo ne vix sibi constet qui cum dicat esse quaedam et corporis et fortunae mala, tamen eum qui in his omnibus sit beatum fore censeat si sapiens sit. Distrahor-tum hoc mihi probabilius tum illud videtur. Et tamen, nisi alterutrum sit, virtutem jacere plane puto; verum in his discrepant.

134 もっと大きな相違点を見てみよう。ゼノンは幸福な人生は美徳のみにあると考えている。アンティオコスの考えはどうか? 彼は言う、「確かにそうだが、それは幸福な人生であっても最も幸福な人生ではない」。美徳には欠けたものがないと考えたゼノンは神だったが、美徳以外にも人間には価値あるものや必要なものがあるというアンティオコスは小者だ。しかし、ゼノンは不自然なほどに美徳に高い価値を置いたのではないかと僕は思う。特にテオフラストスが明確かつ雄弁に多く語っているだけに。しかし、テオフラストスは矛盾しているのではないか。彼は肉体と財産にとっての悪が存在するという一方で、賢者であるならこんな悪に囲まれていても幸福になれると言っているからである。こういうわけで僕は全く異なる方角に引き裂かれる思いをしている。後の方が真実らしいと思えるときもあれば、前の意見がそう思える時もある。それでもどちらかが真実らしくなければ、美徳は完全に崩壊してしまうと僕は思う。ところが、両者はこの点で全く意見が一致しないのだ。

134 Look at an even much wider disagreement : Zeno thinks that the happy life is placed in virtue alone ; what is the view of Antiochus ? 'Yes,' says he, ' the happy life, but not the happiest.' Zeno was a god, he deemed that virtue lacks nothing : Antiochus is a puny mortal, he thinks that many things besides virtue are some of them dear to man and some even necessary. But I fear that Zeno assigns more to virtue than nature would allow, especially as Theophrastus says a great deal with eloquence and fullness on the opposite side. And as for Theophrastus, I am afraid it is hardly consistent of him both to say that certain evils of body and estate do exist, and yet to hold that a man for whom these are his entire environment will be happy if he is wise. I am dragged in different directions - now the latter view seems to me the more probable, now the former. And yet I firmly believe that unless one or other is true, virtue is overthrown ; but they are at variance on these points.

XLIV.

135. Quid? illa in quibus consentiunt num pro veris probare possumus? Sapientis animum numquam nec cupiditate moveri nec laetitia efferri. Age, haec probabilia sane sint: num etiam illa, numquam timere, numquam dolere? Sapiensne non timeat, si patria deleatur? non doleat, si deleta sit? Durum, sed Zenoni necessarium, cui praeter honestum nihil est in bonis, tibi vero, Antioche, minime, cui praeter honestatem multa bona, praeter turpitudinem multa mala videntur, quae et venientia metuat sapiens necesse est et venisse doleat. Sed quaero quando ista fuerint ab Academia vetere decreta, ut animum sapientis commoveri et conturbari negarent? Mediocritates illi probabant et in omni permotione naturalem volebant esse quendam modum. Legimus omnes Crantoris veteris Academici de luctu. Est enim non magnus, verum aureolus et, ut Tuberoni Panaetius praecipit, ad verbum ediscendus libellus. Atque illi quidem etiam utiliter a natura dicebant permotiones istas animis nostris datas: metum cavendi causa, misericordiam aegritudinemque clementiae, ipsam iracundiam fortitudinis quasi cotem esse dicebant, recte secusne alias viderimus.

135 ではどうだろう、彼らが意見の一致することは真実であると僕たちは認めることができるだろうか。例えば、賢者は決して欲望によって影響されることはないとか喜びで高揚することはないという説は真実だろうか。これは多分真実らしいかもしれない。しかし、次の説はそうでもない。それは賢者は決して恐怖も痛みも感じないという説である。賢者は自分の国が破壊されても恐怖を感じないのだろうか? 痛みがあっても感じないのだろうか? これは困難な説である。道徳的な価値以外は何も善のカテゴリーに入れないゼノンにはこの説は必然的だろうが、正直さ以外にも沢山の善を認め、卑劣さ以外にも沢山の悪を認めるアンティオコスにはそうではない。そうした悪がやってくるとなれば賢者は恐れるし、悪がやってきた後は苦しむだろう。しかし、古アカデメイア派が賢者の魂は混乱することも動揺することもないということを教義としたのは何時のことだろうか。この学派は中庸の精神を尊ぶ人たちで、どんな感情にも自然な程度というものがあるという考えである。僕たちはみんな古アカデメイア派のクラントールの『悲しみについて』という本を読んでいる。小さいが中身の珠玉の本で、パナイティオスがトゥベロンに勧めたように、一字一句詳しく暗誦している。そして古アカデメイア派は感情というものは実際の必要性があって自然が人間の心に与えたものだと言っている。恐怖は用心するためであり、哀れみと悲しみは慈悲のために、怒りは決断力を磨くためにあるのだと言っていた。この説の当否については別の機会に論じることにする。

135 XLIV. " Again, those tenets on which they agree surely cannot be approved by us as true ? The doctrine that the mind of the wise man is never moved by desire or elated by joy ? well, granted that this may be probable, surely the following tenets are not so too, that he never feels fear and that he never feels pain ? would the wise man feel no fear lest his country might be destroyed ? no pain if it were ? A hard doctrine, although unavoidable for Zeno, who includes nothing in the category of good save moral worth ; but not at all unavoidable for you, Antiochus, who think many things good beside moral worth, and many bad beside baseness - things that the wise man is bound to fear when they are coming and to regret when they have come. But I want to know when the Old Academy adopted 'decisions' (a) of that sort, asserting that the mind of the wise man does not undergo emotion and perturbation. That school were upholders of the mean in things, and held that in all emotion there was a certain measure that was natural. We have all read the Old Academician Crantor's On Grief, for it is not a large but a golden little volume, and one to be thoroughly studied word by word, as Panaetius enjoins upon Tubero. And the Old Academy indeed used to say that the emotions in question were bestowed by nature upon our minds for actually useful purposes - fear for the sake of exercising caution, pity and sorrow for the sake of mercy ; anger itself they used to say was a sort of whetstone of courage - whether this was right or not let us consider on another occasion.(a)

136. Atrocitas quidem ista tua quo modo in veterem Academiam irruperit nescio: illa vero ferre non possum, non quo mihi displiceant (sunt enim Socratica pleraque mirabilia Stoicorum, quae παραδοξα[Greek: paradoxa] nominantur), sed ubi Xenocrates, ubi Aristoteles ista tetigit ( hos enim quasi eosdem esse voltis)? Illi umquam dicerent sapientis solos reges, solos divites, solos formosos? omnia quae ubique essent, sapientis esse? neminem consulem, praetorem, imperatorem, nescio an(おそらく) ne quinquevirum quidem quemquam(=neminem) nisi sapientem? postremo, solum civem, solum liberum? insipientis omnis peregrinos, exsules, servos, furiosos? denique scripta Lycurgi, Solonis, duodecim tabulas nostras non esse leges? ne urbis quidem aut civitatis, nisi quae essent sapientium?

136 どうしてあなたの言うその厳格さが古アカデメイア派の理論の中に入っていったのか僕はわからない。このような教義を僕は受け入れることは出来ない。それは何も不充分だからではない(ストア派のいわゆるパラドックスは素晴らしいものでソクラテスが作ったものである)、それより一体クセノクラテスやアリストテレスがそんな説をどこで言っているんだ。あなた達はそれが二人の説と同じだといっているからである。彼らはいつ言っただろうか。賢者だけが王者だと、金持ちだと、美しいと? 全て至る所に存在するものは賢者のものだと。執政官、法務官、将軍、五人委員にしろ、賢者以外の誰も知らないと。賢者だけが市民で自由人だと。賢者でない者は外国人であり、亡命者であり、奴隷であり、狂人であると。リュクルゴスとソロンの書いたルール、12表法は法律ではないと、賢者のものではない市民や都市はないと。

136 How indeed that ferocity of yours forced an entrance into the Old Academy I do not know ; but I cannot approve (b) those doctrines, not because they seem unsatisfactory to me (for most of the 'surprising arguments,' the so-called paradoxa. of the Stoics belong to Socrates), but where did Xenocrates hint at those views, or Aristotle (for you maintain that Xenocrates and Aristotle are almost identical) ? could they ever say that wise men alone are kings, alone wealthy, alone handsome, that all the things anywhere existing belong to the wise man, that no one is consul or praetor or general, no one even a police-magistrate, except the wise man, and finally that he only is a citizen and a free man, and that all those not wise are foreigners and exiles and slaves and madmen ? in fact that the rules given under the hand of Lycurgus and Solon, and our Twelve Tables, are not laws ? that there are no cities even nor states save those that are the work of wise men ?

137. Haec tibi, Luculle, si es assensus Antiocho, familiari tuo, tam sunt defendenda quam moenia: mihi autem bono modo, tantum quantum videbitur.

XLV.

Legi apud Clitomachum, cum Carneades et Stoicus Diogenes ad senatum in Capitolio starent, A. Albinum, qui tum P. Scipione et M. Marcello coss. praetor esset, eum qui cum avo tuo, Luculle, consul fuit, doctum sane hominem, ut indicat ipsius historia scripta Graece, jocantem dixisse Carneadi: 'Ego tibi, Carneade, praetor esse non videor, [quia sapiens non sum] nec haec urbs nec in ea civitas.' Tum ille: 'Huic Stoico non videris.' Aristoteles aut Xenocrates, quos Antiochus sequi volebat, non dubitavisset quin et praetor ille esset et Roma urbs et eam civitas incoleret. Sed ille noster est plane, ut supra dixi, Stoicus, perpauca balbutiens.

137 ルクルスさん、あなたはもしあなたの友人のアンティオコスの考え方を受け入れるのなら、あなたはローマの城壁を守ったのと同じように、この学説を守る必要があります。でも僕は自分の気に入っただけのんびりやるだけでいい。XL∨ 僕はクレイトマコスで読んだが、カルネアデスとストア派のディオゲネスがカピトリヌスの丘の元老院に来た時、執政官はプブリウス・スキピオとマルクス・マルケルスだったが、時の政務官アウルス・アルビヌスは(この人は、ルクルスさん、あなたの祖父が執政官の時の同僚だった人で、ギリシア語で書かれた彼の自伝を見れば、学識のあった人だと分かる)冗談でカルネアデスに次のように言った。「カルネアデスさん、あなたの考えでは、私は本当の政務官ではないし[私は賢者ではないから、]この町は都市でもないし住民は市民でもないのですね」と。するとカルネアデスは答えた「このストア派の友人(=ディオゲネス)にとってはそうですね」と。アンティオコスが自分はその後継者だというアリストテレスやクセノクラテスなら、彼が政務官であり、ローマが都市であり、市民が住んでいることに疑いを持たないだろう。しかし、僕達のアンティオコスは少々雄弁さには欠けるが今僕が言ったように完全にストア派の哲学者だ(=132)。

137 You, Lucullus, if you have accepted the views of your associate Antiochus, are bound to defend these doctrines as you would defend the walls of Rome, but I need only do so in moderation, just as much as I think fit. XLV. " I have read in Clitomachus that when  Carneades and the Stoic Diogenes (c) were on the Capitol attending on the senate, Aulus Albinus, who was praetor at the time, in the consulship of Publius Scipio and Marcus Marcellus, - he was a colleague of your grandfather, Lucullus, as consul, and his own history written in Greek shows him to have been a decidedly learned man, - said to Carneades in jest: ' In your view, Carneades, I am not a real praetor [because I am not a wise man (d)], nor is this a real city nor its corporation a real corporation.' 'In the view of our Stoic friend here you are not,' replied Carneades. Aristotle or Xenocrates, the masters of whom Antiochus made himself out to be a follower, would not have doubted either that Albinus was a praetor or Rome a city or its inhabitants a corporation ; but our friend Carneades, as I said above, is a downright Stoic, though stammering on a very few points.

138. Vos autem mihi veremini ne labar ad opinionem et aliquid asciscam et comprobem incognitum (quod minime voltis). Quid consilii datis? Testatur saepe Chrysippus tres solas esse sententias quae defendi possint de finibus bonorum, circumcidit et amputat multitudinem: aut enim honestatem esse finem aut voluptatem aut utrumque: nam qui summum bonum dicant id esse si vacemus omni molestia, eos invidiosum nomen voluptatis fugere, sed in vicinitate versari, quod facere eos etiam qui illud idem cum honestate conjungerent, nec multo secus eos qui ad honestatem prima naturae commoda adjungerent: ita tres relinquit sententias, quas putat probabiliter posse defendi.

138 一方、あなた達は僕が臆断を形成して自分の知らないことを受け入れて承認するのではないかと心配してくれている。それが望ましくないと思っている。では、どんな忠告をくれるのか? クリュシッポスはしばしば最高善のうちで擁護できる理論は三つだけだと言って、多くの説を切り捨てた。つまり、目的は高潔であるか(=ゼノン)、快楽であるか(=エピクロス)、その両方であるか(=カリッポン)だ。あらゆる苦痛から逃れることを最高善だという人達は、快楽という名前を忌まわしいものとして避けているが、似た方向に向かっている。快楽を高潔さと結びつけている人たちは同じ事をしているし、高潔さに本性の第一の利益を組み合わせている人も大して違ったことをしていない。だから、擁護できると思われる三つの説を残したのである。

138 As for yourselves however, seeing that I am afraid I may slip into forming opinions and adopt and approve something that I do not know (which you specially disapprove of), what advice do you give me ? Chrysippus often solemnly avows that from among possible views as to the chief good there are only three that can be defended - a crowd of others he lops off and discards : for he holds that the end is either moral goodness, or pleasure, or a combination of the two ; for those who say that the chief good consists in our being free from all trouble are trying (he says) to avoid the unpopular word ' pleasure,' but don't get very far away from it, and the same is also the case with those who combine freedom from trouble with moral goodness, nor is it very different with those who to moral goodness join the primary advantages of nature : thus he leaves three opinions that he thinks capable of a probable defence.

139. Sit sane ita, quamquam a Polemonis et Peripateticorum et Antiochi finibus non facile divellor, nec quicquam habeo adhuc probabilius―verum tamen video quam suaviter voluptas sensibus nostris blandiatur. Labor eo, ut assentiar Epicuro aut Aristippo. Revocat virtus vel potius reprehendit manu: pecudum illos motus esse dicit, hominem jungit deo. Possum esse medius, ut, quoniam Aristippus, quasi animum nullum habeamus, corpus solum tuetur, Zeno, quasi corporis simus expertes, animum solum complectitur, ut Calliphontem sequar, cujus quidem sententiam Carneades ita studiose defensitabat, ut eam probare etiam videretur. Quamquam Clitomachus affirmabat numquam se intellegere potuisse quid Carneadi probaretur. Sed, si istum finem velim sequi, nonne ipsa veritas et gravis et recta ratio mihi obversetur? 'Tune, cum honestas in voluptate contemnenda consistat, honestatem cum voluptate tamquam hominem cum belua copulabis?'

139 もしそうだとするなら、たとえ僕がポレモンとペリパトス派とアンティオコスの教える目的から離れがたいし、それ以上に真実らしいものに出会わなかったにもかかわらず、快楽がいかに感覚にとって甘美なものであるかを思わずにいられない。僕はエピクロスやアリスティッポスの説に同意してしまいそうだ。だが、美徳が僕を呼び止める。いやむしろその手で引き止める。美徳は快楽とは野獣の感情であるといい、美徳は人間を神と結びつけてくれる。おそらく可能な線はその中間にある。アリスティッポスがまるで精神がないかのように肉体だけを見るのと同じように、ゼノンが我々には肉体がないかのように精神だけを考えるのだ。だから、僕はカリッポンに従うべきだろう。彼の意見はカルネアデスはいつも熱心に擁護しているので、カルネアデスはカリッポンの意見に同意してると思われている(クレイトマコスはカルネアデスが何を受け入れたかはよく分からないといつも言っている)。しかし、もし僕がカリッポンの説に従うなら、真実の神と重々しくて正義感に満ちた理性が引き止めて、こういうのではないか。「高潔さは快楽を蔑視することであるのに、お前は高潔と快楽とをまるので人間と獣をめあわせるように結びつけるのか」と。

139 Suppose it is so, although I find it hard to be parted from the Ends of Polemo and the Peripatetics and Antiochus, and hitherto have got nothing more probable - but nevertheless I see how sweetly pleasure flatters our senses. I am slipping into agreeing with Epicurus or else Aristippus : virtue calls me back, or rather plucks me back with her hand ; she declares that those are the feelings of the beasts of the field, and she links the human being with god. A possible line is for me to be neutral, so that, as Aristippus looks only at the body, as if we had no mind, and Zeno takes into consideration only the mind, as if we were without a body, I should follow Calliphon, whose opinion indeed Carneades was constantly defending with so much zeal that he was thought actually to accept it (although Clitomachus used to declare that he had never been able to understand what Carneades did accept) ; but if I were willing to follow that End, would not truth herself and the weight of right reason meet me with the reply : 'What, when the essence of morality is to scorn pleasure, will you couple morality with pleasure, like a human being with a beast ? '

XLVI.

140. Unum igitur par quod depugnet reliquum est, voluptas cum honestate. De quo Chrysippo fuit, quantum ego sentio, non magna contentio. Alteram si sequare, multa ruunt et maxime communitas cum hominum genere, caritas, amicitia, iustitia, reliquae virtutes: quarum esse nulla potest, nisi erit gratuita. Nam quae voluptate quasi mercede aliqua ad officium impellitur, ea non est virtus, sed fallax imitatio simulatioque virtutis. Audi contra illos, qui nomen honestatis a se ne intellegi quidem dicant, nisi forte, quod gloriosum sit in volgus, id honestum velimus dicere: fontem omnium bonorum in corpore esse, hanc normam, hanc regulam, hanc praescriptionem esse naturae, a qua qui aberravisset, eum numquam quid in vita sequeretur habiturum.

140 結局、この一つの組み合わせ、快楽と高潔さを戦わせなければならないのだ。そしてこの問題にクリュシッポスは、僕の見る限り、それほど格闘して来なかった。もし人が快楽に従うのなら、多くのものが崩壊していしまうだろう。特に人間との付き合い、愛情、友情、正義などのもろもろの美徳が失われるだろう。これらのものは正直さを欠いては成立しないからである。というのは、美徳が快楽目当てで義務を行ったら、それはもはや美徳ではないからである。それは見せかけのごまかしであり、美徳のふりでしかない。それとは逆に美徳に何に意味も見いだせないと言う人達がいる。単に人前を取り繕うために道徳などという名前をつけるだけなのだ。あらゆる善の源泉は肉体の中にある。これが自然のルールであり基準であり命令なのだ。そこから外れてしまえば、人生で従うべき目的に決して到達することは出来ないと。

140 XLVI. There remains therefore one match to be fought off - pleasure versus moral worth : and on this issue Chrysippus, as far as I for my part can perceive, had not much of a struggle. If one should follow the former, many things fall in ruin, and especilly fellowship with mankind, affection, friendship, justice and the rest of the virtues, none of which can exist unless they are disinterested, for virtue driven to duty by pleasure as a sort of pay is not virtue at all but a deceptive sham and pretence of virtue. Hear on the opposite side those who say that they do not even understand what the word 'virtue' means, unless indeed we choose to give the name 'moral' to what looks well with the mob : that the source of all things good is in the body - this is nature's canon and rule and injunction, to stray away from which will result in a man's never having an object to follow in life.

141. Nihil igitur me putatis, haec et alia innumerabilia cum audiam, moveri? Tam moveor quam tu, Luculle, neque me minus hominem quam te putaveris. Tantum interest, quod tu, cum es commotus, acquiescis, assentiris, approbas, verum illud certum, comprehensum, perceptum, ratum, firmum, fixum esse vis, deque eo nulla ratione neque pelli neque moveri potes: ego nihil ejus modi esse arbitror, cui si assensus sim, non assentiar saepe falso, quoniam vera a falsis nullo discrimine separantur, praesertim cum judicia ista dialecticae nulla sint.

141 あなた達は僕がこうしていろんな人の無数の考え方を聞いているときに、全然それらに影響されないと思うのだろうか。ルクルスさん、僕はあなた達と同じくよく影響を受ける。だから、僕があなた達より人間味がなないと思わないでほしい。あなた達と僕とに違いがあるとすれば、あなた達は強く影響を受けたら、その事が確かで把握され知覚され正当され固定されたものだと思って同意したり受け入れたり承認したりして、そからどんなことがあっても引き離せないようになってしまうが、それに対して僕は逆に、もし僕が同意しても自分がしばしば虚偽なものに同意していることにならないようなものは何もないと考えている。というのは、真実は虚偽とはっきり区別できないからである。特にあなた達の言う論理的な基準など存在しないのである。

141 Do you people therefore suppose that when I am listening to these and countless other things, I am quite unaffected ? I am just as much affected as you are, Lucullus, pray don't think that I am less a human being than yourself. The only difference is that whereas you, when you have been deeply affected,acquiesce,assent,approve,hold that the fact is certain, comprehended, perceived, ratified, firm, fixed, and are unable to be driven or moved away from it by any reason, I on the contrary am of the opinion that there is nothing of such a kind that if I assent to it I shall not often be assenting to a falsehood, since truths are not separated from falsehoods by any distinction, especially as those logical criteria of yours are non-existent.

142. Venio enim iam ad tertiam partem philosophiae. Aliud judicium Protagorae est, qui putet id cuique verum esse, quod cuique videatur: aliud Cyrenaicorum, qui praeter permotiones intimas nihil putant esse judicii: aliud Epicuri, qui omne judicium in sensibus et in rerum notitiis et in voluptate constituit. Plato autem omne judicium veritatis veritatemque ipsam abductam ab opinionibus et a sensibus cogitationis ipsius et mentis esse voluit.

142 ここで哲学の第三の部門(=問答法)に移ろう。真実の基準の一つの見方はプロタゴラスのもので、その人に真実と思えるものがその人にとっての真実だというものである。もう一つはキレネ派のもので、内的感情以外にはどんな基準もないというものである。さらにもう一つは、エピクロスのもので、彼は判断の基準を全面的に感覚と事物の概念に置いている。一方、プラトンは、真実の基準と真実それ自体は人間の臆断と感覚とは区別されていて、思考と精神の活動に属しているという。

142 " For I come now to the third part of philosophy. One view of the criterion is that of Protagoras. who holds that what seems true to each person is true for each person, another is that of the Cyrenaics, who hold that there is no criterion whatever except the inward emotions, another that of Epicurus, who places the standard of judgement entirely in the senses and in notions of objects and in pleasure ; Plato however held that the entire criterion of truth and truth itself is detached from opinions and from the senses and belongs to the mere activity of thought and to the mind.

143. Num quid horum probat noster Antiochus? Ille vero ne majorum quidem suorum. Ubi enim aut Xenocratem sequitur, cujus libri sunt de ratione loquendi multi et multum probati, aut ipsum Aristotelem, quo profecto nihil est acutius, nihil politius? A Chrysippo pedem nusquam.

XLVII.

Quid ergo Academici appellamur? an abutimur gloria nominis? aut cur cogimur eos sequi, qui inter se dissident? In hoc ipso, quod in elementis dialectici docent, quo modo judicare oporteat verum falsumne sit, si quid ita conexum est, ut hoc, 'si dies est, lucet,' quanta contentio est! Aliter Diodoro, aliter Philoni, Chrysippo aliter placet. Quid? cum Cleanthe doctore suo quam multis rebus Chrysippus dissidet! quid? duo vel principes dialecticorum, Antipater et Archidemus, opiniosissimi homines, nonne multis in rebus dissentiunt?

143 僕達の友人のアンティオコスはこれらの教師たちのどれかの学説を受け入れていないだろうか。彼は逆に自分の学派の先輩たちのものは何も受け入れてはいない。クセノクラテスは論理学の本を何冊も書いて高く評価されているのに、アンティオコスはクセノクラテス(=アカデメイア派)を受け継いでいるところは全然ない。また、アリストテレスの学識と鋭さは誰にも勝るが、アンティオコスはアリストテレスの説も受け継いではいない。ところが、クリュシッポス(=ストア派)の言うことはほとんどそのまま受け入れている。XL∨II では、僕たちはアカデメイア派なのだろうか。この名誉ある名前をつけるのは間違いだろうか。一つの派の学者たちの間でも意見がわかれているのに、どうして僕達をその一派のどれかに所属させようとするのだろうか。問答者たちが教えるごく初歩的な事柄についても、「もし夜が明けたら、明るい」というような仮言命題について、真実と虚偽の判断の適当なやり方について、どれほどの論争が行われていることだろうか! ディオドロスとフィロンとクリュシッポスはそれぞれ全く異なる意見をもっているのである。だから、クリュシッポスと彼の師であるクレアンテスはどれほど多くの点で異なっているだろうか。アンティパトロスとアルキデーモス(アルケデモス=ストア派、前2世紀、タルソス出身)という二人の代表的な問答者たち、もっとも頑固な独断主義者も、多くの点で意見を異にしている。

143 Surely our friend Antiochus does not approve any doctrine of these teachers ? On the contrary he does not even accept anything from his own ancestors - for where does he follow either Xenocrates, who has many volumes on logic(a) that are highly thought of, or Aristotle himself, who is assuredly unsurpassed for acumen and finish ? He never diverges a foot's length from Chrysippus. XLVII. Why then are we called the Academics ? is our use of that glorious title a mistake ? Or why is the attempt made to force us to follow a set of thinkers who are divided among themselves ? Even on a matter that is among the very elements taught by the dialecticians, the proper mode of judging the truth or falsehood of a hypothetical judgement like ' if day has dawned, it is light,' what a dispute goes on ! Diodorus holds one view, Philo another, Chrysippus another. Then, how many points of difference there are between Chrysippus and his teacher Cleanthes ? Then, do not two of even the leading dialecticians, Antipater and Archidemus, the most obstinate dogmatists(a) of all  mankind, disagree on many things ?

144. Quid me igitur, Luculle, in invidiam et tamquam in contionem vocas? et quidem, ut seditiosi tribuni solent, occludi tabernas iubes? quo enim spectat illud, cum artificia tolli quereris a nobis, nisi ut opifices concitentur? qui si undique omnes convenerint, facile contra vos incitabuntur. Expromam primum illa invidiosa, quod eos omnis, qui in contione stabunt, exsules, servos, insanos esse dicatis: deinde ad illa veniam, quae iam non ad multitudinem, sed ad vosmet ipsos, qui adestis, pertinent. Negat enim vos Zeno, negat Antiochus scire quicquam. Quo modo? inquies: nos enim defendimus etiam insipientem multa comprehendere.

144 だから、ルクルスさん、どうしてあなたは僕を憎まれ者にしようとするのか。どうして僕を民会に呼び出して僕に喋らせて、僕に治安を乱す護民官の真似をさせて店を閉めさせるようなことをするのか。何が目当てで僕が実用的な技術を廃棄しようとしていると言って非難するのか。あなたは技術者たちを騒乱へとあおるつもりなのか。しかし、仮に彼らが全国から集まってきたとしても、彼らの抗議の声をあなた達に向けさせることは簡単だ。会議場に集まった民衆に向かってあなた達が彼らのことを亡命者だ奴隷だ気違いだと言っているといって、あなた達の不人気な学説は披露しておいてから、つぎに民衆ではなくあなた自身についての問題点を指摘しようと思う。「ゼノンとアンティオコスによれば、ルクルスさん、あなたは何も知ってはいないのだ。「どういう意味だ」とあなたは言うだろう、「我々は賢者でなくても多くのことを捉えることができると主張しているのだ」と。 

144 Why then, Lucullus, do you bring me into disfavour, and summon me before a public assembly, so to speak, and actually imitate seditious tribunes and order the shops to be shut ? for what is the object of your complaint that we are abolishing the practical sciences, unless it aims at stirring up the craftsmen ? But if they all come together from every quarter, it will be easy to stir them on to attack your side ! I shall first expound the unpopular doctrine that all the persons then standing in the assembly are on your showing exiles, slaves and madmen ; then I shall come to the point that concerns not the multitude but you yourselves now present : according to Zeno and according to Antiochus, you do not know anything ! ' What do you mean by that ? ' you will say ; ' for(というのは) what we maintain is that even the unwise man can comprehend many things.'
 
145. At scire negatis quemquam rem ullam nisi sapientem. Et hoc quidem Zeno gestu conficiebat. Nam, cum extensis digitis adversam manum ostenderat, 'visum,' inquiebat, 'huius modi est.' Deinde, cum paulum digitos contraxerat, 'assensus huius modi.' Tum cum plane compresserat pugnumque fecerat, comprehensionem illam esse dicebat: qua ex similitudine etiam nomen ei rei, quod ante non fuerat, καταληψιν[Greek: katalepsin] imposuit. Cum autem laevam manum adverterat et illum pugnum arte vehementerque compresserat, scientiam talem esse dicebat, cujus compotem nisi sapientem esse neminem. Sed qui sapientes sint aut fuerint ne ipsi quidem solent dicere. Ita tu nunc, Catule, lucere nescis nec tu, Hortensi, in tua villa nos esse.

145 ところが、あなた達は賢者以外の誰一人として何も知ってはいないと言っているのだ。このことをゼノンはよく身振りで証明した。というのは、彼はまず開いた手を差し出して見せ、「表象とはこのようなものだ」と言い、次に少し指を折り曲げて、「同意とはこのようなものだ」と言い、さらに指をしっかり閉じて拳をつくり、「把握とはこれだ」と言ったのだ。(そして彼はこの説明によってカタレープシスという、それまではなかった呼び名をこの過程に与えた)。さらに彼は左手を右手の拳に近づけて強く握りしめて、「知識とはこのようなもので、これは賢者以外の誰も手に入れることは出来ない」と言ったではないか。しかし、誰が賢者なのか、あるいは賢者であったのかは、彼らもまた語ることはなかった。だから、カトゥルス君、君はいま明るいことを知らないし、ホルテンシウスよ、君は僕達が君の別荘にいることを知らないのだ!

145 But you deny that anybody except the wise man knows anything ; and this Zeno used to demonstrate by gesture : for he would display his hand in front of one with the fingers stretched out and say ' A visual appearance is like this ' ; next he closed his fingers a little and said, ' An act of assent is like this ' ; then he pressed his fingers closely together and made a fist, and said that that was comprehension (and from this illustration he gave to that process the actual name of catalepsis, which it had not had before) ; but then he used to apply his left hand to his right fist and squeeze it tightly and forcibly, and then say that such was knowledge, which was within the power of nobody save the wise man - but who is a wise man or ever has been even they themselves do not usually say. On that showing you, Catulus, at the present moment, do not know that it is daytime, nor do you, Hortensius, know that we are at your countryhouse !

146. Num minus haec invidiose dicuntur? nec tamen nimis eleganter: illa subtilius. Sed quo modo tu, si nihil comprehendi posset, artificia concidere dicebas neque mihi dabas id quod probabile esset satis magnam vim habere ad artis, sic ego nunc tibi refero artem sine scientia esse non posse. An pateretur hoc Zeuxis aut Phidias aut Polyclitus, nihil se scire, cum in iis esset tanta sollertia? Quodsi eos docuisset aliquis quam vim habere diceretur scientia, desinerent irasci: ne nobis quidem suscenserent, cum didicissent id tollere nos, quod nusquam esset, quod autem satis esset ipsis relinquere. Quam rationem majorum etiam comprobat diligentia, qui primum jurare 'ex sui animi sententia' quemque voluerunt, deinde ita teneri 'si sciens falleret,' quod inscientia multa versaretur in vita, tum, qui testimonium diceret, ut 'arbitrari' se diceret etiam quod ipse vidisset, quaeque jurati judices cognovissent, ea non ut esse facta, sed ut 'videri' pronuntiarentur.

146 この話はあなたの説より不人気ではないだろうか? だが、ひどく魅力的でもない。あなたの説のほうがよく出来ている。しかし、もしあなたが言ったように、もし何も把握できないなら、芸術も技術も崩壊するし、そのためには真実らしさがあれば充分だという僕達の主張を認めないというなら、僕は知識がなければ芸術も学問も存在できないと答えよう。ゼウクシスもフィディアスもポリュクレイトスもあれだけの技術を持っているのに自分たちが無知だとは認めるだろうか? しかし知識によってどんな力が獲得できるかについてもし誰かが彼らに説明するなら、彼らも怒ることはやめるだろう。それどころか、僕たちはどこにも存在しないものを排除して彼らにとって必要十分なものだけを残してやっていることをよく説明したら、彼らは僕達に少しも怒ることはないだろう。この理論は僕達の祖先の忠告によっても支持されている。彼らは陪審に自分の良心に従って評決を下すように誓うことを求めたのだ。意識して嘘の評決を下した場合には後で偽証罪に問われると(なぜなら人生の多くのことは無意識下で発生するからである)。また証人となるものは、自分が目撃したと信じていると言い、陪審は宣誓して評決を下す時は、自分たちが確定した事実ではなく、事実であると思わる事を言わなければならない。

146 Surely these are not less unpopular arguments ? though they are not over-neatly put - the ones before were more clearly worked out. But just as you said (a) that if nothing can be comprehended, the practice of the arts and crafts collapses, and would not grant me that sufficient validity for this purpose is possessed by probability, so now I retort to you that art cannot exist without scientific knowledge. Would Zeuxis or Phidias or Polyclitus endure to admit that they knew nothing, when they possessed such great skill ? But if somebody explained to them what power is said to be possessed by knowledge, they would cease to be angry : indeed they would not feel a tinge of resentment even against us after it had been explained to them that we do away with a thing that nowhere exists but left to themselves what is sufficient for them. This theory is also supported by the precaution of our ancestors in requiring every juror to swear to give a verdict 'after the opinion of his own mind,' and afterwards to be held guilty of perjury 'if he gave a false verdict wittingly' (because much that was unwitting occurred in life), and then enacted that a witness giving evidence should say that he  'thought ' even something that he had himself seen, and that the jury giving their verdict on oath should declare not that the facts which they had ascertained ' had occurred ' but that they ' appeared to have.'

XLVIII.

147. Verum, quoniam non solum nauta significat, sed etiam Favonius ipse insusurrat navigandi nobis, Luculle, tempus esse et quoniam satis multa dixi, est mihi perorandum. Posthac tamen, cum haec quaeremus, potius de dissensionibus tantis summorum virorum disseramus, de obscuritate naturae deque errore tot philosophorum, qui de bonis contrariisque rebus tanto opere discrepant, ut, cum plus uno verum esse non possit, jacere necesse sit tot tam nobilis disciplinas, quam(=potiusを受ける) de oculorum sensuumque reliquorum mendaciis et de sorite aut pseudomeno, quas plagas ipsi contra se Stoici texuerunt."

XL∨III 147 ところで、ルクルスさん、僕達の船の船乗りたちが合図をしている。さらに西風が僕達に航海の時を告げている。それにもう僕は語り尽くした。だから話の仕上げをしよう。でも、後でこれらの問題を扱うときには、偉人たちの間に存在する大きな意見の違いと、自然の不明瞭さと、あらゆるこれらの哲学者達の間違い(善とその逆について彼らはまったく意見が異なっているのに、真実は一つしかないはずだから、多くの説は必然的に崩壊するはずだ)について率先して議論することにしよう(=『善悪の究極について』)。僕達の目やそれ以外の感覚が伝えるものは虚偽であるという話や、小麦の「山」(=49)や「嘘つき」(=95)が虚偽であるという話、つまりストア派が自ら陥った罠の話はもうやめておこう。」

147 XLVIII. " However, Lucullus, not only is our sailor signalling but even the west wind itself is whispering that it is time for us to be cruising, and also I have said enough ; so I ought to round off. On a later occasion however when we engage in these inquiries, let us by preference discuss the wide differences of opinion that exist among the men of greatest eminence, the obscurity of nature and the errors of all these philosophers (who disagree so violently about things good and their opposites (a) that, since there cannot be more than one truth, a large number of these famous systems must of necessity collapse), rather than the subject of the falsehoods told by our eyes and the rest of our senses, and the fallacies of 'the heap' (b) and 'the liar' (c) - traps that the Stoics have set to catch themselves."

148. Tum Lucullus : "Non moleste," inquit, "fero nos haec contulisse. Saepius enim congredientes nos, et maxime in Tusculanis nostris, si quae videbuntur, requiremus." "Optime," inquam," sed quid Catulus sentit? quid Hortensius?" Tum Catulus: "Egone?" inquit, "ad patris revolvor sententiam, quam quidem ille Carneadeam esse dicebat, ut percipi nihil putem posse, assensurum autem non percepto, id est opinaturum sapientem existimem, sed ita ut intellegat se opinari sciatque nihil esse quod comprehendi et percipi possit; quare εποχην[Greek: epochen] illam omnium rerum non probans, illi alteri sententiae, nihil esse quod percipi possit, vehementer assentior." "Habeo," inquam, "sententiam tuam nec eam admodum aspernor. Sed tibi quid tandem videtur, Hortensi?" Tum ille ridens "Tollendum!" "Teneo te," inquam "nam ista Academiae est propria sententia." Ita sermone confecto Catulus remansit: nos ad naviculas nostras descendimus.

148 そこでルクルスが言った「私達がこの話題について議論できたことはよかったと思う。これからも何度も私たちは会うだろう。特にトゥスクルムの私の家で会おう。そして、必要な問題について探求しよう。そこで僕が言った、「それはよかった。でも、カトゥルス君の見方はどうなんだろう。ホルテンシウスの見方は」。カトゥルスが言った「僕の見方かい? 僕は自分の父親の考え方に合わせるよ。父が言っていたことはカルネアデスと同じだ。だから、僕もまた何も知覚できないが、知覚していないものに賢者は同意すると思い始めている。つまり賢者は臆断する。ただし、それが臆断であることを理解していて、何も把握も知覚もできないことを知っていると。したがって、全てに対してエポケ(判断中止)をすることを受け入れることで、僕は『知覚できるものは何もない』という二つ目の考え方に強く同意する」。そこで僕は言った「僕もその考えだし、それが重要だと思う。でも、ホルテンシウス、君はどう思う?」。するとホルテンシウスは笑いながら言った「ずらかれ!」。僕は言った「君の言いたいことは分かった。それが真のアカデメイア派の考え方だ」。これで会話は終わった。カトゥルスはそこに残り、僕たちは船に乗りに行った。

148 " I am not sorry," rejoined Lucullus, " that we have debated these subjects ; in fact we will meet more frequently, and particularly at our places at Tusculum, to investigate such questions as we think fit." " Excellent," said I, " but what is Catulus's view ? and Hortensius's ? " " My view ? " replied Catulus ; " I am coming round to the view of my father, which indeed he used to say was that of Carneades, and am beginning to think that nothing can be perceived, but to deem that the wise man will assent to something not perceived, that is, will hold an opinion, but with the qualification that he will understand that it is an opinion and will know that there is nothing that can be comprehended and perceived ; and therefore although agreeing (a) with their rule of epoche as to everything,(b) I assent emphatically to that second view, that nothing exists that can be perceived." " I have your view," said I, " and I do not think it quite negligible ; but pray, Hortensius, what do you think ? " " Away with it ! "(c) he replied with a laugh. " I take you," said I, " for that is the true Academic verdict." The conversation thus concluded, Catulus stayed behind, while we went down to our boats.

Translated into Japanese by (c)Tomokazu Hanafusa 2012.3.6-2013.6.10

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